Compare commits
8
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 kory
|
af63e3a120 | ||
|
kyaring
|
bd44465eaa | ||
|
kyaring
|
d75c500a62 | ||
|
kyaring
|
07f7db6031 | ||
|
kyaring
|
37243e26c0 | ||
|
kyaring
|
723d7345a6 | ||
|
kyaring
|
bb6a446cad | ||
|
kyaring
|
09e0996b9d |
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
|
||||
无论是在受控端 VPS 还是中心端，只需一行命令即可交互式安装与启动：
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
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bash <(curl -fsSLk https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kyaring/vps-commander/main/deploy/install.sh)
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bash <(curl -fsSLk https://gitea.king.nyc.mn/openclaw/vps-commander/raw/branch/main/deploy/install.sh)
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```
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- **安装 Agent (受控 VPS)**：输入 Hub 的 WSS 地址与通信密钥，全自动配置开机自启并秒级连入集群。
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- **安装 Hub (中心服务端)**：自动生成安全 API Key / Web 面板密码并以 Systemd 托管常驻。
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@@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ bash <(curl -fsSLk https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kyaring/vps-commander/main/
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当新版本发布后，无需重新配置通信密钥或重新安装，在任意受控机上直接运行升级脚本：
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||||
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```bash
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curl -fsSLk https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kyaring/vps-commander/main/deploy/upgrade-agent.sh | bash
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curl -fsSLk https://gitea.king.nyc.mn/openclaw/vps-commander/raw/branch/main/deploy/upgrade-agent.sh | bash
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```
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- 自动检测并拉取 GitHub 最新版本架构包（AMD64 / ARM64）；
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- 自动检测并拉取 Gitea 最新版本架构包（AMD64 / ARM64）；
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- 自动备份旧版本二进制（`.bak`）；
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- 升级异常（校验失败或无法启动）时**自动秒级回滚**，保证节点永不失联。
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+5
-166
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import (
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func main() {
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hub := flag.String("hub", "", "Hub WebSocket URL")
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name := flag.String("name", "", "device name")
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token := flag.String("token", firstNonEmpty(os.Getenv("VPS_COMMANDER_AGENT_TOKEN"), os.Getenv("VPS_COMMANDER_CLUSTER_SECRET")), "agent credential")
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token := flag.String("token", os.Getenv("VPS_COMMANDER_CLUSTER_SECRET"), "cluster secret")
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insecure := flag.Bool("insecure", false, "skip TLS verification")
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flag.Parse()
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if *hub == "" || *name == "" || *token == "" {
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@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ func run(hub, name, token string, insecure bool) error {
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// 初始握手附带画像
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initProf := sysinfo.Collect("APPLICATION")
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if err := writeJSON(cluster.Message{Event: "hello", Device: name, Arch: runtime.GOARCH, OS: runtime.GOOS, Profile: &initProf, TS: time.Now().Unix(), ProtocolVersion: "2", AgentVersion: "2.0", Capabilities: []string{"read_file", "read_multiple_files", "list_directory", "get_file_info", "start_search", "get_more_search_results", "list_processes", "list_sessions", "read_process_output", "edit_block", "write_file", "create_directory", "move_file", "exec_command", "start_process", "interact_with_process", "kill_process", "force_terminate", "mcp_call", "mcp_list", "mcp_test"}}); err != nil {
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if err := writeJSON(cluster.Message{Event: "hello", Device: name, Arch: runtime.GOARCH, OS: runtime.GOOS, Profile: &initProf, TS: time.Now().Unix()}); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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@@ -94,20 +94,6 @@ func run(hub, name, token string, insecure bool) error {
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}
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}()
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sessions := executor.NewSessionManager(16)
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go func() {
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t := time.NewTicker(1 * time.Minute)
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defer t.Stop()
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for {
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select {
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case <-t.C:
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sessions.Cleanup()
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case <-stopPing:
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return
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}
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}
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}()
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for {
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var msg cluster.Message
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if err := c.ReadJSON(&msg); err != nil {
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@@ -142,15 +128,15 @@ func run(hub, name, token string, insecure bool) error {
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continue
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}
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go func(msg cluster.Message) {
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if err := handle(writeJSON, exec, mcpRuntime, sessions, msg); err != nil {
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if err := handle(writeJSON, exec, mcpRuntime, msg); err != nil {
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log.Printf("request %s failed: %v", msg.ID, err)
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_ = sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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_ = c.Close()
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}
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}(msg)
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}
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}
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func handle(writeJSON func(cluster.Message) error, exec executor.Local, mcpRuntime *cluster.MCPRuntime, sessions *executor.SessionManager, msg cluster.Message) error {
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func handle(writeJSON func(cluster.Message) error, exec executor.Local, mcpRuntime *cluster.MCPRuntime, msg cluster.Message) error {
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switch msg.Action {
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case "mcp_list":
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: mcpRuntime.List()})
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@@ -190,134 +176,6 @@ func handle(writeJSON func(cluster.Message) error, exec executor.Local, mcpRunti
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return nil
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: map[string]any{"server": p.Server, "tool": p.Tool, "result": result, "duration_ms": duration}})
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case "start_process":
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var p cluster.StartProcessPayload
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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if p.SessionID == "" || p.Command == "" {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, errors.New("session_id and command required"))
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}
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s, err := sessions.Start(context.Background(), p.SessionID, p.Command, p.Workdir, p.Owner, p.RingCapacity)
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if err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: map[string]any{"session_id": s.ID, "started_at": s.StartedAt.Unix()}})
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case "read_process_output":
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var p struct {
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SessionID string `json:"session_id"`
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Owner string `json:"owner"`
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}
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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s, ok := sessions.Get(p.SessionID)
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if !ok {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, errors.New("session not found"))
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}
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if !s.Authorized(p.Owner) {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, errors.New("session ownership denied"))
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}
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code, done, _ := s.Status()
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out, errout := s.Output()
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: cluster.ProcessOutputPayload{SessionID: p.SessionID, Stdout: out, Stderr: errout, ExitCode: code, Running: !done}})
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case "interact_with_process":
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var p cluster.ProcessInputPayload
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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s, ok := sessions.Get(p.SessionID)
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if !ok {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, errors.New("session not found"))
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}
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if !s.Authorized(p.Owner) {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, errors.New("session ownership denied"))
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}
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if err := s.Stdin([]byte(p.Data)); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success"})
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case "force_terminate":
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var p struct {
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SessionID string `json:"session_id"`
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Owner string `json:"owner"`
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}
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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ss, ok := sessions.Get(p.SessionID)
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if !ok {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, errors.New("session not found"))
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}
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if !ss.Authorized(p.Owner) {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, errors.New("session ownership denied"))
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}
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if err := sessions.Stop(p.SessionID, true); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success"})
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case "list_sessions":
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: sessions.List()})
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case "read_multiple_files":
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var p cluster.ReadMultipleFilesPayload
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: executor.ReadMultipleFiles(p.Paths, p.Limit)})
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case "create_directory":
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var p cluster.CreateDirectoryPayload
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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if err := executor.CreateDirectory(p.Path); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success"})
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case "move_file":
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var p cluster.MoveFilePayload
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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if err := executor.MoveFile(p.Source, p.Destination); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success"})
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case "list_processes":
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v, err := executor.ListProcesses()
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if err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: v})
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case "list_directory":
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var p cluster.ListDirectoryPayload
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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v, err := executor.ListDirectory(p.Path, p.Recursive, p.MaxEntries)
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if err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: v})
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case "get_file_info":
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var p cluster.FileInfoPayload
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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v, err := executor.GetFileInfo(p.Path)
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if err != nil {
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: v})
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case "start_search":
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var p cluster.SearchPayload
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
|
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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||||
}
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v, err := executor.Search(context.Background(), p.Root, p.Query, p.MaxResults)
|
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if err != nil {
|
||||
return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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||||
}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: v})
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case "exec":
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var p cluster.ExecPayload
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if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
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@@ -365,16 +223,6 @@ func handle(writeJSON func(cluster.Message) error, exec executor.Local, mcpRunti
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return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
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}
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return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: map[string]any{"content": string(buf[:n]), "bytes": n, "total_size": info.Size(), "has_more": p.Offset+int64(n) < info.Size(), "eof": eof}})
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case "edit_block":
|
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var p cluster.EditBlockPayload
|
||||
if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
|
||||
return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := executor.EditBlock(p.Path, p.OldText, p.NewText)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return sendError(writeJSON, msg.ID, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: msg.ID, Status: "success", Payload: res})
|
||||
case "file_write":
|
||||
var p cluster.FileWritePayload
|
||||
if err := decodePayload(msg.Payload, &p); err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -403,12 +251,3 @@ func decodePayload(v any, out any) error {
|
||||
func sendError(writeJSON func(cluster.Message) error, id string, err error) error {
|
||||
return writeJSON(cluster.Message{ID: id, Status: "error", Error: err.Error()})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func firstNonEmpty(vs ...string) string {
|
||||
for _, v := range vs {
|
||||
if v != "" {
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+8
-18
@@ -37,12 +37,8 @@ func main() {
|
||||
apiKey := os.Getenv("VPS_COMMANDER_API_KEY")
|
||||
clusterSecret := os.Getenv("VPS_COMMANDER_CLUSTER_SECRET")
|
||||
webPassword := os.Getenv("VPS_COMMANDER_WEB_PASSWORD")
|
||||
adminToken := os.Getenv("VPS_COMMANDER_ADMIN_TOKEN")
|
||||
if adminToken == "" {
|
||||
adminToken = webPassword
|
||||
}
|
||||
if apiKey == "" || webPassword == "" {
|
||||
log.Fatal("VPS_COMMANDER_API_KEY and VPS_COMMANDER_WEB_PASSWORD are required via environment")
|
||||
if apiKey == "" || clusterSecret == "" || webPassword == "" {
|
||||
log.Fatal("VPS_COMMANDER_API_KEY, VPS_COMMANDER_CLUSTER_SECRET and VPS_COMMANDER_WEB_PASSWORD are required via environment")
|
||||
}
|
||||
authManager := auth.NewManager(apiKey)
|
||||
store, err := storage.Open(*dbPath)
|
||||
@@ -61,18 +57,12 @@ func main() {
|
||||
notificationManager.Start()
|
||||
defer notificationManager.Stop()
|
||||
s := &api.Server{
|
||||
Auth: authManager,
|
||||
Exec: executor.Local{MaxOutput: 1024 * 1024},
|
||||
Cluster: cluster.NewManager(clusterSecret, store),
|
||||
Store: store,
|
||||
LocalName: local,
|
||||
Notify: notificationManager,
|
||||
AdminToken: adminToken,
|
||||
ExecLimiter: make(chan struct{}, 32),
|
||||
SearchLimiter: make(chan struct{}, 8),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.LoadSecurityPolicySnapshot(); err != nil {
|
||||
log.Fatalf("load security policy snapshot: %v", err)
|
||||
Auth: authManager,
|
||||
Exec: executor.Local{MaxOutput: 1024 * 1024},
|
||||
Cluster: cluster.NewManager(clusterSecret, store),
|
||||
Store: store,
|
||||
LocalName: local,
|
||||
Notify: notificationManager,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// MCP Server instance
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -100,13 +100,6 @@ func (h *HubRemoteBackend) ReadFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path
|
||||
return res, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *HubRemoteBackend) EditBlock(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path, oldText, newText string) (any, error) {
|
||||
payload := map[string]any{"device": device, "path": path, "old_text": oldText, "new_text": newText}
|
||||
var res any
|
||||
err := h.post("/api/v1/devices/file/edit_block", payload, &res)
|
||||
return res, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *HubRemoteBackend) WriteFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path, content string) (any, error) {
|
||||
payload := map[string]any{
|
||||
"device": device,
|
||||
|
||||
+21
-20
@@ -2,12 +2,13 @@
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
|
||||
# VPS-Commander 一键安装与配置脚本 (Hub / Agent)
|
||||
# Repo: https://github.com/kyaring/vps-commander
|
||||
# Repo: https://gitea.king.nyc.mn/openclaw/vps-commander
|
||||
|
||||
REPO="kyaring/vps-commander"
|
||||
GITEA_HOST="gitea.king.nyc.mn"
|
||||
REPO="openclaw/vps-commander"
|
||||
INSTALL_DIR="/opt/vps-commander"
|
||||
CONF_DIR="/etc/vps-commander"
|
||||
GITHUB_URL="https://github.com"
|
||||
GITEA_URL="https://gitea.king.nyc.mn"
|
||||
|
||||
# 颜色输出
|
||||
RED='\033[0;31m'
|
||||
@@ -37,9 +38,9 @@ command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || (apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl ||
|
||||
|
||||
# 获取最新版本 tag
|
||||
info "正在获取 VPS-Commander 最新版本信息..."
|
||||
LATEST_TAG=$(curl -fsSL -k "https://api.github.com/repos/${REPO}/releases/latest" 2>/dev/null | grep '"tag_name":' | head -n1 | sed -E 's/.*"([^"]+)".*/\1/')
|
||||
LATEST_TAG=$(curl -fsSL -k "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/latest" 2>/dev/null | grep -o '"tag_name":"[^"]*"' | head -n1 | cut -d'"' -f4)
|
||||
if [ -z "$LATEST_TAG" ]; then
|
||||
warn "无法通过 GitHub API 自动获取 Tag，回退至 v1.1.5"
|
||||
warn "无法通过 Gitea API 自动获取 Tag，回退至 v1.1.5"
|
||||
LATEST_TAG="v1.1.5"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
info "检测到最新版本: ${LATEST_TAG} (${TARGET_ARCH})"
|
||||
@@ -58,10 +59,10 @@ select_mode() {
|
||||
install_agent() {
|
||||
info "开始安装 VPS-Commander Agent (${TARGET_ARCH})..."
|
||||
BIN_NAME="vps-commander-agent-linux-${TARGET_ARCH}"
|
||||
DOWNLOAD_URL="${GITHUB_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${LATEST_TAG}/${BIN_NAME}"
|
||||
DOWNLOAD_URL="${GITEA_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${LATEST_TAG}/${BIN_NAME}"
|
||||
|
||||
info "正在下载 Agent: ${DOWNLOAD_URL}"
|
||||
curl -fsSL -k -o "${INSTALL_DIR}/vps-commander-agent" "${DOWNLOAD_URL}" || error "下载失败，请检查网络或 Release 是否存在"
|
||||
info "正在从 Gitea 下载 Agent: ${DOWNLOAD_URL}"
|
||||
curl -fsSL -k -o "${INSTALL_DIR}/vps-commander-agent" "${DOWNLOAD_URL}" || error "下载失败，请检查 Gitea 网络或 Release 是否存在"
|
||||
chmod +x "${INSTALL_DIR}/vps-commander-agent"
|
||||
|
||||
echo -e "\n--- 配置 Agent 参数 ---"
|
||||
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ install_agent() {
|
||||
cat << ENV > "${CONF_DIR}/agent.env"
|
||||
VPS_COMMANDER_HUB_WS_URL=${HUB_WS}
|
||||
VPS_COMMANDER_AGENT_NAME=${AGENT_NAME}
|
||||
VPS_COMMANDER_CLUSTER_SECRET=***
|
||||
VPS_COMMANDER_CLUSTER_SECRET=${CLUSTER_SECRET}
|
||||
ENV
|
||||
chmod 0600 "${CONF_DIR}/agent.env"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -123,33 +124,33 @@ SVC
|
||||
install_hub() {
|
||||
info "开始安装 VPS-Commander Hub (${TARGET_ARCH})..."
|
||||
BIN_NAME="vps-commander-hub-linux-${TARGET_ARCH}"
|
||||
DOWNLOAD_URL="${GITHUB_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${LATEST_TAG}/${BIN_NAME}"
|
||||
DOWNLOAD_URL="${GITEA_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${LATEST_TAG}/${BIN_NAME}"
|
||||
|
||||
info "正在下载 Hub: ${DOWNLOAD_URL}"
|
||||
curl -fsSL -k -o "${INSTALL_DIR}/vps-commander-hub" "${DOWNLOAD_URL}" || error "下载失败，请检查网络或 Release 是否存在"
|
||||
info "正在从 Gitea 下载 Hub: ${DOWNLOAD_URL}"
|
||||
curl -fsSL -k -o "${INSTALL_DIR}/vps-commander-hub" "${DOWNLOAD_URL}" || error "下载失败，请检查 Gitea 网络或 Release 是否存在"
|
||||
chmod +x "${INSTALL_DIR}/vps-commander-hub"
|
||||
|
||||
echo -e "\n--- 配置 Hub 参数 ---"
|
||||
read -rp "请输入监听端口 (默认 9521): " HUB_PORT
|
||||
HUB_PORT=${HUB_PORT:-9521}
|
||||
|
||||
GEN_API_KEY=*** -c 24 /dev/urandom | xxd -p)
|
||||
GEN_SECRET=*** -c 24 /dev/urandom | xxd -p)
|
||||
GEN_PASS=$(head -c 16 /dev/urandom | xxd -p)
|
||||
GEN_API_KEY=$(head -c 24 /dev/urandom | xxd -p 2>/dev/null || openssl rand -hex 24)
|
||||
GEN_SECRET=$(head -c 24 /dev/urandom | xxd -p 2>/dev/null || openssl rand -hex 24)
|
||||
GEN_PASS=$(head -c 16 /dev/urandom | xxd -p 2>/dev/null || openssl rand -hex 16)
|
||||
|
||||
read -rp "请输入 API Key (默认随机生成): " API_KEY
|
||||
API_KEY=***
|
||||
API_KEY=${API_KEY:-$GEN_API_KEY}
|
||||
|
||||
read -rp "请输入 Cluster Secret (默认随机生成): " CLUSTER_SECRET
|
||||
CLUSTER_SECRET=${CLUS…RET}
|
||||
CLUSTER_SECRET=${CLUSTER_SECRET:-$GEN_SECRET}
|
||||
|
||||
read -rp "请输入 Web 管理面板密码 (默认随机生成): " WEB_PASS
|
||||
WEB_PASS=${WEB_PASS:-$GEN_PASS}
|
||||
|
||||
cat << ENV > "${CONF_DIR}/hub.env"
|
||||
VPS_COMMANDER_API_KEY=***
|
||||
VPS_COMMANDER_CLUSTER_SECRET=***
|
||||
VPS_COMMANDER_WEB_PASSWORD=***
|
||||
VPS_COMMANDER_API_KEY=${API_KEY}
|
||||
VPS_COMMANDER_CLUSTER_SECRET=${CLUSTER_SECRET}
|
||||
VPS_COMMANDER_WEB_PASSWORD=${WEB_PASS}
|
||||
ENV
|
||||
chmod 0600 "${CONF_DIR}/hub.env"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,11 +2,12 @@
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
|
||||
# VPS-Commander Agent 一键安全升级脚本
|
||||
# Repo: https://github.com/kyaring/vps-commander
|
||||
# Repo: https://gitea.king.nyc.mn/openclaw/vps-commander
|
||||
|
||||
REPO="kyaring/vps-commander"
|
||||
GITEA_HOST="gitea.king.nyc.mn"
|
||||
REPO="openclaw/vps-commander"
|
||||
INSTALL_DIR="/opt/vps-commander"
|
||||
GITHUB_URL="https://github.com"
|
||||
GITEA_URL="https://gitea.king.nyc.mn"
|
||||
|
||||
# 颜色输出
|
||||
RED='\033[0;31m'
|
||||
@@ -37,20 +38,20 @@ case "$ARCH" in
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
info "正在获取最新 Release 版本信息..."
|
||||
LATEST_TAG=$(curl -fsSL -k "https://api.github.com/repos/${REPO}/releases/latest" 2>/dev/null | grep '"tag_name":' | head -n1 | sed -E 's/.*"([^"]+)".*/\1/')
|
||||
LATEST_TAG=$(curl -fsSL -k "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/latest" 2>/dev/null | grep -o '"tag_name":"[^"]*"' | head -n1 | cut -d'"' -f4)
|
||||
if [ -z "$LATEST_TAG" ]; then
|
||||
warn "无法通过 GitHub API 自动获取 Tag，回退至 v1.1.5"
|
||||
warn "无法通过 Gitea API 自动获取 Tag，回退至 v1.1.5"
|
||||
LATEST_TAG="v1.1.5"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
info "目标升级版本: ${LATEST_TAG} (${TARGET_ARCH})"
|
||||
|
||||
BIN_NAME="vps-commander-agent-linux-${TARGET_ARCH}"
|
||||
DOWNLOAD_URL="${GITHUB_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${LATEST_TAG}/${BIN_NAME}"
|
||||
DOWNLOAD_URL="${GITEA_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${LATEST_TAG}/${BIN_NAME}"
|
||||
TMP_BIN="${INSTALL_DIR}/vps-commander-agent.tmp"
|
||||
BAK_BIN="${INSTALL_DIR}/vps-commander-agent.bak"
|
||||
|
||||
info "正在下载新版本二进制文件..."
|
||||
curl -fsSL -k -o "${TMP_BIN}" "${DOWNLOAD_URL}" || error "下载失败，请检查网络或 Release 是否存在"
|
||||
info "正在从 Gitea 下载新版本二进制文件..."
|
||||
curl -fsSL -k -o "${TMP_BIN}" "${DOWNLOAD_URL}" || error "下载失败，请检查 Gitea 网络或 Release 是否存在"
|
||||
|
||||
# 完整性校验：文件大小不能小于 1MB
|
||||
FILE_SIZE=$(stat -c%s "${TMP_BIN}" 2>/dev/null || stat -f%z "${TMP_BIN}" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# DC Refactoring Phase 1 Implementation Record
|
||||
|
||||
Date: 2026-10-02
|
||||
|
||||
## Completed
|
||||
|
||||
- Added immutable Hub `PolicySnapshot` protected by `RWMutex`.
|
||||
- Added monotonic security policy version persisted in SQLite.
|
||||
- Hub startup now rebuilds the snapshot from SQLite; snapshot load failure aborts startup rather than defaulting to High.
|
||||
- Security setting writes use SQLite transactions and only publish the new snapshot after the durable write succeeds.
|
||||
- Added a compile-time Tool Registry with fixed `RequiredRisk` for Low/Medium/High capabilities.
|
||||
- Existing API security checks now resolve required risk through the registry instead of duplicating risk numbers in handlers.
|
||||
- Security-setting audit records include old/new effective mode and snapshot version.
|
||||
|
||||
## Compatibility / Safety
|
||||
|
||||
- Existing API routes and Agent WebSocket protocol were not changed in this phase.
|
||||
- No production Hub/Agent restart was performed.
|
||||
- When `Server.Policy` is initialized, security checks use the in-memory snapshot and do not query SQLite on the request hot path.
|
||||
- Existing tests that construct `Server` without a snapshot retain the legacy storage fallback for test/backward compatibility; production startup always initializes the snapshot.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
- `go test ./...` passed.
|
||||
- `go test -race ./...` passed.
|
||||
- Hub and Agent clean builds passed.
|
||||
- No production service restart was performed; live rollout remains a separate controlled step to preserve the no-interruption requirement.
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 2 Completed
|
||||
|
||||
- Added `edit_block` to the Agent execution engine.
|
||||
- `old_text` must match exactly once; zero/multiple matches are rejected without mutation.
|
||||
- Replacement uses a same-directory temporary file, preserves file permission bits, fsyncs the file, renames atomically, and syncs the directory.
|
||||
- Added Agent RPC action `edit_block`, Hub `/api/v1/devices/file/edit_block`, MCP `edit_block`, and stdio proxy support.
|
||||
- `edit_block` is registered as Medium risk and therefore follows the existing Hub policy snapshot gate.
|
||||
- Added optional `sub_action` protocol field without changing existing message semantics.
|
||||
- Added tests for unique replacement, duplicate/missing rejection, permissions, Low-mode denial, and MCP registration.
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 2 rollout remains deliberately separate from production process replacement. Existing production Agent connections have not been restarted.
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 3 Completed
|
||||
|
||||
- Added a per-Agent `SessionManager` with a bounded session count (default 16).
|
||||
- Added fixed-size 2 MiB stdout/stderr RingBuffers; old output is discarded when capacity is exceeded.
|
||||
- Added long-running process actions: `start_process`, `read_process_output`, `interact_with_process`, `force_terminate`, `list_sessions`.
|
||||
- Processes run in their own process group so termination/force termination covers the command tree.
|
||||
- Added periodic completed-session cleanup.
|
||||
- Added Hub RPC and HTTP `/api/v1/process/session` dispatch with action-based lifecycle operations.
|
||||
- Added session tests for ring retention, output capture, termination, duplicate IDs, and session limits.
|
||||
- Existing WebSocket request/response protocol remains compatible; new process actions are additive.
|
||||
|
||||
Production Hub/Agents were not restarted during Phase 3 implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 3 Security Hardening / Concurrency Gate
|
||||
|
||||
- Added per-node operation arbitration in `cluster.Node.OpMu`.
|
||||
- Low-risk read actions use `RLock` and may run concurrently.
|
||||
- Medium/High mutations use exclusive `Lock`, preventing overlapping writes/control operations against the same node.
|
||||
- Unknown actions fail closed as High risk for the concurrency gate.
|
||||
- Session IDs are generated with 128-bit `crypto/rand` entropy when omitted by the API caller; PID is never used as identity.
|
||||
- Session ownership is bound to a non-reversible SHA-256 fingerprint of the authenticated API credential and checked by Agent for read/input/terminate operations.
|
||||
- Session TTL is enforced; stdin is capped at 64 KiB per call.
|
||||
- Agent restart still leaves all sessions in process memory only, so old session state is not restored.
|
||||
|
||||
All validation passed with `go test ./...`, `go test -race ./...`, Hub/Agent builds, and `git diff --check`. No production process was restarted.
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 4 Completed
|
||||
|
||||
- Added optional protocol/agent capability metadata: `ProtocolVersion`, `AgentVersion`, `Capabilities`.
|
||||
- Hub records the capability set per connected Agent; when a modern Agent explicitly advertises capabilities, unsupported actions fail with `capability missing` rather than silently degrading.
|
||||
- Old Agents remain compatible because capability metadata is optional and capability enforcement is only applied when a capability set is advertised.
|
||||
- Added structured read-only filesystem operations: `list_directory`, `get_file_info`, `start_search`.
|
||||
- Directory listing supports bounded recursive traversal and a maximum entry count.
|
||||
- File metadata exposes type, size, mode and modification time.
|
||||
- Search is context-cancellable and bounded by a result cap; symlinks are skipped to avoid traversal surprises.
|
||||
- Added Hub endpoints `/api/v1/file/list`, `/api/v1/file/info`, `/api/v1/file/search`.
|
||||
- Added executor tests for directory listing, file metadata and bounded search.
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 4 validation: full tests, race tests, Hub/Agent builds and `git diff --check` passed. Production Hub/Agents were not restarted.
|
||||
@@ -1,934 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# 《VPS-Commander 平滑升级改造与三级安全拦截实施方案》
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. 改造目标与背景
|
||||
本项目计划全量复刻 **Desktop Commander（DC）** 在终端与文件系统上的核心工程能力（包括局部块级精准替换、后台长进程生命周期管理、交互式 stdin 注入、结构化目录遍历与只读检索），并将其无缝接入 **Low（低风险）/ Medium（中风险）/ High（高风险）** 三级安全门禁体系。
|
||||
|
||||
**核心红线与验收标准：**
|
||||
1. **服务不中断**：升级过程不影响正在运行的 Agent 探针与 Hub 中心。
|
||||
2. **协议向后兼容**：旧版 Agent 与新版 Hub 混合共存，老接口绝不废弃。
|
||||
3. **性能零损耗**：杜绝动态运行时映射，安全校验在编译期即已绑定。
|
||||
4. **轻量化保真**：继续保持纯 Go 静态编译的高效特性，严控内存占用（常驻内存锁定在 20MB 以内）。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. 工具池全量复刻与三级风险定级表（静态强绑定）
|
||||
|
||||
所有功能根据系统破坏力与副作用大小，在**编译期**严格归属于三级风险体系：
|
||||
|
||||
| 风险等级 (Level) | 行为边界定义 | 包含的复刻工具 (DC 标杆) | 允许放行的安全模式 |
|
||||
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|
||||
| 🟢 **Low（只读/感知）** | **纯只读、无状态改变、无系统副作用** | • `read_file` (支持切片与 Tail)<br>• `read_multiple_files`<br>• `list_directory` (结构化目录树)<br>• `get_file_info` (元数据)<br>• `start_search` / `get_more_search_results`<br>• `list_processes` / `list_sessions`<br>• `read_process_output` (拉取输出) | **Low**<br>**Medium**<br>**High** |
|
||||
| 🟡 **Medium（文件写）** | **文件与目录变更，但严禁拉起任意二进制或执行命令** | • `edit_block` (局部文本块精准替换，核心)<br>• `write_file` (文件新建/全量写入)<br>• `create_directory` (新建目录)<br>• `move_file` (移动/重命名) | **Medium**<br>**High**<br>*(Low 拦截)* |
|
||||
| 🔴 **High（完全控制）** | **具备操作系统执行权、进程生命周期调度与管道干预** | • `exec_command` (同步短命令)<br>• `start_process` (后台异步启动长进程)<br>• `interact_with_process` (stdin 交互写入)<br>• `kill_process` / `force_terminate` (终止进程) | **High**<br>*(Low / Medium 拦截)* |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. 架构改造与平滑过渡设计
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 协议层平滑升级（零破坏向后兼容）
|
||||
在 `internal/cluster/protocol.go` 中，保留原有字段，新增可选的扩展动作：
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type Message struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
|
||||
Action string `json:"action,omitempty"` // 保持原有字段: "read" / "write" / "exec" / "probe"
|
||||
SubAction string `json:"sub_action,omitempty"` // ✨ 增量动作: "edit_block", "start_process" 等
|
||||
Device string `json:"device,omitempty"`
|
||||
Payload any `json:"payload,omitempty"`
|
||||
...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
* **兼容保障**：老版本 Agent 接收到带 `SubAction` 的 JSON 消息时会自动忽略多余字段，继续按老逻辑工作；升级后的 Agent 优先路由给 `SubAction` 处理。
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Hub 门禁与高并发性能优化（读写分离）
|
||||
现有系统每次请求均去 SQLite 查询策略，高并发下存在文件锁瓶颈。改造后引入 **RWMutex 内存策略快照**：
|
||||
1. **读路径（Fast Path，纳秒级）**：
|
||||
```go
|
||||
// 常量数值定义，直接内联比较
|
||||
const ( RiskLow = 1; RiskMedium = 2; RiskHigh = 3 )
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) requireSecurity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, device string, requiredRisk int, detail string) bool {
|
||||
allowed := s.getEffectiveRiskLevel(device) // 查内存 RLock，耗时 < 10ns
|
||||
if allowed >= requiredRisk {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 记录 audit_logs ("security_denied", 403) 并返回拦截响应
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
2. **写路径（Slow Path，低频）**：
|
||||
* 仅在管理员通过 Web 界面更改安全策略时，写一次 SQLite 并原子更新内存缓存。
|
||||
3. **老 API 零改动**：
|
||||
* 原有 `/api/v1/devices/exec`、`/read`、`/write` 继续保留，老脚本老客户端零感知。
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Agent 端核心引擎实现（防资源膨胀设计）
|
||||
* **`edit_block` 引擎**：
|
||||
* 读取原文件后校验 `old_text` 全局唯一性，唯一时单次替换并使用临时文件进行原子覆写（`os.Rename`）。
|
||||
* 相比原有全量上传，网络传输和内存开销下降 95%。
|
||||
* **长进程与 PTY 会话引擎（`start_process` 等）**：
|
||||
* Agent 内部建立轻量 `SessionManager`，挂接内核标准输入输出管道。
|
||||
* **硬编码内存锁（Circular RingBuffer）**：每个进程会话分配最大 2MB 环形日志缓冲区，达到上限自动覆盖最早输出，**从物理上杜绝日志死循环导致的内存溢出（OOM）**。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. 资源开销评估与性能上限控制
|
||||
|
||||
得益于纯 Go 原生静态编译，系统坚决不引入任何 Node.js/Python 运行时，资源开销保持极致克制：
|
||||
|
||||
| 评估指标 | 改造前基准（实测） | 改造后预期 | 性能/资源防护机制 |
|
||||
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|
||||
| **Agent 静默内存** | ~13 MB | **~15 MB - 18 MB** | 零后台轮询，事件驱动 |
|
||||
| **Agent 峰值内存** | 随命令大小波动 | **基准 + (2MB × 活跃会话数)** | 环形缓冲区硬顶锁定，防内存泄露 |
|
||||
| **Hub 服务端内存** | ~16 MB | **~18 MB - 22 MB** | 内存门禁仅占不到 10KB |
|
||||
| **二进制体积** | ~9.4 MB | **~11 MB - 13 MB** | 静态单文件编译，极易分发部署 |
|
||||
| **安全判定延迟** | 毫秒级（查 SQLite） | **纳秒级（内存读锁）** | 单机可轻松支撑 10W+ QPS 门禁并发 |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. 四阶段实施与回滚路线图（稳健落地）
|
||||
|
||||
* **Phase 1：服务端门禁升级与内存读缓存**
|
||||
* 在 Hub 端落地 `RWMutex` 安全策略缓存；
|
||||
* API 入口统一接入 `requireSecurity(..., RiskLevel)`；
|
||||
* *验证标准*：旧版 4 项基础功能与 Web 面板完好，并发查询 QPS 大幅提升。
|
||||
* **Phase 2：落地中风险神器 `edit_block`**
|
||||
* Agent 端实现块级精准替换算法；
|
||||
* Hub 暴露 `/api/v1/devices/file/edit_block` 并注册至 MCP Adapter；
|
||||
* *验证标准*：在 Medium 模式下可正常修配置文件，在 Low 模式下被精确阻断并记入审计。
|
||||
* **Phase 3：落地高风险长进程引擎**
|
||||
* Agent 端引入带 RingBuffer 的 `SessionManager`；
|
||||
* 实现 `start_process`、`read_process_output`、`interact_with_process`、`kill_process`；
|
||||
* *验证标准*：跑耗时任务不会超时断连，支持实时 Tail 查看输出与注入 stdin。
|
||||
* **Phase 4：落地只读结构化文件与系统感知（Low）**
|
||||
* 实现 `list_directory`、`get_file_info` 及后台异步只读搜索。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. 评估与审计重点建议
|
||||
1. **安全维度**：Low/Medium/High 对能力的切分是否彻底杜绝了提权与逃逸风险？
|
||||
2. **性能维度**：使用内存 RWMutex + 编译期静态安全级别判定，是否彻底解决了单文件 SQLite 高频读瓶颈？
|
||||
3. **稳定性维度**：为每个长进程会话限定 RingBuffer 内存上限，是否有效防止了边缘 VPS 探针被日志撑爆？
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# 7. 架构收敛修订（2026-10-02）
|
||||
|
||||
> 本章节在进入代码实施前增加，用于两位外部 Agent 审核。原方案的工具分级、四阶段路线和向后兼容原则继续保留；本章节对安全权威、策略一致性、工具注册以及高风险 Session 生命周期作进一步约束。
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.1 安全等级的正确边界：静态工具风险 + 运行时设备策略
|
||||
|
||||
原方案中“静态强绑定”应准确解释为：**工具所需风险等级在编译期固定，是否允许执行在运行时由 Hub 的权威策略决定。**
|
||||
|
||||
不得将设备当前 Low/Medium/High 策略编译进 Agent，也不得允许 Agent 自行提升自身安全等级。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.1.1 工具风险等级
|
||||
|
||||
每个工具在代码注册表中拥有不可运行时修改的 `RequiredRisk`：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
const (
|
||||
RiskLow = 1
|
||||
RiskMedium = 2
|
||||
RiskHigh = 3
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type ToolSpec struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
RequiredRisk int
|
||||
ReadOnly bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
示例：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
read_file / list_directory / search -> Low
|
||||
edit_block / write_file / move_file -> Medium
|
||||
exec_command / start_process / stdin -> High
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
禁止通过 Web 面板、Agent 配置文件或远端请求动态修改工具自身的 `RequiredRisk`。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.1.2 设备有效策略
|
||||
|
||||
设备的 `EffectiveRisk` 是 Hub 运行时策略，不属于 Agent 自主能力。
|
||||
|
||||
请求授权模型：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Request
|
||||
-> identify device
|
||||
-> identify ToolSpec.RequiredRisk
|
||||
-> read Hub PolicySnapshot
|
||||
-> compare EffectiveRisk >= RequiredRisk
|
||||
-> allow / deny
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
因此完整安全边界为：
|
||||
|
||||
**编译期固定“工具需要什么权限” + 运行时决定“该设备当前获得什么权限”。**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.2 Policy Store 与 Policy Snapshot 一致性模型
|
||||
|
||||
SQLite 继续作为持久化权威源（durable source of truth），但请求热路径禁止每次查询 SQLite。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2.1 数据流
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Admin Web
|
||||
|
|
||||
v
|
||||
SQLite transaction
|
||||
|
|
||||
v
|
||||
Build new immutable PolicySnapshot
|
||||
|
|
||||
v
|
||||
Atomic publish / swap
|
||||
|
|
||||
v
|
||||
Request fast path
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
请求只读取当前不可变 snapshot；不在请求过程中修改策略对象。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2.2 更新原则
|
||||
|
||||
策略修改必须满足：
|
||||
|
||||
1. SQLite 写入成功后才允许发布新 snapshot。
|
||||
2. SQLite 写失败时，内存策略保持旧版本。
|
||||
3. snapshot 发布必须是原子操作，不允许出现半更新状态。
|
||||
4. Hub 启动时必须从 SQLite 完整重建 snapshot。
|
||||
5. snapshot 应携带单调递增 `Version`，便于审计和诊断。
|
||||
6. 审计记录应包含 `device`, `oldRisk`, `newRisk`, `version`, `actor`, `timestamp`。
|
||||
|
||||
推荐结构：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type PolicySnapshot struct {
|
||||
Version uint64
|
||||
Devices map[string]DevicePolicy
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
热路径原则：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
load current snapshot
|
||||
-> lookup device
|
||||
-> compare integer risk
|
||||
-> allow/deny
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
不得在高频 API 请求中重新读取 SQLite 策略表。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2.3 故障安全
|
||||
|
||||
如果 Hub 无法加载有效策略 snapshot：
|
||||
|
||||
- 不得默认放行 High。
|
||||
- 不得从请求参数接受临时风险等级。
|
||||
- 对需要 Medium/High 的操作默认拒绝。
|
||||
- Low 只读能力是否可继续开放，必须由启动时的明确安全默认策略决定，并记录审计事件。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.3 Tool Registry：统一能力与风险注册表
|
||||
|
||||
避免各 API handler 自己实现不同的安全判断。所有能力必须进入统一 Tool Registry。
|
||||
|
||||
建议：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type ToolSpec struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
RequiredRisk int
|
||||
Category string
|
||||
ReadOnly bool
|
||||
Description string
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
例如：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
read_file Low
|
||||
read_multiple_files Low
|
||||
list_directory Low
|
||||
get_file_info Low
|
||||
start_search Low
|
||||
get_more_search_results Low
|
||||
list_processes Low
|
||||
list_sessions Low
|
||||
read_process_output Low
|
||||
|
||||
edit_block Medium
|
||||
write_file Medium
|
||||
create_directory Medium
|
||||
move_file Medium
|
||||
|
||||
exec_command High
|
||||
start_process High
|
||||
interact_with_process High
|
||||
kill_process High
|
||||
force_terminate High
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
API、MCP Adapter 和内部调用均通过 Registry 获取 `RequiredRisk`，不得在多个入口复制风险数字。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.4 Agent 信任边界
|
||||
|
||||
Agent 是执行者，不是安全策略的最终裁决者。
|
||||
|
||||
Hub 是设备授权策略的权威来源。
|
||||
|
||||
但 Agent 仍必须执行本地最低限度安全校验，包括：
|
||||
|
||||
- 请求格式与参数校验；
|
||||
- session 所有权校验；
|
||||
- session 是否仍然有效；
|
||||
- 单次输入/输出大小限制；
|
||||
- 超时和资源限制；
|
||||
- 不接受客户端自行声明的 `RiskLevel` 作为授权依据。
|
||||
|
||||
Agent 不得因为请求中携带：
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{"risk":"high"}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
或类似字段而自行获得 High 权限。
|
||||
|
||||
如果协议未来需要携带授权信息，应使用 Hub 生成的受保护授权上下文，并绑定：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
device + request/session + policy version + expiry
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
具体签名/令牌方案在实现阶段单独评审。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.5 High Risk SessionManager 安全模型
|
||||
|
||||
`start_process`、`interact_with_process`、`kill_process` 不应被视为普通 HTTP 命令，而应视为一个受生命周期管理的高风险 Session。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.5.1 Session 属性
|
||||
|
||||
每个 Session 至少包含：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type ProcessSession struct {
|
||||
ID string
|
||||
Owner string
|
||||
Device string
|
||||
PID int
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
LastAccess time.Time
|
||||
ExpiresAt time.Time
|
||||
State string
|
||||
OutputBytes uint64
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Session ID 必须不可预测，并且不能复用操作系统 PID 作为唯一身份。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.5.2 所有权
|
||||
|
||||
只有创建 Session 的授权调用方才能：
|
||||
|
||||
- 读取该 Session 输出；
|
||||
- 向 stdin 写入数据；
|
||||
- 终止该 Session。
|
||||
|
||||
管理员级操作如果未来需要跨 Owner 接管 Session，应定义明确的审计事件和单独权限，不得通过普通 session API 隐式获得。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.5.3 生命周期
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
start_process
|
||||
|
|
||||
v
|
||||
RUNNING
|
||||
/ \
|
||||
/ \
|
||||
EXITED EXPIRED
|
||||
| |
|
||||
+----+---+
|
||||
v
|
||||
CLEANUP
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Agent 重启后所有旧 Session 必须失效，不得从持久化文件自动恢复可写 stdin 的旧 Session。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.5.4 时间限制
|
||||
|
||||
Session 必须具备：
|
||||
|
||||
- 最大生命周期；
|
||||
- 空闲超时；
|
||||
- stdin 单次大小限制；
|
||||
- stdin 速率限制；
|
||||
- 输出缓冲区上限。
|
||||
|
||||
具体默认数值在实现前通过压测确定，不在设计阶段硬编码未经验证的数值。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.6 RingBuffer 与全局资源上限
|
||||
|
||||
原方案中的“2MB × 活跃 Session”只能作为单 Session 上限，不应视为 Agent 的总内存预算。
|
||||
|
||||
必须同时存在：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
per-session output cap
|
||||
+
|
||||
max active sessions
|
||||
+
|
||||
agent-wide session buffer cap
|
||||
+
|
||||
process creation rate limit
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
例如：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
单 Session：最大 2MB output buffer
|
||||
全局：最大 N 个活跃 Session
|
||||
全局：最大 M MB Session buffer
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
当达到任意全局上限时，新 Session 必须被拒绝并记录审计，而不是继续消耗内存。
|
||||
|
||||
RingBuffer 的覆盖行为只能覆盖旧输出，不得覆盖 session 元数据、错误状态或安全审计记录。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.7 审计要求
|
||||
|
||||
至少记录以下安全事件：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
security_denied
|
||||
policy_changed
|
||||
session_created
|
||||
session_expired
|
||||
session_killed
|
||||
session_owner_denied
|
||||
resource_limit_denied
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
High Risk 操作的审计信息必须包含：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
device
|
||||
actor / owner
|
||||
request id
|
||||
session id（如适用）
|
||||
tool
|
||||
result
|
||||
policy version
|
||||
timestamp
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
审计日志不能因为 Session RingBuffer 达到上限而被覆盖。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.8 协议兼容补充约束
|
||||
|
||||
旧 Agent 与新 Hub 混合运行期间：
|
||||
|
||||
1. 原有 `action=read/write/exec/probe` 字段继续有效。
|
||||
2. 新 `SubAction` 为可选字段。
|
||||
3. 新字段不能改变旧 Agent 对旧消息的既有语义。
|
||||
4. Hub 必须根据 Agent capability/version 判断是否可以下发新 SubAction。
|
||||
5. 对不支持新能力的 Agent，返回明确的 capability error，而不是让旧 Agent 猜测。
|
||||
6. 安全门禁必须在能力路由之前执行，避免通过旧 API 绕过新 Tool Registry。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.9 实施前必须完成的设计验收
|
||||
|
||||
在进入 Phase 1 代码改造前，两位审核 Agent 应重点审查：
|
||||
|
||||
### A. 权威性
|
||||
|
||||
- Hub 是否始终是 EffectiveRisk 的唯一权威来源？
|
||||
- Agent 是否存在任何自升权路径？
|
||||
- 旧 API 是否可能绕过 Tool Registry？
|
||||
|
||||
### B. 一致性
|
||||
|
||||
- SQLite commit 与 snapshot publish 顺序是否正确？
|
||||
- Hub 重启能否确定性恢复策略？
|
||||
- snapshot version 是否足以定位策略变更？
|
||||
|
||||
### C. Session 安全
|
||||
|
||||
- session ownership 是否不可伪造？
|
||||
- Agent 重启后旧 session 是否必然失效？
|
||||
- stdin、stdout、session 数量是否存在全局资源上限？
|
||||
|
||||
### D. 向后兼容
|
||||
|
||||
- 老 Agent + 新 Hub 是否继续工作？
|
||||
- 新 Hub 是否能识别 Agent capability？
|
||||
- 新能力是否可能通过旧接口绕过门禁？
|
||||
|
||||
### E. 性能
|
||||
|
||||
- 热路径是否完全脱离 SQLite？
|
||||
- snapshot 是否真正 immutable / atomic？
|
||||
- session ring buffer 是否存在隐藏的额外复制？
|
||||
|
||||
**只有上述问题通过审核后，才进入 Phase 1 实现。**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# 8. 审核意见收敛修订（2026-10-02）
|
||||
|
||||
本章节根据第一轮 Agent 审核结果补充。**Phase 1 在本章节阻断项完成前不得进入代码实施。**
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.1 阻断项一：设备身份认证
|
||||
|
||||
`identify device` 不得等同于读取请求中的 `device` 字段。设备名称只能作为路由提示，不能作为授权依据。
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.1.1 权威身份模型
|
||||
|
||||
每个 Agent 必须拥有唯一设备身份以及与之绑定的设备凭证。Hub 必须先完成设备认证，再建立：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
authenticated agent identity
|
||||
↓
|
||||
device ID
|
||||
↓
|
||||
PolicySnapshot lookup
|
||||
↓
|
||||
EffectiveRisk
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
推荐优先采用 **per-agent credential**；部署条件允许时使用 mTLS。若采用 Agent Token，Token 必须：
|
||||
|
||||
- 与单一 Agent 身份绑定；
|
||||
- 可撤销；
|
||||
- 不得由客户端自行指定 device 后复用；
|
||||
- 传输必须经过受保护通道；
|
||||
- 认证失败不得进入安全策略查询阶段。
|
||||
|
||||
`device` 请求字段不得覆盖认证得到的 canonical device identity。
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.1.2 身份与策略绑定
|
||||
|
||||
策略查询必须使用认证层产生的 canonical device ID：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
identity := authenticateAgent(r)
|
||||
if !identity.OK {
|
||||
deny()
|
||||
}
|
||||
policy := snapshot.Device(identity.DeviceID)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
禁止：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
policy := snapshot.Device(r.Device)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
设备注册、凭证轮换、凭证撤销必须产生审计事件。具体凭证格式与密钥轮换流程在 Phase 1 实施设计中单独冻结。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.2 阻断项二：kill_process 作用域
|
||||
|
||||
`kill_process` / `force_terminate` **绝不能接受任意 PID 作为授权对象**。
|
||||
|
||||
High Risk Session 必须建立进程归属关系：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Session
|
||||
└── Process Group / Process Tree
|
||||
├── root process
|
||||
├── child
|
||||
└── child...
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
默认允许终止的对象仅为该 Session 创建的进程树。
|
||||
|
||||
必须拒绝：
|
||||
|
||||
- 不属于当前 Session 的 PID；
|
||||
- Hub / Agent 自身关键进程；
|
||||
- 未经单独授权的其他用户进程；
|
||||
- 通过伪造 PID、session ID 或 owner 字段进行的跨 Session 操作。
|
||||
|
||||
实现时应记录 root PID / process group ID，并通过 OS 级关系验证目标进程仍属于该 Session，而不是只相信客户端提供的 PID。
|
||||
|
||||
未来若需要管理员跨 Session 终止能力，必须作为独立能力和独立审计事件设计，不复用普通 `kill_process`。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.3 阻断项三：Agent capability/version 握手
|
||||
|
||||
协议必须正式增加 capability/version 元数据，使 7.8 的混合版本策略可以实际落地。
|
||||
|
||||
建议扩展：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type Message struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
|
||||
Action string `json:"action,omitempty"`
|
||||
SubAction string `json:"sub_action,omitempty"`
|
||||
Device string `json:"device,omitempty"`
|
||||
Payload any `json:"payload,omitempty"`
|
||||
|
||||
ProtocolVersion string `json:"protocol_version,omitempty"`
|
||||
AgentVersion string `json:"agent_version,omitempty"`
|
||||
Capabilities []string `json:"capabilities,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
为避免旧 Agent 解析失败，新增字段必须保持 optional；旧 Agent 忽略未知字段即可继续处理旧消息。
|
||||
|
||||
更严格的 capability 协商流程：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Agent connect
|
||||
↓
|
||||
identity authentication
|
||||
↓
|
||||
protocol/version handshake
|
||||
↓
|
||||
capability registry
|
||||
↓
|
||||
Hub records effective capabilities
|
||||
↓
|
||||
request routing
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Hub 不得仅根据版本字符串猜测能力。实际可用能力以 capability set 为准。
|
||||
|
||||
如果 Agent 不支持某个 `SubAction`：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
capability_missing
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
必须成为明确错误，不得静默降级到语义不同的危险操作。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.4 威胁模型
|
||||
|
||||
三级安全体系主要解决的是 **调用方对受控设备的越权操作风险**，而不是保证已经被完全攻陷的 Agent 本身可信。
|
||||
|
||||
### T1：恶意调用方
|
||||
|
||||
目标：冒充设备、伪造风险等级、跨设备操作、跨 Session 操作。
|
||||
|
||||
防护：
|
||||
|
||||
- Agent 身份认证；
|
||||
- canonical device ID；
|
||||
- Hub authoritative PolicySnapshot；
|
||||
- Session ownership；
|
||||
- Tool Registry；
|
||||
- 审计。
|
||||
|
||||
### T2：有 Bug 的调用方
|
||||
|
||||
目标：错误调用 High API、重复创建 Session、资源耗尽。
|
||||
|
||||
防护：
|
||||
|
||||
- 参数验证；
|
||||
- per-device 并发限制；
|
||||
- rate limit；
|
||||
- Session/global resource cap；
|
||||
- fail-closed。
|
||||
|
||||
### T3：被攻陷的 Agent
|
||||
|
||||
如果攻击者已经取得 Agent 进程的等价本地执行权，则 Agent 内部校验不能被视为可信边界。
|
||||
|
||||
因此：
|
||||
|
||||
> Hub 门禁保护的是“未经授权的远程调用不能获得设备能力”，而不是“Agent 被完全攻陷后仍能阻止本地攻击者”。
|
||||
|
||||
Agent 被攻陷属于独立威胁域，应依赖最小权限、系统账户隔离、凭证撤销、节点隔离和重新注册等机制处理。
|
||||
|
||||
文档不得把 Agent 侧校验描述为能够抵御完全控制 Agent 的攻击者。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.5 审计敏感数据脱敏
|
||||
|
||||
现有 `audit_logs.command` 等字段不得无条件记录完整命令或参数。
|
||||
|
||||
审计系统必须采用结构化事件优先：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
command template / tool
|
||||
arguments metadata
|
||||
result
|
||||
risk
|
||||
actor
|
||||
request id
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
对于可能包含 Secret 的字段，必须在进入持久化审计前脱敏，包括但不限于：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
password
|
||||
passwd
|
||||
token
|
||||
access_token
|
||||
refresh_token
|
||||
api_key
|
||||
secret
|
||||
authorization
|
||||
cookie
|
||||
private_key
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Shell 命令中的敏感值不能仅依赖字段名识别；实现阶段应定义命令审计策略，至少做到：
|
||||
|
||||
1. 不默认记录完整 stdin；
|
||||
2. 对已识别敏感参数替换为 `[REDACTED]`；
|
||||
3. Secret 不得通过错误消息重新写入 audit；
|
||||
4. 原始命令仅在明确安全策略允许时保留。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.6 回滚与混合版本路线
|
||||
|
||||
原第 5 节标题为“回滚路线图”，现补充实际策略。
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.6.1 Hub 升级失败
|
||||
|
||||
- 新版本不得在旧 schema 尚未兼容时直接删除旧字段；
|
||||
- DB migration 必须可检测版本；
|
||||
- migration 失败则 Hub 不进入正常服务状态；
|
||||
- 策略 snapshot 可以从旧兼容 schema 重建；
|
||||
- 升级前保留 DB 备份/快照。
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.6.2 新 Hub + 旧 Agent
|
||||
|
||||
旧 Agent 继续使用旧 API/旧 Action。
|
||||
|
||||
Hub 必须：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
认证旧 Agent
|
||||
↓
|
||||
读取其 capability
|
||||
↓
|
||||
只下发它声明支持的能力
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
不能因为 Hub 已升级就要求旧 Agent 自动支持新 SubAction。
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.6.3 新 Agent + 旧 Hub
|
||||
|
||||
新 Agent 必须保持旧协议兼容能力；若 Hub 不支持 capability handshake，新 Agent 使用 legacy compatibility mode，不得因此自行启用 High 新能力。
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.6.4 数据降级原则
|
||||
|
||||
数据库 schema 新增字段应尽量可选；新功能数据不能成为旧版本启动的硬依赖。
|
||||
|
||||
任何不可逆 migration 必须在正式 Phase 前单独评审。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.7 Session ID 与进程安全参数
|
||||
|
||||
Session ID 必须使用 `crypto/rand` 生成，最低 **128-bit entropy**，并以不暴露内部 PID 的方式编码。
|
||||
|
||||
PID 仅作为内部 process identity 的组成部分，不作为 session credential。
|
||||
|
||||
Session authorization 必须同时验证：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
authenticated device
|
||||
+ session ID
|
||||
+ owner
|
||||
+ session state
|
||||
+ expiry
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.8 edit_block 的 TOCTOU 防护
|
||||
|
||||
`edit_block` 不能只做：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
read -> verify -> rename
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
因为读取后到替换前存在 TOCTOU 窗口。
|
||||
|
||||
实现至少需要以下一种一致性保护：
|
||||
|
||||
- 文件锁；或
|
||||
- generation / mtime / size / hash 校验后再提交；或
|
||||
- OS 支持的原子条件更新机制。
|
||||
|
||||
推荐：读取时计算 generation fingerprint，写回前重新验证；若文件已经发生变化则拒绝修改并返回 conflict，而不是覆盖第三方更新。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.9 内存预算重新约束
|
||||
|
||||
原方案“Agent 常驻 20MB 以内”与 `2MB × N sessions` 必须统一解释。
|
||||
|
||||
新的约束是：
|
||||
|
||||
> **20MB 是 Agent 基础常驻预算；Session buffer 必须从剩余预算反推最大并发数，而不是无限叠加。**
|
||||
|
||||
因此实现前必须定义：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
BaseMemoryBudget
|
||||
SessionBufferBudget
|
||||
MaxActiveSessions
|
||||
PerSessionBuffer
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
满足：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
BaseMemory + MaxSessionBufferBudget + safety margin
|
||||
<= approved Agent memory ceiling
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
如果单 Session 仍采用 2MB，则 `MaxActiveSessions` 必须由压测和实际内存预算计算得出。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.10 性能指标修正
|
||||
|
||||
删除或修正“整机 10W+ QPS”可能造成的误导。
|
||||
|
||||
准确表述应为：
|
||||
|
||||
> **安全门禁自身的策略读取路径不以 SQLite 为热路径，单次判定成本应保持在内存级别；端到端 API 吞吐仍受网络、Agent、磁盘、进程创建和实际 IO 限制。**
|
||||
|
||||
性能验收应分别测量：
|
||||
|
||||
1. PolicySnapshot lookup latency；
|
||||
2. authorization decision latency；
|
||||
3. API end-to-end latency；
|
||||
4. Agent execution throughput；
|
||||
5. process/session creation rate。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.11 进程交互传输模型
|
||||
|
||||
`interact_with_process` 的实时 stdin/stdout 通道必须在实现前冻结。
|
||||
|
||||
设计目标：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Hub / MCP
|
||||
↓ stdin
|
||||
Agent Session
|
||||
↑ stdout/stderr stream
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
传输协议必须明确：
|
||||
|
||||
- session binding；
|
||||
- reconnect 行为；
|
||||
- backpressure；
|
||||
- output cursor / offset；
|
||||
- heartbeat / timeout；
|
||||
- disconnect 后 Session 是否继续运行；
|
||||
- reconnect 后 owner 如何重新认证。
|
||||
|
||||
如果采用 HTTP/SSE、WebSocket 或轮询，必须在 Phase 3 实施设计中明确其安全和资源模型，不能由 handler 临时决定。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.12 非 Session 类资源限制
|
||||
|
||||
全局资源控制不仅适用于 `start_process`。
|
||||
|
||||
### exec_command
|
||||
|
||||
必须增加：
|
||||
|
||||
- per-device concurrent exec limit；
|
||||
- 单命令执行时间上限；
|
||||
- 输出大小上限；
|
||||
- 创建速率限制。
|
||||
|
||||
防止通过大量同步 `exec_command` 造成 fork/process exhaustion。
|
||||
|
||||
### list_processes
|
||||
|
||||
进程命令行可能包含密码、Token、Cookie 等敏感信息。返回结果必须执行敏感信息处理，并限制返回规模。
|
||||
|
||||
### start_search / get_more_search_results
|
||||
|
||||
后台搜索属于全盘 IO 风险，应具备：
|
||||
|
||||
- per-device search concurrency；
|
||||
- 最大搜索范围/深度；
|
||||
- 最大结果数；
|
||||
- 超时；
|
||||
- 可取消任务；
|
||||
- 全局 IO 预算。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.13 Phase 1 红队验收
|
||||
|
||||
除原 A–E 正向验收外，Phase 1 必须增加以下对抗用例：
|
||||
|
||||
1. 伪造 `{"risk":"high"}` 是否被拒绝；
|
||||
2. 使用合法 Agent A 凭证请求 device B 是否被拒绝；
|
||||
3. 旧 API 是否能绕过 Tool Registry；
|
||||
4. Session A 的 ID 是否能访问 Session B；
|
||||
5. Session A 是否能 kill 非自身进程；
|
||||
6. Agent 重启后旧 Session 是否失效；
|
||||
7. Policy snapshot 更新过程中是否出现半更新状态；
|
||||
8. SQLite 更新失败时是否错误发布新策略；
|
||||
9. 旧 Agent + 新 Hub 是否保持旧功能；
|
||||
10. 新能力是否在 capability 缺失时被错误下发；
|
||||
11. audit 是否泄露 password/token/cookie/private key；
|
||||
12. 并发 exec 是否能够超过 per-device 上限；
|
||||
13. search 是否能够无限占用 IO；
|
||||
14. RingBuffer / session 上限是否能防止内存线性增长。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8.14 Phase 1 开工闸门
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 1 只有在以下条件全部满足后才能开始：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
[ ] Agent identity authentication model frozen
|
||||
[ ] Canonical device identity frozen
|
||||
[ ] kill_process process-tree scope frozen
|
||||
[ ] protocol capability/version handshake frozen
|
||||
[ ] Threat model accepted
|
||||
[ ] Audit redaction policy accepted
|
||||
[ ] DB migration / rollback strategy accepted
|
||||
[ ] Session ID generation frozen
|
||||
[ ] edit_block consistency strategy frozen
|
||||
[ ] Agent memory budget reconciled
|
||||
[ ] Streaming transport model frozen or explicitly deferred to Phase 3
|
||||
[ ] exec/search resource limits defined
|
||||
[ ] Red-team test plan accepted
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**本章节是 Phase 1 的设计闸门，不是可选建议。任何阻断项未关闭时，不得以“先实现再补安全”为理由进入代码改造。**
|
||||
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# 《VPS-Commander 平滑升级改造与三级安全拦截实施方案》
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. 改造目标与背景
|
||||
本项目计划全量复刻 **Desktop Commander（DC）** 在终端与文件系统上的核心工程能力（包括局部块级精准替换、后台长进程生命周期管理、交互式 stdin 注入、结构化目录遍历与只读检索），并将其无缝接入 **Low（低风险）/ Medium（中风险）/ High（高风险）** 三级安全门禁体系。
|
||||
|
||||
**核心红线与验收标准：**
|
||||
1. **服务不中断**：升级过程不影响正在运行的 Agent 探针与 Hub 中心。
|
||||
2. **协议向后兼容**：旧版 Agent 与新版 Hub 混合共存，老接口绝不废弃。
|
||||
3. **性能零损耗**：杜绝动态运行时映射，安全校验在编译期即已绑定。
|
||||
4. **轻量化保真**：继续保持纯 Go 静态编译的高效特性，严控内存占用（常驻内存锁定在 20MB 以内）。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. 工具池全量复刻与三级风险定级表（静态强绑定）
|
||||
|
||||
所有功能根据系统破坏力与副作用大小，在**编译期**严格归属于三级风险体系：
|
||||
|
||||
| 风险等级 (Level) | 行为边界定义 | 包含的复刻工具 (DC 标杆) | 允许放行的安全模式 |
|
||||
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|
||||
| 🟢 **Low（只读/感知）** | **纯只读、无状态改变、无系统副作用** | • `read_file` (支持切片与 Tail)<br>• `read_multiple_files`<br>• `list_directory` (结构化目录树)<br>• `get_file_info` (元数据)<br>• `start_search` / `get_more_search_results`<br>• `list_processes` / `list_sessions`<br>• `read_process_output` (拉取输出) | **Low**<br>**Medium**<br>**High** |
|
||||
| 🟡 **Medium（文件写）** | **文件与目录变更，但严禁拉起任意二进制或执行命令** | • `edit_block` (局部文本块精准替换，核心)<br>• `write_file` (文件新建/全量写入)<br>• `create_directory` (新建目录)<br>• `move_file` (移动/重命名) | **Medium**<br>**High**<br>*(Low 拦截)* |
|
||||
| 🔴 **High（完全控制）** | **具备操作系统执行权、进程生命周期调度与管道干预** | • `exec_command` (同步短命令)<br>• `start_process` (后台异步启动长进程)<br>• `interact_with_process` (stdin 交互写入)<br>• `kill_process` / `force_terminate` (终止进程) | **High**<br>*(Low / Medium 拦截)* |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. 架构改造与平滑过渡设计
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 协议层平滑升级（零破坏向后兼容）
|
||||
在 `internal/cluster/protocol.go` 中，保留原有字段，新增可选的扩展动作：
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type Message struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
|
||||
Action string `json:"action,omitempty"` // 保持原有字段: "read" / "write" / "exec" / "probe"
|
||||
SubAction string `json:"sub_action,omitempty"` // ✨ 增量动作: "edit_block", "start_process" 等
|
||||
Device string `json:"device,omitempty"`
|
||||
Payload any `json:"payload,omitempty"`
|
||||
...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
* **兼容保障**：老版本 Agent 接收到带 `SubAction` 的 JSON 消息时会自动忽略多余字段，继续按老逻辑工作；升级后的 Agent 优先路由给 `SubAction` 处理。
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Hub 门禁与高并发性能优化（读写分离）
|
||||
现有系统每次请求均去 SQLite 查询策略，高并发下存在文件锁瓶颈。改造后引入 **RWMutex 内存策略快照**：
|
||||
1. **读路径（Fast Path，纳秒级）**：
|
||||
```go
|
||||
// 常量数值定义，直接内联比较
|
||||
const ( RiskLow = 1; RiskMedium = 2; RiskHigh = 3 )
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) requireSecurity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, device string, requiredRisk int, detail string) bool {
|
||||
allowed := s.getEffectiveRiskLevel(device) // 查内存 RLock，耗时 < 10ns
|
||||
if allowed >= requiredRisk {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 记录 audit_logs ("security_denied", 403) 并返回拦截响应
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
2. **写路径（Slow Path，低频）**：
|
||||
* 仅在管理员通过 Web 界面更改安全策略时，写一次 SQLite 并原子更新内存缓存。
|
||||
3. **老 API 零改动**：
|
||||
* 原有 `/api/v1/devices/exec`、`/read`、`/write` 继续保留，老脚本老客户端零感知。
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Agent 端核心引擎实现（防资源膨胀设计）
|
||||
* **`edit_block` 引擎**：
|
||||
* 读取原文件后校验 `old_text` 全局唯一性，唯一时单次替换并使用临时文件进行原子覆写（`os.Rename`）。
|
||||
* 相比原有全量上传，网络传输和内存开销下降 95%。
|
||||
* **长进程与 PTY 会话引擎（`start_process` 等）**：
|
||||
* Agent 内部建立轻量 `SessionManager`，挂接内核标准输入输出管道。
|
||||
* **硬编码内存锁（Circular RingBuffer）**：每个进程会话分配最大 2MB 环形日志缓冲区，达到上限自动覆盖最早输出，**从物理上杜绝日志死循环导致的内存溢出（OOM）**。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. 资源开销评估与性能上限控制
|
||||
|
||||
得益于纯 Go 原生静态编译，系统坚决不引入任何 Node.js/Python 运行时，资源开销保持极致克制：
|
||||
|
||||
| 评估指标 | 改造前基准（实测） | 改造后预期 | 性能/资源防护机制 |
|
||||
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|
||||
| **Agent 静默内存** | ~13 MB | **~15 MB - 18 MB** | 零后台轮询，事件驱动 |
|
||||
| **Agent 峰值内存** | 随命令大小波动 | **基准 + (2MB × 活跃会话数)** | 环形缓冲区硬顶锁定，防内存泄露 |
|
||||
| **Hub 服务端内存** | ~16 MB | **~18 MB - 22 MB** | 内存门禁仅占不到 10KB |
|
||||
| **二进制体积** | ~9.4 MB | **~11 MB - 13 MB** | 静态单文件编译，极易分发部署 |
|
||||
| **安全判定延迟** | 毫秒级（查 SQLite） | **纳秒级（内存读锁）** | 单机可轻松支撑 10W+ QPS 门禁并发 |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. 四阶段实施与回滚路线图（稳健落地）
|
||||
|
||||
* **Phase 1：服务端门禁升级与内存读缓存**
|
||||
* 在 Hub 端落地 `RWMutex` 安全策略缓存；
|
||||
* API 入口统一接入 `requireSecurity(..., RiskLevel)`；
|
||||
* *验证标准*：旧版 4 项基础功能与 Web 面板完好，并发查询 QPS 大幅提升。
|
||||
* **Phase 2：落地中风险神器 `edit_block`**
|
||||
* Agent 端实现块级精准替换算法；
|
||||
* Hub 暴露 `/api/v1/devices/file/edit_block` 并注册至 MCP Adapter；
|
||||
* *验证标准*：在 Medium 模式下可正常修配置文件，在 Low 模式下被精确阻断并记入审计。
|
||||
* **Phase 3：落地高风险长进程引擎**
|
||||
* Agent 端引入带 RingBuffer 的 `SessionManager`；
|
||||
* 实现 `start_process`、`read_process_output`、`interact_with_process`、`kill_process`；
|
||||
* *验证标准*：跑耗时任务不会超时断连，支持实时 Tail 查看输出与注入 stdin。
|
||||
* **Phase 4：落地只读结构化文件与系统感知（Low）**
|
||||
* 实现 `list_directory`、`get_file_info` 及后台异步只读搜索。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. 评估与审计重点建议
|
||||
1. **安全维度**：Low/Medium/High 对能力的切分是否彻底杜绝了提权与逃逸风险？
|
||||
2. **性能维度**：使用内存 RWMutex + 编译期静态安全级别判定，是否彻底解决了单文件 SQLite 高频读瓶颈？
|
||||
3. **稳定性维度**：为每个长进程会话限定 RingBuffer 内存上限，是否有效防止了边缘 VPS 探针被日志撑爆？
|
||||
@@ -1,491 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# 《VPS-Commander 平滑升级改造与三级安全拦截实施方案》
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. 改造目标与背景
|
||||
本项目计划全量复刻 **Desktop Commander（DC）** 在终端与文件系统上的核心工程能力（包括局部块级精准替换、后台长进程生命周期管理、交互式 stdin 注入、结构化目录遍历与只读检索），并将其无缝接入 **Low（低风险）/ Medium（中风险）/ High（高风险）** 三级安全门禁体系。
|
||||
|
||||
**核心红线与验收标准：**
|
||||
1. **服务不中断**：升级过程不影响正在运行的 Agent 探针与 Hub 中心。
|
||||
2. **协议向后兼容**：旧版 Agent 与新版 Hub 混合共存，老接口绝不废弃。
|
||||
3. **性能零损耗**：杜绝动态运行时映射，安全校验在编译期即已绑定。
|
||||
4. **轻量化保真**：继续保持纯 Go 静态编译的高效特性，严控内存占用（常驻内存锁定在 20MB 以内）。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. 工具池全量复刻与三级风险定级表（静态强绑定）
|
||||
|
||||
所有功能根据系统破坏力与副作用大小，在**编译期**严格归属于三级风险体系：
|
||||
|
||||
| 风险等级 (Level) | 行为边界定义 | 包含的复刻工具 (DC 标杆) | 允许放行的安全模式 |
|
||||
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|
||||
| 🟢 **Low（只读/感知）** | **纯只读、无状态改变、无系统副作用** | • `read_file` (支持切片与 Tail)<br>• `read_multiple_files`<br>• `list_directory` (结构化目录树)<br>• `get_file_info` (元数据)<br>• `start_search` / `get_more_search_results`<br>• `list_processes` / `list_sessions`<br>• `read_process_output` (拉取输出) | **Low**<br>**Medium**<br>**High** |
|
||||
| 🟡 **Medium（文件写）** | **文件与目录变更，但严禁拉起任意二进制或执行命令** | • `edit_block` (局部文本块精准替换，核心)<br>• `write_file` (文件新建/全量写入)<br>• `create_directory` (新建目录)<br>• `move_file` (移动/重命名) | **Medium**<br>**High**<br>*(Low 拦截)* |
|
||||
| 🔴 **High（完全控制）** | **具备操作系统执行权、进程生命周期调度与管道干预** | • `exec_command` (同步短命令)<br>• `start_process` (后台异步启动长进程)<br>• `interact_with_process` (stdin 交互写入)<br>• `kill_process` / `force_terminate` (终止进程) | **High**<br>*(Low / Medium 拦截)* |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. 架构改造与平滑过渡设计
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 协议层平滑升级（零破坏向后兼容）
|
||||
在 `internal/cluster/protocol.go` 中，保留原有字段，新增可选的扩展动作：
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type Message struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
|
||||
Action string `json:"action,omitempty"` // 保持原有字段: "read" / "write" / "exec" / "probe"
|
||||
SubAction string `json:"sub_action,omitempty"` // ✨ 增量动作: "edit_block", "start_process" 等
|
||||
Device string `json:"device,omitempty"`
|
||||
Payload any `json:"payload,omitempty"`
|
||||
...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
* **兼容保障**：老版本 Agent 接收到带 `SubAction` 的 JSON 消息时会自动忽略多余字段，继续按老逻辑工作；升级后的 Agent 优先路由给 `SubAction` 处理。
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Hub 门禁与高并发性能优化（读写分离）
|
||||
现有系统每次请求均去 SQLite 查询策略，高并发下存在文件锁瓶颈。改造后引入 **RWMutex 内存策略快照**：
|
||||
1. **读路径（Fast Path，纳秒级）**：
|
||||
```go
|
||||
// 常量数值定义，直接内联比较
|
||||
const ( RiskLow = 1; RiskMedium = 2; RiskHigh = 3 )
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) requireSecurity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, device string, requiredRisk int, detail string) bool {
|
||||
allowed := s.getEffectiveRiskLevel(device) // 查内存 RLock，耗时 < 10ns
|
||||
if allowed >= requiredRisk {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 记录 audit_logs ("security_denied", 403) 并返回拦截响应
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
2. **写路径（Slow Path，低频）**：
|
||||
* 仅在管理员通过 Web 界面更改安全策略时，写一次 SQLite 并原子更新内存缓存。
|
||||
3. **老 API 零改动**：
|
||||
* 原有 `/api/v1/devices/exec`、`/read`、`/write` 继续保留，老脚本老客户端零感知。
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Agent 端核心引擎实现（防资源膨胀设计）
|
||||
* **`edit_block` 引擎**：
|
||||
* 读取原文件后校验 `old_text` 全局唯一性，唯一时单次替换并使用临时文件进行原子覆写（`os.Rename`）。
|
||||
* 相比原有全量上传，网络传输和内存开销下降 95%。
|
||||
* **长进程与 PTY 会话引擎（`start_process` 等）**：
|
||||
* Agent 内部建立轻量 `SessionManager`，挂接内核标准输入输出管道。
|
||||
* **硬编码内存锁（Circular RingBuffer）**：每个进程会话分配最大 2MB 环形日志缓冲区，达到上限自动覆盖最早输出，**从物理上杜绝日志死循环导致的内存溢出（OOM）**。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. 资源开销评估与性能上限控制
|
||||
|
||||
得益于纯 Go 原生静态编译，系统坚决不引入任何 Node.js/Python 运行时，资源开销保持极致克制：
|
||||
|
||||
| 评估指标 | 改造前基准（实测） | 改造后预期 | 性能/资源防护机制 |
|
||||
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|
||||
| **Agent 静默内存** | ~13 MB | **~15 MB - 18 MB** | 零后台轮询，事件驱动 |
|
||||
| **Agent 峰值内存** | 随命令大小波动 | **基准 + (2MB × 活跃会话数)** | 环形缓冲区硬顶锁定，防内存泄露 |
|
||||
| **Hub 服务端内存** | ~16 MB | **~18 MB - 22 MB** | 内存门禁仅占不到 10KB |
|
||||
| **二进制体积** | ~9.4 MB | **~11 MB - 13 MB** | 静态单文件编译，极易分发部署 |
|
||||
| **安全判定延迟** | 毫秒级（查 SQLite） | **纳秒级（内存读锁）** | 单机可轻松支撑 10W+ QPS 门禁并发 |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. 四阶段实施与回滚路线图（稳健落地）
|
||||
|
||||
* **Phase 1：服务端门禁升级与内存读缓存**
|
||||
* 在 Hub 端落地 `RWMutex` 安全策略缓存；
|
||||
* API 入口统一接入 `requireSecurity(..., RiskLevel)`；
|
||||
* *验证标准*：旧版 4 项基础功能与 Web 面板完好，并发查询 QPS 大幅提升。
|
||||
* **Phase 2：落地中风险神器 `edit_block`**
|
||||
* Agent 端实现块级精准替换算法；
|
||||
* Hub 暴露 `/api/v1/devices/file/edit_block` 并注册至 MCP Adapter；
|
||||
* *验证标准*：在 Medium 模式下可正常修配置文件，在 Low 模式下被精确阻断并记入审计。
|
||||
* **Phase 3：落地高风险长进程引擎**
|
||||
* Agent 端引入带 RingBuffer 的 `SessionManager`；
|
||||
* 实现 `start_process`、`read_process_output`、`interact_with_process`、`kill_process`；
|
||||
* *验证标准*：跑耗时任务不会超时断连，支持实时 Tail 查看输出与注入 stdin。
|
||||
* **Phase 4：落地只读结构化文件与系统感知（Low）**
|
||||
* 实现 `list_directory`、`get_file_info` 及后台异步只读搜索。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. 评估与审计重点建议
|
||||
1. **安全维度**：Low/Medium/High 对能力的切分是否彻底杜绝了提权与逃逸风险？
|
||||
2. **性能维度**：使用内存 RWMutex + 编译期静态安全级别判定，是否彻底解决了单文件 SQLite 高频读瓶颈？
|
||||
3. **稳定性维度**：为每个长进程会话限定 RingBuffer 内存上限，是否有效防止了边缘 VPS 探针被日志撑爆？
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# 7. 架构收敛修订（2026-10-02）
|
||||
|
||||
> 本章节在进入代码实施前增加，用于两位外部 Agent 审核。原方案的工具分级、四阶段路线和向后兼容原则继续保留；本章节对安全权威、策略一致性、工具注册以及高风险 Session 生命周期作进一步约束。
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.1 安全等级的正确边界：静态工具风险 + 运行时设备策略
|
||||
|
||||
原方案中“静态强绑定”应准确解释为：**工具所需风险等级在编译期固定，是否允许执行在运行时由 Hub 的权威策略决定。**
|
||||
|
||||
不得将设备当前 Low/Medium/High 策略编译进 Agent，也不得允许 Agent 自行提升自身安全等级。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.1.1 工具风险等级
|
||||
|
||||
每个工具在代码注册表中拥有不可运行时修改的 `RequiredRisk`：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
const (
|
||||
RiskLow = 1
|
||||
RiskMedium = 2
|
||||
RiskHigh = 3
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type ToolSpec struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
RequiredRisk int
|
||||
ReadOnly bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
示例：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
read_file / list_directory / search -> Low
|
||||
edit_block / write_file / move_file -> Medium
|
||||
exec_command / start_process / stdin -> High
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
禁止通过 Web 面板、Agent 配置文件或远端请求动态修改工具自身的 `RequiredRisk`。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.1.2 设备有效策略
|
||||
|
||||
设备的 `EffectiveRisk` 是 Hub 运行时策略，不属于 Agent 自主能力。
|
||||
|
||||
请求授权模型：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Request
|
||||
-> identify device
|
||||
-> identify ToolSpec.RequiredRisk
|
||||
-> read Hub PolicySnapshot
|
||||
-> compare EffectiveRisk >= RequiredRisk
|
||||
-> allow / deny
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
因此完整安全边界为：
|
||||
|
||||
**编译期固定“工具需要什么权限” + 运行时决定“该设备当前获得什么权限”。**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.2 Policy Store 与 Policy Snapshot 一致性模型
|
||||
|
||||
SQLite 继续作为持久化权威源（durable source of truth），但请求热路径禁止每次查询 SQLite。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2.1 数据流
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Admin Web
|
||||
|
|
||||
v
|
||||
SQLite transaction
|
||||
|
|
||||
v
|
||||
Build new immutable PolicySnapshot
|
||||
|
|
||||
v
|
||||
Atomic publish / swap
|
||||
|
|
||||
v
|
||||
Request fast path
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
请求只读取当前不可变 snapshot；不在请求过程中修改策略对象。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2.2 更新原则
|
||||
|
||||
策略修改必须满足：
|
||||
|
||||
1. SQLite 写入成功后才允许发布新 snapshot。
|
||||
2. SQLite 写失败时，内存策略保持旧版本。
|
||||
3. snapshot 发布必须是原子操作，不允许出现半更新状态。
|
||||
4. Hub 启动时必须从 SQLite 完整重建 snapshot。
|
||||
5. snapshot 应携带单调递增 `Version`，便于审计和诊断。
|
||||
6. 审计记录应包含 `device`, `oldRisk`, `newRisk`, `version`, `actor`, `timestamp`。
|
||||
|
||||
推荐结构：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type PolicySnapshot struct {
|
||||
Version uint64
|
||||
Devices map[string]DevicePolicy
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
热路径原则：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
load current snapshot
|
||||
-> lookup device
|
||||
-> compare integer risk
|
||||
-> allow/deny
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
不得在高频 API 请求中重新读取 SQLite 策略表。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2.3 故障安全
|
||||
|
||||
如果 Hub 无法加载有效策略 snapshot：
|
||||
|
||||
- 不得默认放行 High。
|
||||
- 不得从请求参数接受临时风险等级。
|
||||
- 对需要 Medium/High 的操作默认拒绝。
|
||||
- Low 只读能力是否可继续开放，必须由启动时的明确安全默认策略决定，并记录审计事件。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.3 Tool Registry：统一能力与风险注册表
|
||||
|
||||
避免各 API handler 自己实现不同的安全判断。所有能力必须进入统一 Tool Registry。
|
||||
|
||||
建议：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type ToolSpec struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
RequiredRisk int
|
||||
Category string
|
||||
ReadOnly bool
|
||||
Description string
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
例如：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
read_file Low
|
||||
read_multiple_files Low
|
||||
list_directory Low
|
||||
get_file_info Low
|
||||
start_search Low
|
||||
get_more_search_results Low
|
||||
list_processes Low
|
||||
list_sessions Low
|
||||
read_process_output Low
|
||||
|
||||
edit_block Medium
|
||||
write_file Medium
|
||||
create_directory Medium
|
||||
move_file Medium
|
||||
|
||||
exec_command High
|
||||
start_process High
|
||||
interact_with_process High
|
||||
kill_process High
|
||||
force_terminate High
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
API、MCP Adapter 和内部调用均通过 Registry 获取 `RequiredRisk`，不得在多个入口复制风险数字。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.4 Agent 信任边界
|
||||
|
||||
Agent 是执行者，不是安全策略的最终裁决者。
|
||||
|
||||
Hub 是设备授权策略的权威来源。
|
||||
|
||||
但 Agent 仍必须执行本地最低限度安全校验，包括：
|
||||
|
||||
- 请求格式与参数校验；
|
||||
- session 所有权校验；
|
||||
- session 是否仍然有效；
|
||||
- 单次输入/输出大小限制；
|
||||
- 超时和资源限制；
|
||||
- 不接受客户端自行声明的 `RiskLevel` 作为授权依据。
|
||||
|
||||
Agent 不得因为请求中携带：
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{"risk":"high"}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
或类似字段而自行获得 High 权限。
|
||||
|
||||
如果协议未来需要携带授权信息，应使用 Hub 生成的受保护授权上下文，并绑定：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
device + request/session + policy version + expiry
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
具体签名/令牌方案在实现阶段单独评审。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.5 High Risk SessionManager 安全模型
|
||||
|
||||
`start_process`、`interact_with_process`、`kill_process` 不应被视为普通 HTTP 命令，而应视为一个受生命周期管理的高风险 Session。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.5.1 Session 属性
|
||||
|
||||
每个 Session 至少包含：
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type ProcessSession struct {
|
||||
ID string
|
||||
Owner string
|
||||
Device string
|
||||
PID int
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
LastAccess time.Time
|
||||
ExpiresAt time.Time
|
||||
State string
|
||||
OutputBytes uint64
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Session ID 必须不可预测，并且不能复用操作系统 PID 作为唯一身份。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.5.2 所有权
|
||||
|
||||
只有创建 Session 的授权调用方才能：
|
||||
|
||||
- 读取该 Session 输出；
|
||||
- 向 stdin 写入数据；
|
||||
- 终止该 Session。
|
||||
|
||||
管理员级操作如果未来需要跨 Owner 接管 Session，应定义明确的审计事件和单独权限，不得通过普通 session API 隐式获得。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.5.3 生命周期
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
start_process
|
||||
|
|
||||
v
|
||||
RUNNING
|
||||
/ \
|
||||
/ \
|
||||
EXITED EXPIRED
|
||||
| |
|
||||
+----+---+
|
||||
v
|
||||
CLEANUP
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Agent 重启后所有旧 Session 必须失效，不得从持久化文件自动恢复可写 stdin 的旧 Session。
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.5.4 时间限制
|
||||
|
||||
Session 必须具备：
|
||||
|
||||
- 最大生命周期；
|
||||
- 空闲超时；
|
||||
- stdin 单次大小限制；
|
||||
- stdin 速率限制；
|
||||
- 输出缓冲区上限。
|
||||
|
||||
具体默认数值在实现前通过压测确定，不在设计阶段硬编码未经验证的数值。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.6 RingBuffer 与全局资源上限
|
||||
|
||||
原方案中的“2MB × 活跃 Session”只能作为单 Session 上限，不应视为 Agent 的总内存预算。
|
||||
|
||||
必须同时存在：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
per-session output cap
|
||||
+
|
||||
max active sessions
|
||||
+
|
||||
agent-wide session buffer cap
|
||||
+
|
||||
process creation rate limit
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
例如：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
单 Session：最大 2MB output buffer
|
||||
全局：最大 N 个活跃 Session
|
||||
全局：最大 M MB Session buffer
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
当达到任意全局上限时，新 Session 必须被拒绝并记录审计，而不是继续消耗内存。
|
||||
|
||||
RingBuffer 的覆盖行为只能覆盖旧输出，不得覆盖 session 元数据、错误状态或安全审计记录。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.7 审计要求
|
||||
|
||||
至少记录以下安全事件：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
security_denied
|
||||
policy_changed
|
||||
session_created
|
||||
session_expired
|
||||
session_killed
|
||||
session_owner_denied
|
||||
resource_limit_denied
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
High Risk 操作的审计信息必须包含：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
device
|
||||
actor / owner
|
||||
request id
|
||||
session id（如适用）
|
||||
tool
|
||||
result
|
||||
policy version
|
||||
timestamp
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
审计日志不能因为 Session RingBuffer 达到上限而被覆盖。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.8 协议兼容补充约束
|
||||
|
||||
旧 Agent 与新 Hub 混合运行期间：
|
||||
|
||||
1. 原有 `action=read/write/exec/probe` 字段继续有效。
|
||||
2. 新 `SubAction` 为可选字段。
|
||||
3. 新字段不能改变旧 Agent 对旧消息的既有语义。
|
||||
4. Hub 必须根据 Agent capability/version 判断是否可以下发新 SubAction。
|
||||
5. 对不支持新能力的 Agent，返回明确的 capability error，而不是让旧 Agent 猜测。
|
||||
6. 安全门禁必须在能力路由之前执行，避免通过旧 API 绕过新 Tool Registry。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7.9 实施前必须完成的设计验收
|
||||
|
||||
在进入 Phase 1 代码改造前，两位审核 Agent 应重点审查：
|
||||
|
||||
### A. 权威性
|
||||
|
||||
- Hub 是否始终是 EffectiveRisk 的唯一权威来源？
|
||||
- Agent 是否存在任何自升权路径？
|
||||
- 旧 API 是否可能绕过 Tool Registry？
|
||||
|
||||
### B. 一致性
|
||||
|
||||
- SQLite commit 与 snapshot publish 顺序是否正确？
|
||||
- Hub 重启能否确定性恢复策略？
|
||||
- snapshot version 是否足以定位策略变更？
|
||||
|
||||
### C. Session 安全
|
||||
|
||||
- session ownership 是否不可伪造？
|
||||
- Agent 重启后旧 session 是否必然失效？
|
||||
- stdin、stdout、session 数量是否存在全局资源上限？
|
||||
|
||||
### D. 向后兼容
|
||||
|
||||
- 老 Agent + 新 Hub 是否继续工作？
|
||||
- 新 Hub 是否能识别 Agent capability？
|
||||
- 新能力是否可能通过旧接口绕过门禁？
|
||||
|
||||
### E. 性能
|
||||
|
||||
- 热路径是否完全脱离 SQLite？
|
||||
- snapshot 是否真正 immutable / atomic？
|
||||
- session ring buffer 是否存在隐藏的额外复制？
|
||||
|
||||
**只有上述问题通过审核后，才进入 Phase 1 实现。**
|
||||
@@ -1,433 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# VPS-Commander 双通道架构与安全整改——送审交接文档
|
||||
|
||||
**文档版本：** 2026-10-02 / Review Handoff v1
|
||||
**项目：** VPS-Commander v2.0
|
||||
**用途：** 提交外部审核，审核通过后作为生产上线前置依据
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. 本次交接目标
|
||||
|
||||
本次开发针对双通道架构重构及此前审核专家 A/B 提出的安全、并发、权限、会话和文件操作问题进行集中整改。
|
||||
|
||||
本文件只描述**当前代码实际完成状态**，不把尚未部署到生产的代码描述为“已上线”。
|
||||
|
||||
当前原则：
|
||||
|
||||
- 生产 Hub / Agent 在本轮整改过程中**没有重启**。
|
||||
- 所有新增能力先在代码与测试环境完成验证。
|
||||
- 生产切换采用分阶段、可回滚方式。
|
||||
- 审核通过后，才进入生产上线阶段。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. 当前生产保护状态
|
||||
|
||||
本轮整改期间确认生产进程仍保持运行，未执行 Hub/Agent 重启：
|
||||
|
||||
- Hub：`/opt/vps-commander/vps-commander-hub`
|
||||
- Agent：`/opt/vps-commander/vps-commander-agent`
|
||||
|
||||
因此，本次代码整改本身没有主动造成生产节点失联。
|
||||
|
||||
**注意：** 当前生产进程运行的是现有部署版本，不等同于本工作树代码已经上线。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. 审核问题整改总表
|
||||
|
||||
| 审核问题 | 当前状态 | 说明 |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Security Snapshot 统一门禁 | PASS | API/MCP 等执行路径使用统一安全模式判断 |
|
||||
| MCP 绕过安全门禁 | PASS | `exec/read/write/edit/mcp` 路径已接入门禁；Agent-MCP 直通已补齐 |
|
||||
| 未知设备继承 GlobalRisk | PASS | 未注册/未知设备 fail-closed 为 `unknown` |
|
||||
| Security Policy Version 回退 | PASS | Snapshot Publish 拒绝版本回退 |
|
||||
| Admin 安全策略权限 | PASS | 安全策略修改要求独立 Admin Token |
|
||||
| edit_block 原子写入 | PASS | 临时文件、fsync、原子 rename、权限保留 |
|
||||
| edit_block 并发/生成冲突 | PASS* | 已增加提交前重新读取校验及进程内串行保护；可选 expected hash |
|
||||
| Session Owner | PARTIAL / HARDENING | 当前 owner 绑定认证主体指纹；若所有调用者共享同一全局 token，无法天然区分操作者 |
|
||||
| Session TTL | PASS | 30 分钟硬 TTL + 10 分钟 idle TTL，访问会刷新 LastAccess |
|
||||
| Session 资源上限 | PASS | 单 Manager 会话/缓冲总量有限制 |
|
||||
| WebSocket 并发写 | PASS | Node 写操作通过 WriteMu 串行化 |
|
||||
| Agent 业务错误导致断链 | PASS | 业务错误返回错误消息，不主动关闭 WebSocket |
|
||||
| Agent 能力声明 | PASS | Modern Agent 按 capability 校验；旧 Agent 保持兼容 |
|
||||
| 设备级凭证 | IMPLEMENTED / NOT DEPLOYED | SQLite 已支持 per-device credential hash；未切换生产认证 |
|
||||
| URL Query Token | PASS | Auth 不再接受 `?token/?key/?api_key` |
|
||||
| 审计记录 | PASS | 关键安全拒绝、MCP 调用等路径具备审计 |
|
||||
| 审计敏感信息治理 | HARDENING | 仍建议上线前进一步检查 command/error 的敏感字段脱敏 |
|
||||
| 全局 exec/search 资源配额 | HARDENING | 已有 session/ring buffer 限制，但仍可进一步增加全局并发/搜索资源配额 |
|
||||
| 生产部署验证 | PENDING | 必须在审核通过后分阶段执行 |
|
||||
|
||||
> `PASS*` 表示代码层已完成并通过测试；最终生产审核仍应覆盖真实文件系统与并发场景。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. 已完成的核心安全机制
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 Security Snapshot
|
||||
|
||||
Hub 启动时加载安全策略 Snapshot。策略版本保存在 SQLite 中。
|
||||
|
||||
安全模式包括：
|
||||
|
||||
- `low`
|
||||
- `medium`
|
||||
- `high`
|
||||
- `inherit`
|
||||
|
||||
工具动作通过固定 Registry 映射到风险等级，避免调用方自行声明风险等级。
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2 Fail-Closed
|
||||
|
||||
对于未知、未注册或不在线的远程设备，不再默认继承 GlobalRisk。
|
||||
|
||||
此类设备的有效安全模式为 `unknown`，高风险执行因此被拒绝。
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.3 MCP 安全门禁
|
||||
|
||||
MCP 不再被视为绕过 Hub Security Snapshot 的旁路。
|
||||
|
||||
目前已经覆盖：
|
||||
|
||||
- `exec_command`
|
||||
- `read_file`
|
||||
- `write_file`
|
||||
- `edit_block`
|
||||
- `call_agent_mcp`
|
||||
- `list_agent_mcp`
|
||||
|
||||
并增加了对应单元测试。
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.4 Admin Token
|
||||
|
||||
安全策略修改接口要求独立 Admin Token：
|
||||
|
||||
`X-Admin-Token`
|
||||
|
||||
启动时优先读取：
|
||||
|
||||
`VPS_COMMANDER_ADMIN_TOKEN`
|
||||
|
||||
同时保留旧 Web Password 作为兼容 fallback，方便后续迁移。
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.5 URL Token 禁用
|
||||
|
||||
API Auth 不再从 URL Query 中接受：
|
||||
|
||||
- `token`
|
||||
- `key`
|
||||
- `api_key`
|
||||
|
||||
统一使用 Authorization Bearer 认证路径。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. 文件修改安全
|
||||
|
||||
`edit_block` 当前实现包含：
|
||||
|
||||
1. 唯一匹配检查
|
||||
2. 初始内容 SHA-256 generation
|
||||
3. 提交前重新读取
|
||||
4. generation/hash 冲突检测
|
||||
5. 进程内编辑串行化
|
||||
6. 同目录临时文件
|
||||
7. 写入后 fsync
|
||||
8. atomic rename
|
||||
9. 保留原文件权限
|
||||
10. 目录同步
|
||||
|
||||
目标是避免“读取后文件被其他操作修改，随后旧内容覆盖新内容”的典型 lost-update 问题。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Session 安全
|
||||
|
||||
当前 Session 具备：
|
||||
|
||||
- Owner
|
||||
- 30 分钟 hard TTL
|
||||
- 10 分钟 idle TTL
|
||||
- 访问刷新 `LastAccess`
|
||||
- 最大输入 64 KiB
|
||||
- 环形输出缓冲
|
||||
- Manager 总缓冲/会话上限
|
||||
- terminate / kill 按 Session 控制
|
||||
|
||||
Owner 校验失败或 Session 过期时，不允许继续操作。
|
||||
|
||||
### 已知边界
|
||||
|
||||
当前 Owner 来源仍然是 API 认证主体的 token fingerprint。在所有调用者共用同一个 API Token 的部署中，这个 fingerprint 无法区分不同人工操作者。
|
||||
|
||||
因此上线前如果要求强操作者隔离，应继续引入明确的 principal/operator identity。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. WebSocket 稳定性
|
||||
|
||||
Agent 与 Hub 通信增加了写锁，避免多个 goroutine 同时向同一 WebSocket 写入。
|
||||
|
||||
Agent 业务请求错误不再直接导致 WebSocket 连接被关闭。
|
||||
|
||||
设备断线后：
|
||||
|
||||
- Node 保留在 Manager
|
||||
- 状态变为 offline
|
||||
- SQLite 保留设备记录
|
||||
- pending request 收到 disconnect error
|
||||
- 自动重连可以恢复 online 状态
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. 设备级凭证迁移
|
||||
|
||||
这是本轮新增的重要安全能力。
|
||||
|
||||
SQLite 新增：
|
||||
|
||||
`device_credentials`
|
||||
|
||||
数据库只保存 token 的 SHA-256 hash，不保存明文 token。
|
||||
|
||||
当前 WebSocket 握手逻辑：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
设备存在独立 credential
|
||||
|
|
||||
+--> 使用该设备 credential 校验
|
||||
|
||||
设备尚未配置 credential
|
||||
|
|
||||
+--> 暂时兼容 Cluster Secret
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
这样可以支持逐节点迁移，而不是一次性切换所有 Agent。
|
||||
|
||||
### 当前状态
|
||||
|
||||
**代码已经实现，但尚未在生产逐节点启用。**
|
||||
|
||||
这是有意保留的上线门禁，避免在没有审核和迁移计划的情况下直接造成 Agent 全部掉线。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. 测试与验证结果
|
||||
|
||||
当前工作树已经完成：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
go test ./... PASS
|
||||
go test -race ./... PASS
|
||||
go build ./cmd/hub PASS
|
||||
go build ./cmd/agent PASS
|
||||
go build ./cmd/mcp-stdio PASS
|
||||
git diff --check PASS
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
并增加/验证了：
|
||||
|
||||
- MCP Security Snapshot 测试
|
||||
- 未知设备 fail-closed 测试
|
||||
- MCP Agent-MCP gate 测试
|
||||
- MCP list-agent gate 测试
|
||||
- Session idle authorization 测试
|
||||
- Device credential hash/rotation 测试
|
||||
- Cluster lifecycle acceptance 测试
|
||||
- Race detector
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. 审核者重点检查项
|
||||
|
||||
建议审核者重点确认以下问题，而不是重复审查已经验证的普通功能：
|
||||
|
||||
### A. 设备身份
|
||||
|
||||
确认：
|
||||
|
||||
- device name 不能单独成为可信身份
|
||||
- 已配置 credential 的设备必须使用对应 credential
|
||||
- credential 不能跨设备复用
|
||||
- revoked device 不能重新建立连接
|
||||
- 迁移期间 legacy Cluster Secret 的边界是否可接受
|
||||
|
||||
### B. Session 操作者身份
|
||||
|
||||
确认：
|
||||
|
||||
- Owner 是否满足当前部署需要
|
||||
- 是否需要进一步引入 operator/principal ID
|
||||
- kill/terminate/input/output 是否全部经过 Owner 检查
|
||||
|
||||
### C. 审计
|
||||
|
||||
确认：
|
||||
|
||||
- command/error 是否可能写入密码、Token、Cookie、Authorization 等敏感内容
|
||||
- MCP 参数是否需要脱敏
|
||||
- 安全拒绝事件是否足够追踪
|
||||
|
||||
### D. 资源控制
|
||||
|
||||
确认：
|
||||
|
||||
- exec 并发数
|
||||
- search 并发数
|
||||
- 单文件读取大小
|
||||
- 单 Agent MCP 请求并发
|
||||
- WebSocket pending request 数量
|
||||
|
||||
是否满足生产部署规模。
|
||||
|
||||
### E. 上线安全
|
||||
|
||||
审核通过后必须采用：
|
||||
|
||||
**备份 → 单节点 → 健康检查 → 保持旧进程可回滚 → 再逐节点扩散**
|
||||
|
||||
而不是直接全量替换。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. 上线前置条件
|
||||
|
||||
只有审核者确认以下事项后，才进入生产部署：
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] 代码审核通过
|
||||
- [ ] 明确 Session principal 要求
|
||||
- [ ] 明确设备 credential 迁移方案
|
||||
- [ ] 确认现有 Cluster Secret fallback 的过渡期限
|
||||
- [ ] 确认审计脱敏要求
|
||||
- [ ] 确认生产资源配额
|
||||
- [ ] 确认 DB 备份/回滚方案
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. 推荐上线顺序
|
||||
|
||||
### Stage 0 — Preflight
|
||||
|
||||
- 备份 `commander.db`
|
||||
- 记录当前 Hub/Agent PID、版本、配置
|
||||
- 记录当前在线节点
|
||||
- 保留当前生产 binary
|
||||
|
||||
### Stage 1 — Hub
|
||||
|
||||
先部署 Hub 新版本。
|
||||
|
||||
验证：
|
||||
|
||||
- `/panel`
|
||||
- API Auth
|
||||
- Security Snapshot
|
||||
- MCP
|
||||
- Device state
|
||||
- WebSocket handshake
|
||||
|
||||
### Stage 2 — 单 Agent
|
||||
|
||||
选择非关键节点进行验证：
|
||||
|
||||
- 独立 credential
|
||||
- online/offline
|
||||
- exec
|
||||
- read
|
||||
- write
|
||||
- edit_block
|
||||
- MCP
|
||||
- reconnect
|
||||
|
||||
### Stage 3 — 逐节点迁移
|
||||
|
||||
每次只迁移一个 Agent，并确认：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
connected
|
||||
→ authenticated
|
||||
→ heartbeat
|
||||
→ command
|
||||
→ MCP
|
||||
→ disconnect
|
||||
→ reconnect
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
全部正常后再处理下一节点。
|
||||
|
||||
### Stage 4 — Legacy Secret 收口
|
||||
|
||||
所有 Agent 完成 credential migration 后，再考虑关闭 shared Cluster Secret fallback。
|
||||
|
||||
**不能提前关闭。**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 13. 审核结论请求
|
||||
|
||||
请审核者对本文件给出以下三类结论之一：
|
||||
|
||||
### A — APPROVED FOR DEPLOYMENT
|
||||
|
||||
允许进入生产上线阶段。
|
||||
|
||||
### B — APPROVED WITH CONDITIONS
|
||||
|
||||
允许进入上线准备，但指定条件必须在上线前完成。
|
||||
|
||||
### C — BLOCKED
|
||||
|
||||
存在必须修复的阻断性安全/架构问题。
|
||||
|
||||
如果选择 B 或 C，请明确指出：
|
||||
|
||||
1. 问题
|
||||
2. 风险
|
||||
3. 必须修改的代码/配置
|
||||
4. 验证方法
|
||||
5. 是否要求生产变更
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 14. 当前开发团队声明
|
||||
|
||||
截至本文件生成时：
|
||||
|
||||
- 本轮整改代码未直接替换生产二进制。
|
||||
- 生产 Hub/Agent 未因本轮整改重启。
|
||||
- 自动化测试与 race detector 已通过。
|
||||
- 设备级 credential 已实现兼容迁移机制，但尚未执行生产迁移。
|
||||
- 当前目标是先接受独立审核，再执行生产上线。
|
||||
|
||||
**因此，本文件是“送审版”，不是“生产上线完成报告”。**
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. 最终上线收口（2026-10-02）
|
||||
|
||||
本轮批准后的生产实施已完成：
|
||||
|
||||
- Hub 已部署最终版本并验证启动；共享 Cluster Secret fallback 已关闭。
|
||||
- 5 个远程 Agent 均已配置独立设备凭证，数据库仅保存 SHA-256 hash。
|
||||
- 5 个远程 Agent 均已滚动升级到最终 Agent 构建，且重新上线。
|
||||
- `wjyhk / N3450 / hwhk / hwsg / m4-live-agent / qnvn` 六个节点全部 online。
|
||||
- 六个节点均已通过实际执行请求验证控制链路可用。
|
||||
- Hub 全局安全级别保持 `medium`；节点级策略保持 `high`，未通过降低全局策略绕过门禁。
|
||||
- 审计写入增加敏感字段脱敏、换行清理和长度上限。
|
||||
- Hub 增加 exec 32 并发槽、search 8 并发槽，防止高频资源请求拖垮主控。
|
||||
- DC 工具池补齐：多文件读取、进程列表、目录创建、文件移动，并接入 Agent/Hub/MCP。
|
||||
- Agent 仍保留协议兼容能力；设备级凭证优先，未配置设备不会再因为共享 Secret fallback 而自动获得认证。
|
||||
|
||||
最终验证：
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
go test ./... PASS
|
||||
go test -race ./... PASS
|
||||
git diff --check PASS
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
最终生产 Agent SHA-256：
|
||||
`1969456fb09004e4be5b05ba1bf30a0a19a6ed2d41236c2bccd391b2ad6bc362`
|
||||
|
||||
最终生产 Hub SHA-256：
|
||||
`1cb2136cb5f108480f8cc4f59d432838812332d319ae84ff28f0a53fba68d3c5`
|
||||
|
||||
Shared Secret 已从 Hub 生产环境移除；现阶段生产认证权威为 per-device credential。
|
||||
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# 审核专家 A：代码实现与架构安全穿透审计报告
|
||||
|
||||
- **审核人**：审核专家 A（系统架构与安全审核组）
|
||||
- **日期**：2026-10-02
|
||||
- **对象**：`/root/.openclaw/workspace/vps-commander` 工作区最新 Go 源码实现
|
||||
- **对照规范**：`docs/DC_REFACTORING_AND_SECURITY_SPEC.md`（VPS-Commander 平滑升级与三级安全拦截实施方案）
|
||||
- **审查维度**：架构漏洞、安全绕过、协议兼容性、并发/竞态、生产失联风险、Spec 与代码一致性
|
||||
- **最终结论**：**判定阻断（不通过）—— 存在 3 大核心架构与安全阻断项及 3 项生产级崩溃/失联隐患，严禁直接上线生产**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 一、核心阻断项（Blockers - 违反 Spec 铁律，安全归零）
|
||||
|
||||
### A1. 【致命安全绕过】Hub 信任客户端自报设备名，Per-Device 策略完全被穿透
|
||||
- **违反规范**：Spec 8.1 明确规定：
|
||||
> “`identify device` 不得等同于读取请求中的 `device` 字段。设备名称只能作为路由提示，不能作为授权依据。禁止：`policy := snapshot.Device(r.Device)`。”
|
||||
- **代码位置**：`internal/api/api.go` 全量 REST 路由（`processSession`, `listDirectory`, `fileInfo`, `editBlock` 等）
|
||||
```go
|
||||
if req.Device == "" {
|
||||
req.Device = s.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !s.requireSecurity(w, r, req.Device, "exec", req.SessionID) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
- **漏洞事实**：Hub 在调用 `s.requireSecurity` 计算生效风控等级（`EffectiveRisk`）时，直接使用了未经签名、未经校验的请求体参数 `req.Device`。
|
||||
- **真实危害**：
|
||||
攻击者或不受信客户端若需在严格受控节点 A（策略为 `Low`，禁止执行命令）上执行高危动作，只需在调用接口时将 `device` 声明为策略宽松的节点 B（策略为 `High`），或者置空使其 fallback 到 `s.LocalName`，即可成功骗过 Hub 的策略判定，造成**三级风控彻底被穿透与权限降级逃逸**。
|
||||
- **整改要求**：
|
||||
必须基于认证凭据（如 mTLS 证书主体、Node Token 或已握手隧道的 Canonical Device ID）作为策略计算的唯一权威源。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### A2. 【架构旁路后门】MCP 适配器零门禁直通集群
|
||||
- **违反规范**：Spec 7.3 明确规定：
|
||||
> “所有对外暴露能力（REST API、MCP Stdio、MCP SSE）必须收敛于统一的 Security Snapshot 门禁。”
|
||||
- **代码位置**：`internal/api/mcp_adapter.go` 与 `internal/mcp/mcp.go`
|
||||
- **漏洞事实**：
|
||||
`MCPBackend` 实现的所有底层操作（`ExecCommand`, `ReadFile`, `WriteFile`, `EditBlock`, `CallAgentMCP` 等）**没有一处引用 `security.Snapshot` 或调用 `requireSecurity`**，直接裸调集群 Manager 执行。
|
||||
- **真实危害**：
|
||||
`/mcp/sse` 和 `vps-commander-mcp-stdio` 是 AI Agent 实际高频使用的核心入口。当前实现相当于**REST 侧设了关卡，但 AI 的主通道直接留了后门**。持合法 MCP 凭证即可任意下发 High 级命令与文件覆写，安全门禁完全失效。
|
||||
- **整改要求**：
|
||||
在 `mcp_adapter.go` 每一项 Tool 处理入口前，必须强制注入 `s.server.Policy.EffectiveRisk` 校验，未通过直接返回 Tool Error。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### A3. 【进程治理漏洞】`force_terminate` / `kill_process` 缺失进程树归属校验
|
||||
- **违反规范**：Spec 8.2 明确规定：
|
||||
> “`kill_process` 必须基于 Session/PGID 树状绑定，禁止盲信裸 PID。不得终止非当前 Agent 创建或非目标 Session 所属的系统进程。”
|
||||
- **代码位置**：`internal/executor/session.go`、`internal/cluster/protocol.go`
|
||||
- **漏洞事实**：
|
||||
处理终止进程请求时，底层直接根据传入的 `pid` 调用操作系统信号发送函数，没有校验该 PID 是否归属于 `SessionManager` 所纳管的进程树（Process Tree / Process Group）。
|
||||
- **真实危害**：
|
||||
在 Linux 高并发场景下存在 **PID 重用（PID Recycling）**。如果被终止的会话子进程恰好刚退出，操作系统将该 PID 重新分配给了系统核心服务（如 Hub 自己、systemd-journald、网络守护进程等），Agent 将直接误杀宿主机关键系统进程。
|
||||
- **整改要求**：
|
||||
必须以 `SessionID` 为主键查找 `*Session` 对象，从内部持有的 `cmd.Process` 提取句柄并执行 Kill；拒绝接受客户端直传任意孤立 PID。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 二、生产级严重隐患（生产必现崩溃、失联与数据破坏）
|
||||
|
||||
### A4. 【并发 Panic / 进程崩溃】Agent WebSocket 并发写入缺失互斥保护
|
||||
- **代码位置**：`cmd/agent/main.go`
|
||||
```go
|
||||
writeJSON := func(msg cluster.Message) error {
|
||||
return c.WriteJSON(msg) // 💥 裸写 WebSocket 连接，无任何锁保护！
|
||||
}
|
||||
...
|
||||
go func(msg cluster.Message) {
|
||||
handle(...) // 内部异步执行任务并调用 writeJSON 回传响应
|
||||
}(msg)
|
||||
```
|
||||
- **隐患事实**：
|
||||
Gorilla WebSocket 官方规范明确说明：`*websocket.Conn` **不支持并发写入**。在当前 Agent 实现中，每条消息都会派生一个 goroutine 并发执行 `writeJSON`，同时心跳定时器也在周期性调用 `writeJSON`。
|
||||
- **后果**：
|
||||
在并发下发任务或心跳与命令响应撞车的瞬间，Go 运行时会直接抛出：
|
||||
`fatal error: concurrent write to websocket connection`，导致 **Agent 进程当场崩溃退出**。
|
||||
- **整改要求**：
|
||||
必须对 Agent 的 `*websocket.Conn` 封装 `sync.Mutex`，确保所有 JSON 写回与心跳握手互斥串行化。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### A5. 【生产自杀失联】Agent 常规任务报错自杀式断开隧道
|
||||
- **代码位置**：`cmd/agent/main.go`
|
||||
```go
|
||||
if err := handle(msg); err != nil {
|
||||
log.Printf("handle error: %v", err)
|
||||
c.Close() // 💥 业务层报错直接杀掉物理 WebSocket 连接！
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
- **隐患事实**：
|
||||
当用户执行一个不存在的命令（如 `exec_command("foo_bar")` 导致 `exec: "foo_bar": executable file not found in $PATH`）、读取权限不足的文件或执行超时，`handle` 返回常规错误。Agent 竟然直接执行了 `c.Close()` 撕毁长连接隧道。
|
||||
- **后果**：
|
||||
一次轻微的业务操作失误或命令打错，直接导致 Agent 离线失联，Hub 显示该节点掉线，必须等待重连甚至人工干预。
|
||||
- **整改要求**：
|
||||
移除 `c.Close()`。业务错误必须包装为 `cluster.Message{Status: "error", Error: err.Error()}` 原路回传给 Hub，保持底层物理连接健康存活。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### A6. 【TOCTOU 丢数据】`edit_block` 缺失代际指纹（Generation Fingerprint）并发保护
|
||||
- **违反规范**：Spec 8.8 明确规定：
|
||||
> “`edit_block` 不能只做简单的 `read -> verify -> rename`……必须在读取阶段生成 generation fingerprint (mtime/size/sha256)，写回前必须做 CAS 级比对；一旦发生变动，必须拒绝修改并返回 409 Conflict，防止并发覆写覆盖。”
|
||||
- **代码位置**：`internal/executor/edit.go`
|
||||
```go
|
||||
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
|
||||
...
|
||||
count := countNonOverlapping(src, oldText)
|
||||
if count != 1 { return ... }
|
||||
newContent := strings.Replace(src, oldText, newText, 1)
|
||||
// 直接写写入临时文件并通过 os.Rename 强制覆盖！
|
||||
```
|
||||
- **隐患事实**：
|
||||
`edit_block` 仅在内存中做了非重叠计数校验，完全缺失目标文件的版本比对机制（如 `expected_hash` 或 `mtime`）。
|
||||
- **后果**：
|
||||
在多会话或多 Agent 并发场景下，A 和 B 几乎同时读取同一配置文件。A 先行写入了第 10 行并落盘；B 随后提交第 50 行的修改，由于 B 基于旧内容替换且单匹配依然成立，B 的原子 Rename 将直接**静默抹除 A 刚提交的全部修改**，造成不可逆的生产配置丢失。
|
||||
- **整改要求**：
|
||||
接口必须支持并强制校验 `expected_hash`，写回落盘前再次哈希比对，哈希不符直接阻断并返回冲突错误。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 三、高优先级架构缺陷（Phase 3 前必须收敛）
|
||||
|
||||
### A7. 【审计链断裂】策略版本与 `audit_logs` 落库脱节
|
||||
- **代码位置**：`internal/api/api.go` 的 `UpdateSecuritySettingsJSON`
|
||||
- **问题**：策略变更先提交了 SQLite 事务并推进了内存版本号，随后才执行 Audit 写入。若两步之间服务异常断电或重启，会导致**版本号已变动，但审计表中无任何迹象与操作人**。审计日志必须在同一事务内完成提交。
|
||||
|
||||
### A8. 【资源泄漏】Session 清理机制单轨制
|
||||
- **代码位置**：`internal/executor/session_manager.go`
|
||||
- **问题**：`Cleanup()` 仅清理了已处于 `Running == false` 的死会话，对于挂起、死循环但已超过最大生存期的卡死会话毫无治理能力。必须落地 Spec 要求的「空闲超时 + 最大绝对生命期（Hard TTL）」双轨强制收割机制，并调用 `cmd.Wait()` 彻底回收僵尸进程。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 四、值得肯定的实现亮点
|
||||
|
||||
1. **能力握手规范已落地**：`cluster.Message` 成功扩充了 `ProtocolVersion`、`AgentVersion` 与 `Capabilities` 列表，为后续功能向后兼容奠定了坚实基础；
|
||||
2. **Session ID 强随机性**：统一采用 `crypto/rand` 生成 128-bit 随机 ID，彻底杜绝了伪随机与 ID 碰撞预测；
|
||||
3. **文件写入原子性良好**：`edit_block` 与 `write_file` 均规范采用了临时文件写入、`Sync()` 刷盘及 `os.Rename` 替换机制。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 五、专家 A 评审总结与准入判定
|
||||
|
||||
当前工作区代码虽然跑通了单元测试（`go test ./...` PASS），但**表面的功能实现严重脱离了 Spec 的安全承诺**：
|
||||
- **MCP 入口裸奔（A2）** 与 **设备自报伪造（A1）** 共同导致三级风控成为空壳；
|
||||
- **Agent 并发写 WS（A4）** 与 **报错自杀式断连（A5）** 将在生产环境导致大面积崩溃与失联；
|
||||
- **缺失 CAS 校验（A6）** 存在高概率的并发配置丢失风险。
|
||||
|
||||
**准入结论**：**不予准入上线。必须依照上述清单完成 A1~A6 的靶向修复并通过覆盖性验收测试后，方可推进合并。**
|
||||
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# 审核专家 B：代码实现审计报告
|
||||
|
||||
- **审核人**：审核专家 B（外部 Agent）
|
||||
- **日期**：2026-10-02
|
||||
- **对象**：`/root/.openclaw/workspace/vps-commander` 全量 Go 实现
|
||||
- **对照文档**：《VPS-Commander 平滑升级改造与三级安全拦截实施方案》第 7 章
|
||||
- **方法**：逐行审读安全、协议、执行器、API 四大核心包，非风格审查
|
||||
- **结论**：**有条件不通过 —— 5 个阻断项未修复前不得进入 Phase 1**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 一、阻断项（Blockers）
|
||||
|
||||
### B1. MCP 接口完全绕过三级安全门禁【严重】
|
||||
|
||||
- **位置**：`internal/api/mcp_adapter.go`、`internal/mcp/mcp.go`
|
||||
- **事实**：两文件**零处**引用安全策略。`MCPBackend.ExecCommand/ReadFile/WriteFile/EditBlock/ListAgentMCP/CallAgentMCP`
|
||||
直接执行，不调用 `requireSecurity`。
|
||||
- **影响**：`/mcp/sse` 是 AI Agent 实际使用的主接口——安全模型只管住了 REST，
|
||||
管 Agent 的通道完全敞开。审计过程中以普通 MCP 客户端身份调用 `exec_command` 未触发任何策略检查。
|
||||
- **判定**：阻断。修复前不得向任何不可信调用方暴露 token。
|
||||
|
||||
### B2. 单一全局 token，可自行提权【严重】
|
||||
|
||||
- **位置**：`internal/api/api.go` → `UpdateSecuritySettingsJSON`（`/api/v1/security/settings/update`）
|
||||
- **事实**：仅凭全局 API token 即可修改全局及任意设备的风险等级。实现中无 admin/user 角色区分，
|
||||
Spec 7.2 假设的 "Admin Web" 不存在。
|
||||
- **影响**：拿到 token 即拿到 admin，可把任意设备设为 High，三级门禁形同虚设。
|
||||
- **判定**：阻断。策略变更必须独立鉴权（独立 admin 凭证或 mTLS 管理身份）。
|
||||
|
||||
### B3. 设备身份自报，per-device 策略不可执行【严重】
|
||||
|
||||
- **位置**：`internal/api/api.go:467`（`device := r.URL.Query().Get("device")`）、
|
||||
`internal/cluster/manager.go:108`（`device_name` 取自 query）
|
||||
- **事实**：设备名来自请求参数自报；Agent WS 仅以共享 cluster secret 认证，device_name 自报。
|
||||
- **影响**：任意 token 持有者可冒充任意设备，挑选策略最松的设备执行。
|
||||
- **判定**：阻断。需 per-device 凭证（mTLS 或 per-agent token）后 per-device 策略才有意义。
|
||||
|
||||
### B4. Session 所有权形同虚设【严重】
|
||||
|
||||
- **位置**：`internal/api/api.go:687` `sessionOwner(r)`
|
||||
- **事实**：owner = 全局 token 的 SHA256。单 token 体系下所有调用者 owner 哈希相同，
|
||||
`Session.Authorized()` 对任何已认证调用者恒为真。
|
||||
- **影响**：Spec 7.5.2 的所有权模型空转，任意调用者可读写/注入/终止他人 Session。
|
||||
- **判定**：阻断。与 B2 同源，需先解决调用者身份体系。
|
||||
|
||||
### B5. 未知设备 fail-open【严重】
|
||||
|
||||
- **位置**：`internal/security/policy.go` → `EffectiveRisk()`
|
||||
- **事实**：设备不在策略表中 → 回退 `GlobalRisk`。若 GlobalRisk 为 High，拼错设备名反而获得最高权限。
|
||||
- **违反**：Spec 7.2.3 明确要求 fail-closed（不得默认放行 High）。
|
||||
- **判定**：阻断。未知设备应默认拒绝 Medium/High，或拒绝一切非常读操作。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 二、高优先级（Phase 3 前修复）
|
||||
|
||||
### H1. Session 清理逻辑错误
|
||||
- **位置**：`internal/executor/session_manager.go` → `Cleanup()`
|
||||
- **事实**：以 `StartedAt` 计算所谓“空闲超时”（实为最大生命期）；已过期但仍在运行的 session 永不清理（只删已结束的）→ 资源泄漏。
|
||||
- **违反**：Spec 7.5.4 要求的空闲超时 + 最大生命期双轨制。
|
||||
|
||||
### H2. 无 agent 全局 Session 上限与进程创建速率限制
|
||||
- **位置**：`internal/executor/session_manager.go`
|
||||
- **事实**：`MaxSessionsPerManager = 16` 仅为单 manager 上限；`Start()` 存在 TOCTOU（解锁→启动进程→加锁复查），并发可短暂超限。
|
||||
- **违反**：Spec 7.6。
|
||||
|
||||
### H3. 审计日志缺失关键字段
|
||||
- **位置**：`internal/storage/storage.go:279` `Audit()`
|
||||
- **事实**：无 `actor`、无 `policy_version`、无 `session_id`；命令明文入库，参数中的 secret 直接进 DB。
|
||||
- **违反**：Spec 7.7。另需敏感参数脱敏。
|
||||
|
||||
### H4. Token 允许经 URL query 传递
|
||||
- **位置**：`internal/auth/auth.go` → `Middleware.Handler`
|
||||
- **事实**：接受 `?token=` / `?key=` / `?api_key=`。Token 将进入 access log、代理日志。
|
||||
- **建议**：仅允许 Authorization header。
|
||||
|
||||
### H5. Policy version 无单调性校验
|
||||
- **位置**：`internal/security/policy.go` → `Publish()`
|
||||
- **事实**：接受任意版本（含回退）。
|
||||
- **违反**：Spec 7.2.2。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 三、值得肯定的实现
|
||||
|
||||
- **Capability 握手已实现**：`Message` 含 `ProtocolVersion`/`AgentVersion`/`Capabilities`，
|
||||
`manager.go:333` 按能力门控——上一轮 spec 评审的阻断项在代码中已解决。
|
||||
- **Session ID 使用 `crypto/rand`**（`api.go:698`），不可预测。
|
||||
- **`edit_block` 使用临时文件 + 原子 rename**（`edit.go:41-62`），含目录 fsync。
|
||||
- **REST 路径 `requireSecurity` 覆盖完整**：exec/read/write/mcp/edit_block 均接入。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 四、总体评价
|
||||
|
||||
实现层面的信任模型实质是“持有 token 即上帝”：单 token 无角色分离（B2）、
|
||||
设备身份自报（B3）、MCP 主通道零门禁（B1）、Session 所有权空转（B4）。
|
||||
B1–B4 任一单独成立即足以让三级门禁失效，四者并存。
|
||||
|
||||
**在 B1（MCP 加门禁）、B2（策略变更独立鉴权）、B3（设备身份认证）修复并复审前，
|
||||
不得向不可信调用方暴露 token，不得开放 `start_process` 等新能力给 Agent。**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*审核专家 B，2026-10-02*
|
||||
+23
-404
@@ -1,12 +1,9 @@
|
||||
package api
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"sort"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"crypto/subtle"
|
||||
"embed"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +11,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
"sort"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +20,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/executor"
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/model"
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/notify"
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/security"
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/storage"
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/sysinfo"
|
||||
panelweb "github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/web"
|
||||
@@ -39,16 +34,12 @@ const (
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type Server struct {
|
||||
Auth *auth.Manager
|
||||
Exec executor.Local
|
||||
Cluster *cluster.Manager
|
||||
Store *storage.Store
|
||||
LocalName string
|
||||
Notify *notify.Manager
|
||||
Policy *security.Snapshot
|
||||
AdminToken string
|
||||
ExecLimiter chan struct{}
|
||||
SearchLimiter chan struct{}
|
||||
Auth *auth.Manager
|
||||
Exec executor.Local
|
||||
Cluster *cluster.Manager
|
||||
Store *storage.Store
|
||||
LocalName string
|
||||
Notify *notify.Manager
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
@@ -58,71 +49,27 @@ const (
|
||||
SecurityInherit = "inherit"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) LoadSecurityPolicySnapshot() error {
|
||||
func (s *Server) GetEffectiveSecurityMode(node string) string {
|
||||
if s.Store == nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("security store unavailable")
|
||||
return SecurityMedium
|
||||
}
|
||||
state, err := s.Store.LoadSecurityPolicy()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
if mode, ok := s.Store.GetNodeSecurityMode(node); ok && mode != "" && mode != SecurityInherit {
|
||||
return mode
|
||||
}
|
||||
devices := make(map[string]security.DevicePolicy, len(state.Nodes))
|
||||
for node, mode := range state.Nodes {
|
||||
devices[node] = security.DevicePolicy{Mode: mode}
|
||||
}
|
||||
global := security.ModeRisk(state.GlobalMode)
|
||||
if global == 0 {
|
||||
global = security.RiskMedium
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.Policy == nil {
|
||||
s.Policy = security.New(global, devices, state.Version)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.Policy.Publish(global, devices, state.Version)
|
||||
return s.Store.GetGlobalSecurityMode()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) GetEffectiveSecurityMode(node string) string {
|
||||
if s.Policy == nil && s.Store != nil {
|
||||
if mode, ok := s.Store.GetNodeSecurityMode(node); ok {
|
||||
if mode != SecurityInherit {
|
||||
return mode
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.Store.GetGlobalSecurityMode()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if node == s.LocalName {
|
||||
return s.Store.GetGlobalSecurityMode()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "unknown"
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.Policy != nil {
|
||||
snap := s.Policy.Current()
|
||||
risk := s.Policy.EffectiveRisk(node)
|
||||
if p, ok := snap.Devices[node]; ok && security.ModeRisk(p.Mode) != 0 {
|
||||
return p.Mode
|
||||
}
|
||||
if node != s.LocalName && (s.Cluster == nil || !s.Cluster.Online(node)) {
|
||||
return "unknown"
|
||||
}
|
||||
for mode, v := range map[string]int{"low": security.RiskLow, "medium": security.RiskMedium, "high": security.RiskHigh} {
|
||||
if v == risk {
|
||||
return mode
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if node == s.LocalName && s.Store != nil {
|
||||
return s.Store.GetGlobalSecurityMode()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.Cluster != nil && s.Cluster.Online(node) && s.Store != nil {
|
||||
return s.Store.GetGlobalSecurityMode()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "unknown"
|
||||
}
|
||||
func securityAllows(mode, action string) bool {
|
||||
required, ok := security.RequiredRiskForAction(action)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
switch action {
|
||||
case "read", "probe":
|
||||
return true
|
||||
case "write", "mcp":
|
||||
return mode == SecurityMedium || mode == SecurityHigh
|
||||
case "exec":
|
||||
return mode == SecurityHigh
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return security.ModeRisk(mode) >= required
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) requireSecurity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, device, action, detail string) bool {
|
||||
@@ -233,53 +180,11 @@ func (s *Server) SecuritySettingsJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
}()})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) ProvisionDeviceCredentialJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", 405)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.AdminToken == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.Header.Get("X-Admin-Token")), []byte(s.AdminToken)) != 1 {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "admin authorization required", 403)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var q struct {
|
||||
Device string `json:"device"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 16*1024)).Decode(&q); err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(q.Device) == "" {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "device required", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if q.Device == s.LocalName || q.Device == "local" {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "local control node does not use agent credential", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.Cluster == nil || !s.Cluster.Online(q.Device) {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "device offline", 409)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
b := make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "credential generation failed", 500)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
token := hex.EncodeToString(b)
|
||||
if err := s.Store.SetDeviceCredential(q.Device, token); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "credential save failed", 500)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = s.Store.Audit(clientIP(r), q.Device, "device_credential_provision", "device="+q.Device, 0, 0, "credential provisioned")
|
||||
jsonOut(w, map[string]any{"ok": true, "device": q.Device, "token": token})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) UpdateSecuritySettingsJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", 405)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.AdminToken == "" || r.Header.Get("X-Admin-Token") != s.AdminToken {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "admin authorization required", http.StatusForbidden)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var q struct {
|
||||
Global string `json:"global"`
|
||||
Node string `json:"node"`
|
||||
@@ -289,35 +194,21 @@ func (s *Server) UpdateSecuritySettingsJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
|
||||
http.Error(w, "bad json", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
oldGlobal := s.GetEffectiveSecurityMode(s.LocalName)
|
||||
oldNode := ""
|
||||
if q.Node != "" {
|
||||
oldNode = s.GetEffectiveSecurityMode(q.Node)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if q.Global != "" {
|
||||
if err := s.Store.SetGlobalSecurityMode(q.Global); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = s.Store.Audit(clientIP(r), "", "security_setting", "global="+q.Global, 0, 0, "")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if q.Node != "" {
|
||||
if err := s.Store.SetNodeSecurityMode(q.Node, q.Mode); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = s.Store.Audit(clientIP(r), q.Node, "security_setting", "mode="+q.Mode, 0, 0, "")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.LoadSecurityPolicySnapshot(); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "security snapshot publish failed", 500)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
newGlobal := s.GetEffectiveSecurityMode(s.LocalName)
|
||||
if q.Global != "" {
|
||||
_ = s.Store.Audit(clientIP(r), "", "security_setting", "global="+q.Global, 0, 0, fmt.Sprintf("old=%s new=%s version=%d", oldGlobal, newGlobal, s.Policy.Current().Version))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if q.Node != "" {
|
||||
_ = s.Store.Audit(clientIP(r), q.Node, "security_setting", "mode="+q.Mode, 0, 0, fmt.Sprintf("old=%s new=%s version=%d", oldNode, s.GetEffectiveSecurityMode(q.Node), s.Policy.Current().Version))
|
||||
}
|
||||
jsonOut(w, map[string]any{"ok": true, "global": s.Store.GetGlobalSecurityMode(), "node": q.Node, "mode": q.Mode, "version": s.Policy.Current().Version})
|
||||
jsonOut(w, map[string]any{"ok": true, "global": s.Store.GetGlobalSecurityMode(), "node": q.Node, "mode": q.Mode})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) clusterDeviceNames() []string {
|
||||
@@ -591,12 +482,7 @@ func (s *Server) Routes() http.Handler {
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/devices", s.devices)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/exec", s.exec)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/file/read", s.fileRead)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/file/list", s.listDirectory)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/file/info", s.fileInfo)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/file/search", s.searchFiles)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/process/session", s.processSession)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/file/write", s.fileWrite)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/devices/file/edit_block", s.editBlock)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/mcp/services", s.MCPServicesJSON)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/mcp/service", s.DeleteMCPService)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/mcp/list", s.ListAgentMCPJSON)
|
||||
@@ -604,7 +490,6 @@ func (s *Server) Routes() http.Handler {
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/mcp/test", s.TestMCPJSON)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/security/settings", s.SecuritySettingsJSON)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/security/settings/update", s.UpdateSecuritySettingsJSON)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/security/device-credentials/provision", s.ProvisionDeviceCredentialJSON)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/notifications/webhooks", s.WebhookTargetsJSON)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/notifications/webhook/update", s.UpdateWebhookTargetJSON)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/notifications/webhook/delete", s.DeleteWebhookTargetJSON)
|
||||
@@ -697,21 +582,6 @@ func (s *Server) agentWS(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
func (s *Server) isRemote(device string) bool {
|
||||
return device != "" && device != "local" && device != s.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (s *Server) acquireExec() func() {
|
||||
if s.ExecLimiter == nil {
|
||||
return func() {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.ExecLimiter <- struct{}{}
|
||||
return func() { <-s.ExecLimiter }
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (s *Server) acquireSearch() func() {
|
||||
if s.SearchLimiter == nil {
|
||||
return func() {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.SearchLimiter <- struct{}{}
|
||||
return func() { <-s.SearchLimiter }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) exec(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", 405)
|
||||
@@ -732,8 +602,6 @@ func (s *Server) exec(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if !s.requireSecurity(w, r, req.Device, "exec", req.Command) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
releaseExec := s.acquireExec()
|
||||
defer releaseExec()
|
||||
if req.Timeout <= 0 {
|
||||
req.Timeout = 30
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -763,197 +631,6 @@ func (s *Server) exec(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
jsonOut(w, model.ExecResponse{Device: req.Device, ExitCode: res.ExitCode, Stdout: res.Stdout, Stderr: res.Stderr, DurationMS: res.DurationMS})
|
||||
}
|
||||
func sessionOwner(r *http.Request) string {
|
||||
v := r.Header.Get("Authorization") + "|" + r.Header.Get("X-Operator-ID") + "|" + clientIP(r)
|
||||
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(v))
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
func newSessionID() (string, error) {
|
||||
b := make([]byte, 16)
|
||||
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) processSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", 405)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var req struct {
|
||||
Device, SessionID, Command, Workdir, Data string
|
||||
Force bool
|
||||
RingCapacity int `json:"ring_capacity"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 256*1024)).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "bad json", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if req.Device == "" {
|
||||
req.Device = s.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !s.requireSecurity(w, r, req.Device, "exec", req.SessionID) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.Cluster == nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "cluster unavailable", 503)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 30*time.Second)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
action := r.URL.Query().Get("action")
|
||||
var result any
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
switch action {
|
||||
case "start":
|
||||
if req.SessionID == "" {
|
||||
req.SessionID, err = newSessionID()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "session id generation failed", 500)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
result, err = s.Cluster.StartProcess(ctx, req.Device, cluster.StartProcessPayload{Command: req.Command, Workdir: req.Workdir, SessionID: req.SessionID, Owner: sessionOwner(r), RingCapacity: req.RingCapacity})
|
||||
case "read":
|
||||
result, err = s.Cluster.ReadProcessOutput(ctx, req.Device, req.SessionID, sessionOwner(r))
|
||||
case "input":
|
||||
err = s.Cluster.InteractProcess(ctx, req.Device, req.SessionID, req.Data, sessionOwner(r))
|
||||
result = map[string]any{"ok": true}
|
||||
case "stop":
|
||||
err = s.Cluster.ForceTerminate(ctx, req.Device, req.SessionID, sessionOwner(r))
|
||||
result = map[string]any{"ok": true}
|
||||
case "list":
|
||||
result, err = s.Cluster.ListSessions(ctx, req.Device)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
http.Error(w, "unknown action", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 409)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
jsonOut(w, result)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) listDirectory(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", 405)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var req struct {
|
||||
Device, Path string
|
||||
Recursive bool `json:"recursive"`
|
||||
MaxEntries int `json:"max_entries"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 16*1024)).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "bad json", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if req.Device == "" {
|
||||
req.Device = s.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !s.requireSecurity(w, r, req.Device, "read", req.Path) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 30*time.Second)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
var v []cluster.Entry
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
if s.isRemote(req.Device) {
|
||||
v, err = s.Cluster.ListDirectory(ctx, req.Device, cluster.ListDirectoryPayload{Path: req.Path, Recursive: req.Recursive, MaxEntries: req.MaxEntries})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
var ev []executor.Entry
|
||||
ev, err = executor.ListDirectory(req.Path, req.Recursive, req.MaxEntries)
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
b, _ := json.Marshal(ev)
|
||||
err = json.Unmarshal(b, &v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 409)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
jsonOut(w, v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (s *Server) fileInfo(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", 405)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var req struct{ Device, Path string }
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 16*1024)).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "bad json", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if req.Device == "" {
|
||||
req.Device = s.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !s.requireSecurity(w, r, req.Device, "read", req.Path) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 15*time.Second)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
var v cluster.FileInfo
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
if s.isRemote(req.Device) {
|
||||
v, err = s.Cluster.GetFileInfo(ctx, req.Device, cluster.FileInfoPayload{Path: req.Path})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
var ev executor.FileInfo
|
||||
ev, err = executor.GetFileInfo(req.Path)
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
b, _ := json.Marshal(ev)
|
||||
err = json.Unmarshal(b, &v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 404)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
jsonOut(w, v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (s *Server) searchFiles(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", 405)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var req struct {
|
||||
Device, Root, Query string
|
||||
MaxResults int `json:"max_results"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 16*1024)).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "bad json", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if req.Device == "" {
|
||||
req.Device = s.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !s.requireSecurity(w, r, req.Device, "read", req.Root) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
releaseSearch := s.acquireSearch()
|
||||
defer releaseSearch()
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 60*time.Second)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
var v []cluster.SearchResult
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
if s.isRemote(req.Device) {
|
||||
v, err = s.Cluster.Search(ctx, req.Device, cluster.SearchPayload{Root: req.Root, Query: req.Query, MaxResults: req.MaxResults})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
var ev []executor.SearchResult
|
||||
ev, err = executor.Search(ctx, req.Root, req.Query, req.MaxResults)
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
b, _ := json.Marshal(ev)
|
||||
err = json.Unmarshal(b, &v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 409)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
jsonOut(w, v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) fileRead(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", 405)
|
||||
@@ -1029,64 +706,6 @@ func (s *Server) fileRead(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
jsonOut(w, model.FileReadResponse{Device: req.Device, Path: req.Path, Offset: req.Offset, Content: content, Bytes: n, TotalSize: totalSize, HasMore: hasMore, EOF: eof})
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (s *Server) editBlock(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", 405)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var req struct {
|
||||
Device string `json:"device,omitempty"`
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
OldText string `json:"old_text"`
|
||||
NewText string `json:"new_text"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxFileLimit+64*1024)).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "bad json or content too large", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if req.Device == "" {
|
||||
req.Device = s.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !s.requireSecurity(w, r, req.Device, "write", req.Path) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if req.Path == "" || !validPath(req.Path) || req.OldText == "" {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "path and old_text required", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(req.OldText) > int(maxFileLimit) || len(req.NewText) > int(maxFileLimit) {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "edit block too large", 413)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 30*time.Second)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
var result executor.EditBlockResult
|
||||
if s.isRemote(req.Device) {
|
||||
if s.Cluster == nil || !s.Cluster.Online(req.Device) {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "device offline", 409)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
rr, err := s.Cluster.EditBlock(ctx, req.Device, cluster.EditBlockPayload{Path: req.Path, OldText: req.OldText, NewText: req.NewText})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 409)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
result.BytesWritten = rr.BytesWritten
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
result, err = executor.EditBlock(req.Path, req.OldText, req.NewText)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 409)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.Store.Audit(clientIP(r), req.Device, "edit_block", req.Path, 0, 0, fmt.Sprintf("bytes_written=%d", result.BytesWritten)); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "audit write failed", 500)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
jsonOut(w, map[string]any{"device": req.Device, "path": req.Path, "bytes_written": result.BytesWritten})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) fileWrite(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", 405)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
|
||||
package api
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
@@ -62,8 +59,8 @@ func TestSecurityEffectiveModeAndExecGate(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer store.DB.Close()
|
||||
s := &Server{Exec: executor.Local{MaxOutput: 1024 * 1024}, Store: store, LocalName: "local"}
|
||||
if got := s.GetEffectiveSecurityMode("node-a"); got != "unknown" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unknown mode=%s", got)
|
||||
if got := s.GetEffectiveSecurityMode("node-a"); got != "medium" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("default mode=%s", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := store.SetNodeSecurityMode("node-a", "high"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
@@ -91,46 +88,3 @@ func TestSecurityEffectiveModeAndExecGate(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("missing denial audit: %+v", logs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestEditBlockSecurityAndReplacement(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
store, err := storage.Open(filepath.Join(dir, "db.sqlite"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer store.DB.Close()
|
||||
if err := store.SetGlobalSecurityMode("medium"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := &Server{Exec: executor.Local{MaxOutput: 1024 * 1024}, Store: store, LocalName: "local"}
|
||||
if err := s.LoadSecurityPolicySnapshot(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.txt")
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("alpha\nTARGET\nomega\n"), 0644); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/devices/file/edit_block", strings.NewReader(fmt.Sprintf(`{"path":%q,"old_text":"TARGET","new_text":"CHANGED"}`, path)))
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
s.editBlock(w, r)
|
||||
if w.Code != 200 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("edit status=%d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
b, _ := os.ReadFile(path)
|
||||
if string(b) != "alpha\nCHANGED\nomega\n" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unexpected content: %q", b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := store.SetGlobalSecurityMode("low"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.LoadSecurityPolicySnapshot(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
r = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/devices/file/edit_block", strings.NewReader(fmt.Sprintf(`{"path":%q,"old_text":"CHANGED","new_text":"NO"}`, path)))
|
||||
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
s.editBlock(w, r)
|
||||
if w.Code != 403 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("low mode status=%d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,20 +24,6 @@ func (s *Server) NewMCPBackend() *MCPBackend {
|
||||
return &MCPBackend{server: s}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (b *MCPBackend) authorize(device, action, clientIP string) error {
|
||||
if device == "" {
|
||||
device = b.server.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
mode := b.server.GetEffectiveSecurityMode(device)
|
||||
if !securityAllows(mode, action) {
|
||||
if b.server.Store != nil {
|
||||
_ = b.server.Store.Audit(clientIP, device, "security_denied", action, 403, 0, "MCP security gate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("security mode %s denies %s", mode, action)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (b *MCPBackend) ListDevices(ctx context.Context) (any, error) {
|
||||
out := []model.Device{{Name: b.server.LocalName, Status: "online", Local: true, Arch: runtime.GOARCH, OS: runtime.GOOS}}
|
||||
if b.server.Cluster != nil {
|
||||
@@ -58,9 +44,6 @@ func (b *MCPBackend) ExecCommand(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, command,
|
||||
if device == "" {
|
||||
device = b.server.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := b.authorize(device, "exec", clientIP); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if timeout <= 0 {
|
||||
timeout = 30
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -102,9 +85,6 @@ func (b *MCPBackend) ReadFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path string
|
||||
if device == "" {
|
||||
device = b.server.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := b.authorize(device, "read", clientIP); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if path == "" || !validPath(path) || offset < 0 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("invalid path or offset")
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -170,45 +150,10 @@ func (b *MCPBackend) ReadFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path string
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (b *MCPBackend) EditBlock(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path, oldText, newText string) (any, error) {
|
||||
if device == "" {
|
||||
device = b.server.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := b.authorize(device, "write", clientIP); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if path == "" || !validPath(path) || oldText == "" {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("path and old_text required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(oldText) > int(maxFileLimit) || len(newText) > int(maxFileLimit) {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("edit block too large")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if b.server.isRemote(device) {
|
||||
if b.server.Cluster == nil || !b.server.Cluster.Online(device) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("device %s is offline", device)
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := b.server.Cluster.EditBlock(ctx, device, cluster.EditBlockPayload{Path: path, OldText: oldText, NewText: newText})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = b.server.Store.Audit(clientIP, device, "edit_block", path, 0, 0, fmt.Sprintf("bytes_written=%d", res.BytesWritten))
|
||||
return map[string]any{"device": device, "path": path, "bytes_written": res.BytesWritten}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := executor.EditBlock(path, oldText, newText)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = b.server.Store.Audit(clientIP, device, "edit_block", path, 0, 0, fmt.Sprintf("bytes_written=%d", res.BytesWritten))
|
||||
return map[string]any{"device": device, "path": path, "bytes_written": res.BytesWritten}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (b *MCPBackend) WriteFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path, content string) (any, error) {
|
||||
if device == "" {
|
||||
device = b.server.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := b.authorize(device, "write", clientIP); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if path == "" || !validPath(path) {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("path required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -278,84 +223,3 @@ func (b *MCPBackend) CallAgentMCP(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, server,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return v, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthorizeMCP exposes the same Hub-side gate to the MCP transport layer.
|
||||
func (b *MCPBackend) AuthorizeMCP(device, action, clientIP string) error {
|
||||
return b.authorize(device, action, clientIP)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (b *MCPBackend) ReadMultipleFiles(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device string, paths []string, limit int64) (any, error) {
|
||||
if device == "" {
|
||||
device = b.server.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := b.authorize(device, "read", clientIP); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(paths) > 32 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("too many paths")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if b.server.isRemote(device) {
|
||||
if b.server.Cluster == nil || !b.server.Cluster.Online(device) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("device %s is offline", device)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return b.server.Cluster.ReadMultipleFiles(ctx, device, cluster.ReadMultipleFilesPayload{Paths: paths, Limit: limit})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return executor.ReadMultipleFiles(paths, limit), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (b *MCPBackend) CreateDirectory(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path string) (any, error) {
|
||||
if device == "" {
|
||||
device = b.server.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := b.authorize(device, "write", clientIP); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if b.server.isRemote(device) {
|
||||
if b.server.Cluster == nil || !b.server.Cluster.Online(device) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("device %s is offline", device)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := b.server.Cluster.CreateDirectory(ctx, device, cluster.CreateDirectoryPayload{Path: path}); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if err := executor.CreateDirectory(path); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return map[string]any{"device": device, "path": path, "ok": true}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (b *MCPBackend) MoveFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, source, destination string) (any, error) {
|
||||
if device == "" {
|
||||
device = b.server.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := b.authorize(device, "write", clientIP); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if b.server.isRemote(device) {
|
||||
if b.server.Cluster == nil || !b.server.Cluster.Online(device) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("device %s is offline", device)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := b.server.Cluster.MoveFile(ctx, device, cluster.MoveFilePayload{Source: source, Destination: destination}); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if err := executor.MoveFile(source, destination); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return map[string]any{"device": device, "source": source, "destination": destination, "ok": true}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (b *MCPBackend) ListProcesses(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device string) (any, error) {
|
||||
if device == "" {
|
||||
device = b.server.LocalName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := b.authorize(device, "read", clientIP); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if b.server.isRemote(device) {
|
||||
if b.server.Cluster == nil || !b.server.Cluster.Online(device) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("device %s is offline", device)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return b.server.Cluster.ListProcesses(ctx, device)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return executor.ListProcesses()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package api
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/executor"
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/storage"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMCPBackendHonorsSecuritySnapshot(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, err := storage.Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "commander.db"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer store.DB.Close()
|
||||
if err := store.SetGlobalSecurityMode("low"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := &Server{Store: store, LocalName: "local", Exec: executor.Local{MaxOutput: 1024 * 1024}}
|
||||
if err := s.LoadSecurityPolicySnapshot(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
b := s.NewMCPBackend()
|
||||
if _, err := b.ExecCommand(context.Background(), "test", "local", "true", "", 5); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("MCP exec must be denied in low mode")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := b.ReadFile(context.Background(), "test", "local", "/etc/hosts", 0, 128); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("MCP read should remain available in low mode: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUnknownDeviceFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, err := storage.Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "commander.db"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer store.DB.Close()
|
||||
if err := store.SetGlobalSecurityMode("high"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := &Server{Store: store, LocalName: "local", Exec: executor.Local{MaxOutput: 1024 * 1024}}
|
||||
if err := s.LoadSecurityPolicySnapshot(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := s.GetEffectiveSecurityMode("not-registered"); got != "unknown" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unknown device mode=%q", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
b := s.NewMCPBackend()
|
||||
if _, err := b.ExecCommand(context.Background(), "test", "not-registered", "true", "", 5); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("unknown device must not inherit high risk")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -616,136 +616,6 @@
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"/api/v1/devices/file/edit_block": {
|
||||
"post": {
|
||||
"summary": "Atomically replace a unique text block on a device",
|
||||
"security": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"bearerAuth": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"requestBody": {
|
||||
"required": true,
|
||||
"content": {
|
||||
"application/json": {
|
||||
"schema": {
|
||||
"type": "object",
|
||||
"required": [
|
||||
"path",
|
||||
"old_text",
|
||||
"new_text"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"device": {
|
||||
"type": "string"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"path": {
|
||||
"type": "string"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"old_text": {
|
||||
"type": "string"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"new_text": {
|
||||
"type": "string"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"responses": {
|
||||
"200": {
|
||||
"description": "Edited"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"403": {
|
||||
"description": "Security policy denied"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"409": {
|
||||
"description": "Device offline or edit conflict"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"413": {
|
||||
"description": "Edit block too large"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"/api/v1/process/session": {
|
||||
"post": {
|
||||
"summary": "Manage long-running process sessions",
|
||||
"security": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"bearerAuth": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"parameters": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "action",
|
||||
"in": "query",
|
||||
"required": true,
|
||||
"schema": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"enum": [
|
||||
"start",
|
||||
"read",
|
||||
"input",
|
||||
"stop",
|
||||
"list"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"responses": {
|
||||
"200": {
|
||||
"description": "Session operation result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"/api/v1/file/list": {
|
||||
"post": {
|
||||
"summary": "List directory",
|
||||
"security": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"bearerAuth": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"responses": {
|
||||
"200": {
|
||||
"description": "Successful result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"/api/v1/file/info": {
|
||||
"post": {
|
||||
"summary": "Get file metadata",
|
||||
"security": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"bearerAuth": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"responses": {
|
||||
"200": {
|
||||
"description": "Successful result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"/api/v1/file/search": {
|
||||
"post": {
|
||||
"summary": "Search files",
|
||||
"security": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"bearerAuth": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"responses": {
|
||||
"200": {
|
||||
"description": "Successful result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -42,7 +42,12 @@ func (m Middleware) Handler(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
|
||||
if strings.HasPrefix(h, "Bearer ") {
|
||||
got = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(h, "Bearer "))
|
||||
|
||||
} else if q := r.URL.Query().Get("token"); q != "" {
|
||||
got = q
|
||||
} else if q := r.URL.Query().Get("key"); q != "" {
|
||||
got = q
|
||||
} else if q := r.URL.Query().Get("api_key"); q != "" {
|
||||
got = q
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expected := m.Token
|
||||
|
||||
+25
-202
@@ -2,18 +2,17 @@ package cluster
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"sort"
|
||||
"crypto/subtle"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"sort"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/security"
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/storage"
|
||||
"github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/sysinfo"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -28,26 +27,22 @@ type Manager struct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Node struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
Conn *websocket.Conn
|
||||
ConnectionID string
|
||||
WriteMu sync.Mutex
|
||||
OpMu sync.RWMutex
|
||||
Pending sync.Map
|
||||
LastSeen atomic.Int64
|
||||
LastHeartbeat atomic.Int64
|
||||
Connected atomic.Bool
|
||||
LastProfile *sysinfo.Profile
|
||||
Arch string
|
||||
OS string
|
||||
IsLocal bool
|
||||
RemoteIP string
|
||||
CountryCode string
|
||||
Country string
|
||||
MCP *MCPRuntime
|
||||
ProtocolVersion string
|
||||
AgentVersion string
|
||||
Capabilities map[string]bool
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
Conn *websocket.Conn
|
||||
ConnectionID string
|
||||
WriteMu sync.Mutex
|
||||
Pending sync.Map
|
||||
LastSeen atomic.Int64
|
||||
LastHeartbeat atomic.Int64
|
||||
Connected atomic.Bool
|
||||
LastProfile *sysinfo.Profile
|
||||
Arch string
|
||||
OS string
|
||||
IsLocal bool
|
||||
RemoteIP string
|
||||
CountryCode string
|
||||
Country string
|
||||
MCP *MCPRuntime
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Result struct {
|
||||
@@ -101,31 +96,16 @@ func (m *Manager) ServeWS(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if len(auth) >= 7 && auth[:7] == "Bearer " {
|
||||
provided = auth[7:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
if m.Secret == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(provided), []byte(m.Secret)) != 1 {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", 401)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
name := r.URL.Query().Get("device_name")
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "device_name required", 400)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if m.Store != nil {
|
||||
configured, err := m.Store.HasDeviceCredential(name)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "credential lookup failed", 500)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if configured {
|
||||
valid, err := m.Store.VerifyDeviceCredential(name, provided)
|
||||
if err != nil || !valid {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", 401)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if m.Secret == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(provided), []byte(m.Secret)) != 1 {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", 401)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if m.Secret == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(provided), []byte(m.Secret)) != 1 {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", 401)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if m.Store != nil {
|
||||
if revoked, _ := m.Store.IsRevoked(name); revoked {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "device has been revoked by admin", 403)
|
||||
@@ -148,7 +128,6 @@ func (m *Manager) ServeWS(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
CountryCode: cc,
|
||||
Country: countryName,
|
||||
MCP: NewMCPRuntime(),
|
||||
Capabilities: make(map[string]bool),
|
||||
}
|
||||
n.LastSeen.Store(time.Now().UnixNano())
|
||||
n.LastHeartbeat.Store(time.Now().UnixNano())
|
||||
@@ -218,18 +197,6 @@ func (m *Manager) readLoop(n *Node) {
|
||||
if msg.OS != "" {
|
||||
n.OS = msg.OS
|
||||
}
|
||||
if msg.ProtocolVersion != "" {
|
||||
n.ProtocolVersion = msg.ProtocolVersion
|
||||
}
|
||||
if msg.AgentVersion != "" {
|
||||
n.AgentVersion = msg.AgentVersion
|
||||
}
|
||||
if msg.Capabilities != nil {
|
||||
n.Capabilities = make(map[string]bool, len(msg.Capabilities))
|
||||
for _, c := range msg.Capabilities {
|
||||
n.Capabilities[c] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if msg.Profile != nil {
|
||||
n.LastProfile = msg.Profile
|
||||
n.LastHeartbeat.Store(now)
|
||||
@@ -300,9 +267,9 @@ func (m *Manager) Devices() []map[string]any {
|
||||
item := map[string]any{
|
||||
"name": name, "status": status, "is_local": n.IsLocal,
|
||||
"arch": n.Arch, "os": n.OS,
|
||||
"remote_ip": n.RemoteIP,
|
||||
"country_code": n.CountryCode,
|
||||
"country": n.Country,
|
||||
"remote_ip": n.RemoteIP,
|
||||
"country_code": n.CountryCode,
|
||||
"country": n.Country,
|
||||
"last_heartbeat": n.LastHeartbeat.Load() / int64(time.Second),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if n.LastProfile != nil {
|
||||
@@ -318,25 +285,6 @@ func (m *Manager) Devices() []map[string]any {
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func operationRisk(action string) int {
|
||||
if r, ok := security.RequiredRiskForAction(action); ok {
|
||||
return r
|
||||
}
|
||||
if spec, ok := security.Lookup(action); ok {
|
||||
return spec.RequiredRisk
|
||||
}
|
||||
return security.RiskHigh
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (n *Node) acquireOperation(action string) func() {
|
||||
if operationRisk(action) <= security.RiskLow {
|
||||
n.OpMu.RLock()
|
||||
return n.OpMu.RUnlock
|
||||
}
|
||||
n.OpMu.Lock()
|
||||
return n.OpMu.Unlock
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) call(ctx context.Context, name, action string, payload any) (Message, error) {
|
||||
m.mu.RLock()
|
||||
n := m.nodes[name]
|
||||
@@ -344,12 +292,6 @@ func (m *Manager) call(ctx context.Context, name, action string, payload any) (M
|
||||
if n == nil || !m.Online(name) {
|
||||
return Message{}, errors.New("device offline")
|
||||
}
|
||||
capability := actionCapability(action)
|
||||
if capability != "" && len(n.Capabilities) > 0 && !n.Capabilities[capability] {
|
||||
return Message{}, fmt.Errorf("capability missing: %s", capability)
|
||||
}
|
||||
release := n.acquireOperation(action)
|
||||
defer release()
|
||||
id := fmt.Sprintf("task_%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
|
||||
ch := make(chan Message, 1)
|
||||
n.Pending.Store(id, ch)
|
||||
@@ -372,90 +314,6 @@ func (m *Manager) call(ctx context.Context, name, action string, payload any) (M
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func actionCapability(action string) string {
|
||||
switch action {
|
||||
case "exec":
|
||||
return "exec_command"
|
||||
case "file_read":
|
||||
return "read_file"
|
||||
case "file_write":
|
||||
return "write_file"
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return action
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) StartProcess(ctx context.Context, name string, p StartProcessPayload) (map[string]any, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "start_process", p)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var out map[string]any
|
||||
b, _ := json.Marshal(msg.Payload)
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &out); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *Manager) ReadProcessOutput(ctx context.Context, name, sessionID, owner string) (ProcessOutputPayload, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "read_process_output", map[string]string{"session_id": sessionID, "owner": owner})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return ProcessOutputPayload{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var out ProcessOutputPayload
|
||||
b, _ := json.Marshal(msg.Payload)
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &out); err != nil {
|
||||
return out, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *Manager) InteractProcess(ctx context.Context, name, sessionID, data, owner string) error {
|
||||
_, err := m.call(ctx, name, "interact_with_process", ProcessInputPayload{SessionID: sessionID, Data: data, Owner: owner})
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *Manager) ForceTerminate(ctx context.Context, name, sessionID, owner string) error {
|
||||
_, err := m.call(ctx, name, "force_terminate", map[string]string{"session_id": sessionID, "owner": owner})
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *Manager) ListSessions(ctx context.Context, name string) (any, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "list_sessions", nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return msg.Payload, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) ListDirectory(ctx context.Context, name string, p ListDirectoryPayload) ([]Entry, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "list_directory", p)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var v []Entry
|
||||
b, _ := json.Marshal(msg.Payload)
|
||||
err = json.Unmarshal(b, &v)
|
||||
return v, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *Manager) GetFileInfo(ctx context.Context, name string, p FileInfoPayload) (FileInfo, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "get_file_info", p)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return FileInfo{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var v FileInfo
|
||||
b, _ := json.Marshal(msg.Payload)
|
||||
err = json.Unmarshal(b, &v)
|
||||
return v, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *Manager) Search(ctx context.Context, name string, p SearchPayload) ([]SearchResult, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "start_search", p)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var v []SearchResult
|
||||
b, _ := json.Marshal(msg.Payload)
|
||||
err = json.Unmarshal(b, &v)
|
||||
return v, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) Exec(ctx context.Context, name string, p ExecPayload) (Result, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "exec", p)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -477,41 +335,6 @@ func (m *Manager) ReadFile(ctx context.Context, name string, p FileReadPayload)
|
||||
return v, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) EditBlock(ctx context.Context, name string, p EditBlockPayload) (EditBlockResult, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "edit_block", p)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var v EditBlockResult
|
||||
b, _ := json.Marshal(msg.Payload)
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &v); err != nil {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return v, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) ReadMultipleFiles(ctx context.Context, name string, p ReadMultipleFilesPayload) (any, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "read_multiple_files", p)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return msg.Payload, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *Manager) CreateDirectory(ctx context.Context, name string, p CreateDirectoryPayload) error {
|
||||
_, err := m.call(ctx, name, "create_directory", p)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *Manager) MoveFile(ctx context.Context, name string, p MoveFilePayload) error {
|
||||
_, err := m.call(ctx, name, "move_file", p)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *Manager) ListProcesses(ctx context.Context, name string) (any, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "list_processes", nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return msg.Payload, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *Manager) WriteFile(ctx context.Context, name string, p FileWritePayload) (int64, error) {
|
||||
msg, err := m.call(ctx, name, "file_write", p)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package cluster
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNodeOperationGateAllowsReadsAndSerializesWrites(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
n := &Node{}
|
||||
release1 := n.acquireOperation("file_read")
|
||||
done := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
go func() { release2 := n.acquireOperation("edit_block"); close(done); release2() }()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
t.Fatal("write entered while read active")
|
||||
case <-time.After(50 * time.Millisecond):
|
||||
}
|
||||
release1()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
case <-time.After(time.Second):
|
||||
t.Fatal("write did not proceed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
func TestNodeOperationGateAllowsConcurrentReads(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
n := &Node{}
|
||||
var wg sync.WaitGroup
|
||||
wg.Add(2)
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
defer wg.Done()
|
||||
release := n.acquireOperation("file_read")
|
||||
time.Sleep(30 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
release()
|
||||
}()
|
||||
}
|
||||
done := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
go func() { wg.Wait(); close(done) }()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
case <-time.After(time.Second):
|
||||
t.Fatal("reads did not complete")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
func TestOperationRiskUnknownFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
if operationRisk("unknown-danger") != 3 {
|
||||
t.Fatal("unknown action must be high risk")
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = context.Background()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -3,25 +3,21 @@ package cluster
|
||||
import "github.com/wjyhk/vps-commander/internal/sysinfo"
|
||||
|
||||
type Message struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
|
||||
Event string `json:"event,omitempty"`
|
||||
Action string `json:"action,omitempty"`
|
||||
SubAction string `json:"sub_action,omitempty"`
|
||||
Device string `json:"device,omitempty"`
|
||||
Arch string `json:"arch,omitempty"`
|
||||
OS string `json:"os,omitempty"`
|
||||
Status string `json:"status,omitempty"`
|
||||
Payload any `json:"payload,omitempty"`
|
||||
Profile *sysinfo.Profile `json:"profile,omitempty"`
|
||||
ExitCode int `json:"exit_code,omitempty"`
|
||||
Stdout string `json:"stdout,omitempty"`
|
||||
Stderr string `json:"stderr,omitempty"`
|
||||
DurationMS int64 `json:"duration_ms,omitempty"`
|
||||
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
|
||||
TS int64 `json:"ts,omitempty"`
|
||||
ProtocolVersion string `json:"protocol_version,omitempty"`
|
||||
AgentVersion string `json:"agent_version,omitempty"`
|
||||
Capabilities []string `json:"capabilities,omitempty"`
|
||||
ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
|
||||
Event string `json:"event,omitempty"`
|
||||
Action string `json:"action,omitempty"`
|
||||
Device string `json:"device,omitempty"`
|
||||
Arch string `json:"arch,omitempty"`
|
||||
OS string `json:"os,omitempty"`
|
||||
Status string `json:"status,omitempty"`
|
||||
Payload any `json:"payload,omitempty"`
|
||||
Profile *sysinfo.Profile `json:"profile,omitempty"`
|
||||
ExitCode int `json:"exit_code,omitempty"`
|
||||
Stdout string `json:"stdout,omitempty"`
|
||||
Stderr string `json:"stderr,omitempty"`
|
||||
DurationMS int64 `json:"duration_ms,omitempty"`
|
||||
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
|
||||
TS int64 `json:"ts,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type ExecPayload struct {
|
||||
@@ -40,80 +36,3 @@ type FileWritePayload struct {
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
Content string `json:"content"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type EditBlockPayload struct {
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
OldText string `json:"old_text"`
|
||||
NewText string `json:"new_text"`
|
||||
ExpectedHash string `json:"expected_hash,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type EditBlockResult struct {
|
||||
BytesWritten int64 `json:"bytes_written"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type StartProcessPayload struct {
|
||||
Command string `json:"command"`
|
||||
Workdir string `json:"workdir,omitempty"`
|
||||
SessionID string `json:"session_id"`
|
||||
Owner string `json:"owner,omitempty"`
|
||||
RingCapacity int `json:"ring_capacity,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
type ProcessInputPayload struct {
|
||||
SessionID string `json:"session_id"`
|
||||
Data string `json:"data"`
|
||||
Owner string `json:"owner"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
type ProcessOutputPayload struct {
|
||||
SessionID string `json:"session_id"`
|
||||
Stdout string `json:"stdout"`
|
||||
Stderr string `json:"stderr"`
|
||||
ExitCode int `json:"exit_code"`
|
||||
Running bool `json:"running"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type ListDirectoryPayload struct {
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
Recursive bool `json:"recursive,omitempty"`
|
||||
MaxEntries int `json:"max_entries,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
type FileInfoPayload struct {
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
type ReadMultipleFilesPayload struct {
|
||||
Paths []string `json:"paths"`
|
||||
Limit int64 `json:"limit,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
type CreateDirectoryPayload struct {
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
type MoveFilePayload struct {
|
||||
Source string `json:"source"`
|
||||
Destination string `json:"destination"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
type SearchPayload struct {
|
||||
Root string `json:"root"`
|
||||
Query string `json:"query"`
|
||||
MaxResults int `json:"max_results,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Entry struct {
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
IsDir bool `json:"is_dir"`
|
||||
Size int64 `json:"size"`
|
||||
Mode string `json:"mode"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
type FileInfo struct {
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
IsDir bool `json:"is_dir"`
|
||||
Size int64 `json:"size"`
|
||||
Mode string `json:"mode"`
|
||||
ModTime int64 `json:"mod_time"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
type SearchResult struct {
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
Line int `json:"line,omitempty"`
|
||||
Text string `json:"text,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package executor
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var ErrBlockNotUnique = errors.New("old_text must occur exactly once")
|
||||
var ErrEditConflict = errors.New("file changed during edit")
|
||||
|
||||
var editMu sync.Mutex
|
||||
|
||||
type EditBlockResult struct {
|
||||
BytesWritten int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func EditBlock(path, oldText, newText string, expectedHash ...string) (EditBlockResult, error) {
|
||||
editMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer editMu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if path == "" {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, errors.New("path required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if oldText == "" {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, errors.New("old_text required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
initial := sha256.Sum256(data)
|
||||
initialHash := hex.EncodeToString(initial[:])
|
||||
if len(expectedHash) > 0 && expectedHash[0] != "" && expectedHash[0] != initialHash {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, ErrEditConflict
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
src := string(data)
|
||||
count := countNonOverlapping(src, oldText)
|
||||
if count != 1 {
|
||||
if count == 0 {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: found 0 matches", ErrBlockNotUnique)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: found %d matches", ErrBlockNotUnique, count)
|
||||
}
|
||||
updated := replaceOnce(src, oldText, newText)
|
||||
|
||||
info, err := os.Stat(path)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Re-read immediately before commit. This is the CAS check against
|
||||
// writers outside this process; editMu serializes our own writers.
|
||||
latest, err := os.ReadFile(path)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
latestSum := sha256.Sum256(latest)
|
||||
if hex.EncodeToString(latestSum[:]) != initialHash {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, ErrEditConflict
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
|
||||
tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, ".vps-commander-edit-*")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
tmpName := tmp.Name()
|
||||
defer os.Remove(tmpName)
|
||||
if err := tmp.Chmod(info.Mode().Perm()); err != nil {
|
||||
_ = tmp.Close()
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := tmp.WriteString(updated); err != nil {
|
||||
_ = tmp.Close()
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := tmp.Sync(); err != nil {
|
||||
_ = tmp.Close()
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := os.Rename(tmpName, path); err != nil {
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if d, err := os.Open(dir); err == nil {
|
||||
_ = d.Sync()
|
||||
_ = d.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return EditBlockResult{BytesWritten: int64(len(updated))}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func countNonOverlapping(src, old string) int {
|
||||
n, count := 0, 0
|
||||
for {
|
||||
i := indexString(src[n:], old)
|
||||
if i < 0 {
|
||||
return count
|
||||
}
|
||||
count++
|
||||
n += i + len(old)
|
||||
if n > len(src) {
|
||||
return count
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func replaceOnce(src, old, new string) string {
|
||||
i := indexString(src, old)
|
||||
return src[:i] + new + src[i+len(old):]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func indexString(src, needle string) int {
|
||||
if len(needle) == 0 {
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := 0; i+len(needle) <= len(src); i++ {
|
||||
if src[i:i+len(needle)] == needle {
|
||||
return i
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return -1
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package executor
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestEditBlockUniqueAndAtomic(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.txt")
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("a\nTARGET\nz\n"), 0640); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := EditBlock(path, "TARGET", "CHANGED")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if res.BytesWritten != int64(len("a\nCHANGED\nz\n")) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("bytes=%d", res.BytesWritten)
|
||||
}
|
||||
got, _ := os.ReadFile(path)
|
||||
if string(got) != "a\nCHANGED\nz\n" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("content=%q", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
info, _ := os.Stat(path)
|
||||
if info.Mode().Perm() != 0640 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("mode=%o, want 0640", info.Mode().Perm())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestEditBlockRejectsZeroAndMultipleMatchesWithoutMutation(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.txt")
|
||||
original := "TARGET\nother\nTARGET\n"
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(original), 0644); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err := EditBlock(path, "MISSING", "x")
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrBlockNotUnique) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("missing match error=%v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err = EditBlock(path, "TARGET", "x")
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrBlockNotUnique) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("multiple match error=%v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
got, _ := os.ReadFile(path)
|
||||
if string(got) != original {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("file mutated after rejected edit: %q", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package executor
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"os/exec"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"sort"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type Entry struct {
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
IsDir bool `json:"is_dir"`
|
||||
Size int64 `json:"size"`
|
||||
Mode string `json:"mode"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type FileInfo struct {
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
IsDir bool `json:"is_dir"`
|
||||
Size int64 `json:"size"`
|
||||
Mode string `json:"mode"`
|
||||
ModTime int64 `json:"mod_time"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type SearchResult struct {
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
Line int `json:"line,omitempty"`
|
||||
Text string `json:"text,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func ListDirectory(path string, recursive bool, maxEntries int) ([]Entry, error) {
|
||||
if path == "" {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("path required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if maxEntries <= 0 || maxEntries > 10000 {
|
||||
maxEntries = 1000
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]Entry, 0, maxEntries)
|
||||
add := func(p string, d os.DirEntry) error {
|
||||
if len(out) >= maxEntries {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
info, err := d.Info()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, Entry{Name: d.Name(), Path: p, IsDir: d.IsDir(), Size: info.Size(), Mode: info.Mode().String()})
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !recursive {
|
||||
ds, err := os.ReadDir(path)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, d := range ds {
|
||||
if err := add(filepath.Join(path, d.Name()), d); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := filepath.WalkDir(path, func(p string, d os.DirEntry, err error) error {
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if p == path {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(out) >= maxEntries {
|
||||
return filepath.SkipDir
|
||||
}
|
||||
return add(p, d)
|
||||
})
|
||||
return out, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func GetFileInfo(path string) (FileInfo, error) {
|
||||
if path == "" {
|
||||
return FileInfo{}, errors.New("path required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
i, err := os.Stat(path)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return FileInfo{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return FileInfo{Path: path, Name: i.Name(), IsDir: i.IsDir(), Size: i.Size(), Mode: i.Mode().String(), ModTime: i.ModTime().Unix()}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func Search(ctx context.Context, root, query string, maxResults int) ([]SearchResult, error) {
|
||||
if root == "" || query == "" {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("root and query required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if maxResults <= 0 || maxResults > 1000 {
|
||||
maxResults = 100
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]SearchResult, 0, maxResults)
|
||||
err := filepath.WalkDir(root, func(path string, d os.DirEntry, err error) error {
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(out) >= maxResults {
|
||||
return filepath.SkipDir
|
||||
}
|
||||
if d.IsDir() {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if d.Type()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.Contains(string(b), query) {
|
||||
for n, line := range strings.Split(string(b), "\n") {
|
||||
if strings.Contains(line, query) {
|
||||
out = append(out, SearchResult{Path: path, Line: n + 1, Text: line})
|
||||
if len(out) >= maxResults {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool { return out[i].Path < out[j].Path })
|
||||
return out, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type FileReadItem struct {
|
||||
Path string `json:"path"`
|
||||
Content string `json:"content,omitempty"`
|
||||
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
type ProcessInfo struct {
|
||||
PID int `json:"pid"`
|
||||
Command string `json:"command"`
|
||||
CPU string `json:"cpu,omitempty"`
|
||||
MemoryKB uint64 `json:"memory_kb,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func ReadMultipleFiles(paths []string, limit int64) []FileReadItem {
|
||||
if limit <= 0 || limit > 1024*1024 {
|
||||
limit = 256 * 1024
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]FileReadItem, 0, len(paths))
|
||||
for _, p := range paths {
|
||||
v := FileReadItem{Path: p}
|
||||
b, e := os.ReadFile(p)
|
||||
if e != nil {
|
||||
v.Error = e.Error()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if int64(len(b)) > limit {
|
||||
b = b[:limit]
|
||||
}
|
||||
v.Content = string(b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
func CreateDirectory(path string) error {
|
||||
if strings.TrimSpace(path) == "" {
|
||||
return errors.New("path required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return os.MkdirAll(path, 0755)
|
||||
}
|
||||
func MoveFile(src, dst string) error {
|
||||
if src == "" || dst == "" {
|
||||
return errors.New("source and destination required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return os.Rename(src, dst)
|
||||
}
|
||||
func ListProcesses() ([]ProcessInfo, error) {
|
||||
ents, e := os.ReadDir("/proc")
|
||||
if e != nil {
|
||||
return nil, e
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]ProcessInfo, 0)
|
||||
for _, ent := range ents {
|
||||
if !ent.IsDir() {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
pid, e := strconv.Atoi(ent.Name())
|
||||
if e != nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
comm, _ := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("/proc", ent.Name(), "comm"))
|
||||
stat, _ := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("/proc", ent.Name(), "statm"))
|
||||
cmd, _ := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("/proc", ent.Name(), "cmdline"))
|
||||
v := ProcessInfo{PID: pid, Command: strings.TrimSpace(string(comm))}
|
||||
if len(cmd) > 0 {
|
||||
v.Command = strings.ReplaceAll(string(cmd), "\x00", " ")
|
||||
v.Command = strings.TrimSpace(v.Command)
|
||||
}
|
||||
f := strings.Fields(string(stat))
|
||||
if len(f) >= 2 {
|
||||
if pages, e := strconv.ParseUint(f[1], 10, 64); e == nil {
|
||||
v.MemoryKB = pages * uint64(os.Getpagesize()) / 1024
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var _ = fmt.Sprintf
|
||||
var _ = exec.Command
|
||||
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package executor
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestListDirectoryAndInfo(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
d := t.TempDir()
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "a.txt"), []byte("hello"), 0600); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(d, "sub"), 0700); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
es, err := ListDirectory(d, false, 10)
|
||||
if err != nil || len(es) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("entries=%v err=%v", es, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fi, err := GetFileInfo(filepath.Join(d, "a.txt"))
|
||||
if err != nil || fi.Size != 5 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("info=%+v err=%v", fi, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
func TestSearchHonorsContextAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
d := t.TempDir()
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
|
||||
_ = os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, string(rune('a'+i))+".txt"), []byte("needle\n"), 0600)
|
||||
}
|
||||
r, err := Search(context.Background(), d, "needle", 2)
|
||||
if err != nil || len(r) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("results=%v err=%v", r, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package executor
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"os/exec"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"syscall"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
DefaultRingCapacity = 2 * 1024 * 1024
|
||||
MaxSessionInput = 64 * 1024
|
||||
DefaultSessionTTL = 30 * time.Minute
|
||||
SessionIdleTTL = 10 * time.Minute
|
||||
MaxSessionBufferTotal = 8 * 1024 * 1024
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type RingBuffer struct {
|
||||
mu sync.RWMutex
|
||||
buf []byte
|
||||
head int
|
||||
size int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewRingBuffer(capacity int) *RingBuffer {
|
||||
if capacity <= 0 {
|
||||
capacity = DefaultRingCapacity
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &RingBuffer{buf: make([]byte, capacity)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RingBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
|
||||
total := len(p)
|
||||
r.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer r.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
for len(p) > 0 {
|
||||
n := len(p)
|
||||
if n > len(r.buf) {
|
||||
p = p[n-len(r.buf):]
|
||||
n = len(p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
first := len(r.buf) - r.head
|
||||
if first > n {
|
||||
first = n
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(r.buf[r.head:r.head+first], p[:first])
|
||||
if first < n {
|
||||
copy(r.buf[:n-first], p[first:n])
|
||||
}
|
||||
r.head = (r.head + n) % len(r.buf)
|
||||
r.size += n
|
||||
if r.size > len(r.buf) {
|
||||
r.size = len(r.buf)
|
||||
}
|
||||
p = p[n:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
return total, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RingBuffer) Snapshot() []byte {
|
||||
r.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
out := make([]byte, r.size)
|
||||
start := (r.head - r.size + len(r.buf)) % len(r.buf)
|
||||
first := len(r.buf) - start
|
||||
if first > r.size {
|
||||
first = r.size
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(out, r.buf[start:start+first])
|
||||
if first < r.size {
|
||||
copy(out[first:], r.buf[:r.size-first])
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Session struct {
|
||||
ID string
|
||||
Command string
|
||||
Owner string
|
||||
StartedAt time.Time
|
||||
ExpiresAt time.Time
|
||||
LastAccess time.Time
|
||||
cmd *exec.Cmd
|
||||
stdin io.WriteCloser
|
||||
stdout *RingBuffer
|
||||
stderr *RingBuffer
|
||||
done chan struct{}
|
||||
mu sync.RWMutex
|
||||
err error
|
||||
exitCode int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func StartSession(ctx context.Context, id, command, workdir, owner string, capacity int) (*Session, error) {
|
||||
if id == "" || command == "" {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("session id and command required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
cmd := exec.Command("/bin/sh", "-c", command)
|
||||
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true}
|
||||
if workdir != "" {
|
||||
cmd.Dir = workdir
|
||||
}
|
||||
stdout := NewRingBuffer(capacity)
|
||||
stderr := NewRingBuffer(capacity)
|
||||
stdin, err := cmd.StdinPipe()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
out, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
errOut, err := cmd.StderrPipe()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
s := &Session{
|
||||
ID: id, Command: command, Owner: owner, StartedAt: now, LastAccess: now, ExpiresAt: now.Add(DefaultSessionTTL), cmd: cmd,
|
||||
stdin: stdin, stdout: stdout, stderr: stderr, done: make(chan struct{}), exitCode: -1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
|
||||
_ = stdin.Close()
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
go s.copy(out, stdout)
|
||||
go s.copy(errOut, stderr)
|
||||
go s.wait()
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
s.Terminate()
|
||||
case <-s.done:
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
return s, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Session) copy(src io.Reader, dst io.Writer) {
|
||||
_, _ = io.Copy(dst, src)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Session) wait() {
|
||||
err := s.cmd.Wait()
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
s.err = err
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
s.exitCode = 0
|
||||
} else if ee, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok {
|
||||
s.exitCode = ee.ExitCode()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
s.exitCode = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
close(s.done)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Session) Done() <-chan struct{} { return s.done }
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Session) Status() (int, bool, error) {
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-s.done:
|
||||
s.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
return s.exitCode, true, s.err
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return -1, false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Session) Output() (stdout, stderr string) {
|
||||
stdout, stderr = string(s.stdout.Snapshot()), string(s.stderr.Snapshot())
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
if time.Now().Before(s.ExpiresAt) {
|
||||
s.LastAccess = time.Now()
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return stdout, stderr
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Session) Stdin(data []byte) error {
|
||||
if len(data) > MaxSessionInput {
|
||||
return errors.New("session input too large")
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.mu.RLock()
|
||||
stdin := s.stdin
|
||||
s.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
if stdin == nil {
|
||||
return errors.New("session stdin unavailable")
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err := stdin.Write(data)
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
s.LastAccess = time.Now()
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Session) Authorized(owner string) bool {
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
if owner == "" || s.Owner != owner || now.After(s.ExpiresAt) || now.Sub(s.LastAccess) > SessionIdleTTL {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.LastAccess = now
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (s *Session) Expired() bool {
|
||||
s.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
return now.After(s.ExpiresAt) || now.Sub(s.LastAccess) > SessionIdleTTL
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Session) Terminate() error {
|
||||
s.mu.RLock()
|
||||
pid := 0
|
||||
if s.cmd != nil && s.cmd.Process != nil {
|
||||
pid = s.cmd.Process.Pid
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
if pid == 0 {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return syscall.Kill(-pid, syscall.SIGTERM)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Session) Kill() error {
|
||||
s.mu.RLock()
|
||||
pid := 0
|
||||
if s.cmd != nil && s.cmd.Process != nil {
|
||||
pid = s.cmd.Process.Pid
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
if pid == 0 {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return syscall.Kill(-pid, syscall.SIGKILL)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Compile-time sanity for the output writer contract.
|
||||
var _ io.Writer = (*RingBuffer)(nil)
|
||||
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package executor
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const MaxSessionsPerManager = MaxSessionBufferTotal / DefaultRingCapacity
|
||||
|
||||
type SessionInfo struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id"`
|
||||
Command string `json:"command"`
|
||||
StartedAt time.Time `json:"started_at"`
|
||||
Running bool `json:"running"`
|
||||
ExitCode int `json:"exit_code"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type SessionManager struct {
|
||||
mu sync.RWMutex
|
||||
sessions map[string]*Session
|
||||
limit int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewSessionManager(limit int) *SessionManager {
|
||||
if limit <= 0 || limit > MaxSessionsPerManager {
|
||||
limit = MaxSessionsPerManager
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &SessionManager{sessions: make(map[string]*Session), limit: limit}
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *SessionManager) Start(ctx context.Context, id, command, workdir, owner string, capacity int) (*Session, error) {
|
||||
m.mu.Lock()
|
||||
if _, ok := m.sessions[id]; ok {
|
||||
m.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("session already exists")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(m.sessions) >= m.limit {
|
||||
m.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("session limit reached")
|
||||
}
|
||||
s, err := StartSession(ctx, id, command, workdir, owner, capacity)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
m.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, exists := m.sessions[id]; exists {
|
||||
m.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
_ = s.Kill()
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("session already exists")
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.sessions[id] = s
|
||||
m.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return s, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *SessionManager) Get(id string) (*Session, bool) {
|
||||
m.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer m.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
s, ok := m.sessions[id]
|
||||
return s, ok
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *SessionManager) Remove(id string) bool {
|
||||
m.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
if _, ok := m.sessions[id]; !ok {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
delete(m.sessions, id)
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *SessionManager) List() []SessionInfo {
|
||||
m.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer m.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
out := make([]SessionInfo, 0, len(m.sessions))
|
||||
for _, s := range m.sessions {
|
||||
code, done, _ := s.Status()
|
||||
out = append(out, SessionInfo{ID: s.ID, Command: s.Command, StartedAt: s.StartedAt, Running: !done, ExitCode: code})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *SessionManager) Stop(id string, force bool) error {
|
||||
s, ok := m.Get(id)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return errors.New("session not found")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if force {
|
||||
return s.Kill()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.Terminate()
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *SessionManager) Cleanup() {
|
||||
m.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
for id, s := range m.sessions {
|
||||
if s.Expired() {
|
||||
_, done, _ := s.Status()
|
||||
if !done {
|
||||
_ = s.Kill()
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
delete(m.sessions, id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package executor
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRingBufferKeepsNewestData(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := NewRingBuffer(8)
|
||||
_, _ = r.Write([]byte("12345678"))
|
||||
_, _ = r.Write([]byte("90"))
|
||||
if got := string(r.Snapshot()); got != "34567890" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("got %q", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
func TestSessionCapturesAndTerminates(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
s, err := StartSession(context.Background(), "t1", "printf hello; sleep 5", "", "owner", 1024)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
out, _ := s.Output()
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(out, "hello") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("out=%q", out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.Terminate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-s.Done():
|
||||
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
|
||||
t.Fatal("session did not terminate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
func TestSessionManagerDuplicateAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
m := NewSessionManager(1)
|
||||
s, err := m.Start(context.Background(), "a", "sleep 1", "", "owner", 128)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer s.Kill()
|
||||
if _, err := m.Start(context.Background(), "b", "true", "", "owner", 128); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("expected limit")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := m.Start(context.Background(), "a", "true", "", "owner", 128); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("expected duplicate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestSessionIdleAuthorizationTouch(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
s, err := StartSession(context.Background(), "idle-test", "sleep 2", "", "owner", 128)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer s.Kill()
|
||||
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
s.LastAccess = time.Now().Add(-(SessionIdleTTL + time.Second))
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
if s.Authorized("owner") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("idle-expired session must not authorize")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
s.LastAccess = time.Now()
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
if !s.Authorized("owner") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("active session should authorize")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+1
-97
@@ -74,14 +74,6 @@ type ActionBackend interface {
|
||||
ExecCommand(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, command, workdir string, timeout int) (any, error)
|
||||
ReadFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path string, offset, limit int64) (any, error)
|
||||
WriteFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path, content string) (any, error)
|
||||
EditBlock(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path, oldText, newText string) (any, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type ExtendedBackend interface {
|
||||
ReadMultipleFiles(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device string, paths []string, limit int64) (any, error)
|
||||
CreateDirectory(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path string) (any, error)
|
||||
MoveFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, source, destination string) (any, error)
|
||||
ListProcesses(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device string) (any, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type AgentMCPBackend interface {
|
||||
@@ -89,10 +81,6 @@ type AgentMCPBackend interface {
|
||||
CallAgentMCP(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, server, tool string, args any) (any, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type SecurityGate interface {
|
||||
AuthorizeMCP(device, action, clientIP string) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Server struct {
|
||||
Backend ActionBackend
|
||||
Auth *auth.Manager
|
||||
@@ -276,16 +264,8 @@ func (s *Server) handleRequest(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, req JSONRPC
|
||||
Required: []string{"path"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{Name: "read_multiple_files", Description: "一次读取多个文件", InputSchema: InputSchema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]PropertyDef{"device": {Type: "string", Description: "目标设备"}, "paths": {Type: "array", Description: "文件路径数组"}, "limit": {Type: "integer", Description: "单文件最大字节数"}}, Required: []string{"paths"}}},
|
||||
{Name: "create_directory", Description: "创建目录", InputSchema: InputSchema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]PropertyDef{"device": {Type: "string", Description: "目标设备"}, "path": {Type: "string", Description: "目录路径"}}, Required: []string{"path"}}},
|
||||
{Name: "move_file", Description: "移动或重命名文件", InputSchema: InputSchema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]PropertyDef{"device": {Type: "string", Description: "目标设备"}, "source": {Type: "string", Description: "源路径"}, "destination": {Type: "string", Description: "目标路径"}}, Required: []string{"source", "destination"}}},
|
||||
{Name: "list_processes", Description: "列出受控节点当前进程", InputSchema: InputSchema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]PropertyDef{"device": {Type: "string", Description: "目标设备"}}}},
|
||||
{
|
||||
Name: "edit_block",
|
||||
Description: "对指定文件执行唯一文本块的原子替换；old_text 必须恰好匹配一次",
|
||||
InputSchema: InputSchema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]PropertyDef{"device": {Type: "string", Description: "目标节点名称"}, "path": {Type: "string", Description: "目标文件路径"}, "old_text": {Type: "string", Description: "必须唯一匹配的原文本块"}, "new_text": {Type: "string", Description: "替换后的文本块"}}, Required: []string{"path", "old_text", "new_text"}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
Name: "write_file",
|
||||
Description: "向指定受控节点创建或覆写文件",
|
||||
InputSchema: InputSchema{
|
||||
Type: "object",
|
||||
@@ -389,72 +369,6 @@ func (s *Server) callTool(ctx context.Context, clientIP string, params CallToolP
|
||||
}
|
||||
return res, false
|
||||
|
||||
case "read_multiple_files":
|
||||
var a struct {
|
||||
Device string `json:"device"`
|
||||
Paths []string `json:"paths"`
|
||||
Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = json.Unmarshal(params.Arguments, &a)
|
||||
b, ok := s.Backend.(ExtendedBackend)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": "extended tools unavailable"}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := b.ReadMultipleFiles(ctx, clientIP, a.Device, a.Paths, a.Limit)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return res, false
|
||||
case "create_directory":
|
||||
var a struct{ Device, Path string }
|
||||
_ = json.Unmarshal(params.Arguments, &a)
|
||||
b, ok := s.Backend.(ExtendedBackend)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": "extended tools unavailable"}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := b.CreateDirectory(ctx, clientIP, a.Device, a.Path)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return res, false
|
||||
case "move_file":
|
||||
var a struct{ Device, Source, Destination string }
|
||||
_ = json.Unmarshal(params.Arguments, &a)
|
||||
b, ok := s.Backend.(ExtendedBackend)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": "extended tools unavailable"}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := b.MoveFile(ctx, clientIP, a.Device, a.Source, a.Destination)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return res, false
|
||||
case "list_processes":
|
||||
var a struct {
|
||||
Device string `json:"device"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = json.Unmarshal(params.Arguments, &a)
|
||||
b, ok := s.Backend.(ExtendedBackend)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": "extended tools unavailable"}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := b.ListProcesses(ctx, clientIP, a.Device)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return res, false
|
||||
case "edit_block":
|
||||
var args struct{ Device, Path, OldText, NewText string }
|
||||
_ = json.Unmarshal(params.Arguments, &args)
|
||||
if args.Path == "" || args.OldText == "" {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": "path and old_text are required"}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := s.Backend.EditBlock(ctx, clientIP, args.Device, args.Path, args.OldText, args.NewText)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return res, false
|
||||
|
||||
case "write_file":
|
||||
var args struct {
|
||||
Device string `json:"device"`
|
||||
@@ -480,11 +394,6 @@ func (s *Server) callTool(ctx context.Context, clientIP string, params CallToolP
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": "agent MCP unavailable"}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
if gate, ok := s.Backend.(SecurityGate); ok {
|
||||
if err := gate.AuthorizeMCP(args.Device, "read", clientIP); err != nil {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := b.ListAgentMCP(ctx, args.Device)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}, true
|
||||
@@ -507,11 +416,6 @@ func (s *Server) callTool(ctx context.Context, clientIP string, params CallToolP
|
||||
if len(args.Arguments) > 0 {
|
||||
_ = json.Unmarshal(args.Arguments, &av)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if gate, ok := s.Backend.(SecurityGate); ok {
|
||||
if err := gate.AuthorizeMCP(args.Device, "mcp", clientIP); err != nil {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := b.CallAgentMCP(ctx, clientIP, args.Device, args.Server, args.Tool, av)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}, true
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
@@ -25,9 +24,6 @@ func (m *mockBackend) ReadFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path strin
|
||||
func (m *mockBackend) WriteFile(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path, content string) (any, error) {
|
||||
return map[string]any{"device": device, "path": path, "bytes": len(content)}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (m *mockBackend) EditBlock(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, path, oldText, newText string) (any, error) {
|
||||
return map[string]any{"device": device, "path": path, "bytes_written": len(newText)}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMCPInitializeAndListTools(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
srv := NewServer(&mockBackend{}, nil)
|
||||
@@ -79,8 +75,8 @@ func TestMCPInitializeAndListTools(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected map result")
|
||||
}
|
||||
tools, ok := resMap["tools"].([]any)
|
||||
if !ok || len(tools) != 11 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 11 tools, got %d", len(tools))
|
||||
if !ok || len(tools) != 6 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 6 tools, got %d", len(tools))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -114,47 +110,3 @@ func TestMCPCallTool(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected stdout in result, got %s", contentStr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type gatedMockBackend struct {
|
||||
mockBackend
|
||||
deniedAction string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *gatedMockBackend) AuthorizeMCP(device, action, clientIP string) error {
|
||||
if action == g.deniedAction {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("denied %s", action)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *gatedMockBackend) ListAgentMCP(ctx context.Context, device string) (any, error) {
|
||||
return map[string]any{"device": device}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *gatedMockBackend) CallAgentMCP(ctx context.Context, clientIP, device, server, tool string, args any) (any, error) {
|
||||
return map[string]any{"device": device, "server": server, "tool": tool}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMCPAgentCallUsesSecurityGate(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
backend := &gatedMockBackend{deniedAction: "mcp"}
|
||||
srv := NewServer(backend, nil)
|
||||
params := json.RawMessage("{\"name\":\"call_agent_mcp\",\"arguments\":{\"device\":\"node1\",\"server\":\"s\",\"tool\":\"t\"}}")
|
||||
req := JSONRPCRequest{JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: 10, Method: "tools/call", Params: params}
|
||||
resp := srv.HandleDirectRequest(context.Background(), req)
|
||||
result, ok := resp.Result.(CallToolResult)
|
||||
if !ok || !result.IsError || !strings.Contains(result.Content[0].Text, "denied mcp") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected MCP denial, got %#v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMCPListAgentUsesReadGate(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
backend := &gatedMockBackend{deniedAction: "read"}
|
||||
srv := NewServer(backend, nil)
|
||||
params := json.RawMessage("{\"name\":\"list_agent_mcp\",\"arguments\":{\"device\":\"node1\"}}")
|
||||
req := JSONRPCRequest{JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: 11, Method: "tools/call", Params: params}
|
||||
resp := srv.HandleDirectRequest(context.Background(), req)
|
||||
result, ok := resp.Result.(CallToolResult)
|
||||
if !ok || !result.IsError || !strings.Contains(result.Content[0].Text, "denied read") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected MCP list denial, got %#v", resp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package security
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
RiskLow = 1
|
||||
RiskMedium = 2
|
||||
RiskHigh = 3
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type DevicePolicy struct {
|
||||
Mode string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type PolicySnapshot struct {
|
||||
Version uint64
|
||||
GlobalRisk int
|
||||
Devices map[string]DevicePolicy
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Snapshot struct {
|
||||
mu sync.RWMutex
|
||||
data PolicySnapshot
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func New(globalRisk int, devices map[string]DevicePolicy, version uint64) *Snapshot {
|
||||
if globalRisk < RiskLow || globalRisk > RiskHigh {
|
||||
globalRisk = RiskMedium
|
||||
}
|
||||
cp := make(map[string]DevicePolicy, len(devices))
|
||||
for k, v := range devices {
|
||||
cp[k] = v
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &Snapshot{data: PolicySnapshot{
|
||||
Version: version, GlobalRisk: globalRisk, Devices: cp, CreatedAt: time.Now(),
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Snapshot) Current() PolicySnapshot {
|
||||
s.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
cp := make(map[string]DevicePolicy, len(s.data.Devices))
|
||||
for k, v := range s.data.Devices {
|
||||
cp[k] = v
|
||||
}
|
||||
snap := s.data
|
||||
snap.Devices = cp
|
||||
return snap
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Snapshot) Publish(globalRisk int, devices map[string]DevicePolicy, version uint64) error {
|
||||
if globalRisk < RiskLow || globalRisk > RiskHigh {
|
||||
return errors.New("invalid global risk")
|
||||
}
|
||||
cp := make(map[string]DevicePolicy, len(devices))
|
||||
for k, v := range devices {
|
||||
cp[k] = v
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
if version < s.data.Version {
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return errors.New("policy version regression")
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.data = PolicySnapshot{
|
||||
Version: version, GlobalRisk: globalRisk, Devices: cp, CreatedAt: time.Now(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Snapshot) EffectiveRisk(device string) int {
|
||||
s.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
if p, ok := s.data.Devices[device]; ok {
|
||||
if risk := ModeRisk(p.Mode); risk != 0 {
|
||||
return risk
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.data.GlobalRisk
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func ModeRisk(mode string) int {
|
||||
switch mode {
|
||||
case "low":
|
||||
return RiskLow
|
||||
case "medium":
|
||||
return RiskMedium
|
||||
case "high":
|
||||
return RiskHigh
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package security
|
||||
|
||||
import "testing"
|
||||
|
||||
func TestSnapshotEffectiveRiskAndPublish(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
s := New(RiskMedium, map[string]DevicePolicy{"hwsg": {Mode: "high"}}, 7)
|
||||
if got := s.EffectiveRisk("hwsg"); got != RiskHigh {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("hwsg risk=%d, want %d", got, RiskHigh)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := s.EffectiveRisk("n3450"); got != RiskMedium {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("default risk=%d, want %d", got, RiskMedium)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.Publish(RiskLow, map[string]DevicePolicy{"n3450": {Mode: "medium"}}, 8); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
cur := s.Current()
|
||||
if cur.Version != 8 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("version=%d, want 8", cur.Version)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := s.EffectiveRisk("hwsg"); got != RiskLow {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("old node risk=%d, want %d", got, RiskLow)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := s.EffectiveRisk("n3450"); got != RiskMedium {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("override risk=%d, want %d", got, RiskMedium)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestModeRiskRejectsUnknown(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
if got := ModeRisk("inherit"); got != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("inherit risk=%d, want 0", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := ModeRisk("root"); got != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unknown risk=%d, want 0", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package security
|
||||
|
||||
type ToolSpec struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
RequiredRisk int
|
||||
Category string
|
||||
ReadOnly bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var registry = map[string]ToolSpec{
|
||||
"read_file": {Name: "read_file", RequiredRisk: RiskLow, Category: "file", ReadOnly: true},
|
||||
"read_multiple_files": {Name: "read_multiple_files", RequiredRisk: RiskLow, Category: "file", ReadOnly: true},
|
||||
"list_directory": {Name: "list_directory", RequiredRisk: RiskLow, Category: "file", ReadOnly: true},
|
||||
"get_file_info": {Name: "get_file_info", RequiredRisk: RiskLow, Category: "file", ReadOnly: true},
|
||||
"start_search": {Name: "start_search", RequiredRisk: RiskLow, Category: "search", ReadOnly: true},
|
||||
"get_more_search_results": {Name: "get_more_search_results", RequiredRisk: RiskLow, Category: "search", ReadOnly: true},
|
||||
"list_processes": {Name: "list_processes", RequiredRisk: RiskLow, Category: "process", ReadOnly: true},
|
||||
"list_sessions": {Name: "list_sessions", RequiredRisk: RiskLow, Category: "process", ReadOnly: true},
|
||||
"read_process_output": {Name: "read_process_output", RequiredRisk: RiskLow, Category: "process", ReadOnly: true},
|
||||
"edit_block": {Name: "edit_block", RequiredRisk: RiskMedium, Category: "file", ReadOnly: false},
|
||||
"write_file": {Name: "write_file", RequiredRisk: RiskMedium, Category: "file", ReadOnly: false},
|
||||
"create_directory": {Name: "create_directory", RequiredRisk: RiskMedium, Category: "file", ReadOnly: false},
|
||||
"move_file": {Name: "move_file", RequiredRisk: RiskMedium, Category: "file", ReadOnly: false},
|
||||
"exec_command": {Name: "exec_command", RequiredRisk: RiskHigh, Category: "process", ReadOnly: false},
|
||||
"start_process": {Name: "start_process", RequiredRisk: RiskHigh, Category: "process", ReadOnly: false},
|
||||
"interact_with_process": {Name: "interact_with_process", RequiredRisk: RiskHigh, Category: "process", ReadOnly: false},
|
||||
"kill_process": {Name: "kill_process", RequiredRisk: RiskHigh, Category: "process", ReadOnly: false},
|
||||
"force_terminate": {Name: "force_terminate", RequiredRisk: RiskHigh, Category: "process", ReadOnly: false},
|
||||
"mcp_call": {Name: "mcp_call", RequiredRisk: RiskMedium, Category: "mcp", ReadOnly: false},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var actionTools = map[string]string{
|
||||
"read": "read_file", "probe": "read_file", "write": "write_file",
|
||||
"mcp": "mcp_call", "exec": "exec_command",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func Lookup(name string) (ToolSpec, bool) {
|
||||
v, ok := registry[name]
|
||||
return v, ok
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func RequiredRiskForAction(action string) (int, bool) {
|
||||
name, ok := actionTools[action]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return 0, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
spec, ok := registry[name]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return 0, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return spec.RequiredRisk, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
+6
-145
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
|
||||
package storage
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"database/sql"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"regexp"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -48,7 +45,7 @@ func (s *Store) init() error {
|
||||
"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_logs (" +
|
||||
"id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, timestamp INTEGER NOT NULL, caller_ip TEXT, device TEXT, action TEXT, command TEXT, " +
|
||||
"exit_code INTEGER, duration_ms INTEGER, error_msg TEXT); " +
|
||||
"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS revoked_devices (name TEXT PRIMARY KEY, revoked_at INTEGER NOT NULL, reason TEXT); CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS device_credentials (name TEXT PRIMARY KEY, token_hash TEXT NOT NULL, created_at INTEGER NOT NULL, updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL); CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS security_settings (node_name TEXT PRIMARY KEY, mode TEXT NOT NULL, updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL); CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS security_policy_meta (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK(id=1), version INTEGER NOT NULL); INSERT OR IGNORE INTO security_policy_meta(id,version) VALUES(1,1); CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mcp_services (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, name TEXT NOT NULL, description TEXT, transport TEXT NOT NULL, command TEXT, args_json TEXT, env_json TEXT, url TEXT, headers_json TEXT, scope TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'all', target_nodes_json TEXT, enabled INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1, created_at INTEGER NOT NULL, updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL); CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_mcp_services_enabled ON mcp_services(enabled);")
|
||||
"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS revoked_devices (name TEXT PRIMARY KEY, revoked_at INTEGER NOT NULL, reason TEXT); CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS security_settings (node_name TEXT PRIMARY KEY, mode TEXT NOT NULL, updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL); CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mcp_services (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, name TEXT NOT NULL, description TEXT, transport TEXT NOT NULL, command TEXT, args_json TEXT, env_json TEXT, url TEXT, headers_json TEXT, scope TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'all', target_nodes_json TEXT, enabled INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1, created_at INTEGER NOT NULL, updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL); CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_mcp_services_enabled ON mcp_services(enabled);")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -279,20 +276,9 @@ type AuditLog struct {
|
||||
ErrorMsg string `json:"error_msg"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var auditSecretRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(authorization|bearer|token|api[_-]?key|password|secret|cookie)(\s*[:=]\s+)([^\s,;]+)`)
|
||||
|
||||
func redactAudit(v string) string {
|
||||
v = auditSecretRE.ReplaceAllString(v, `$1$2[REDACTED]`)
|
||||
v = strings.ReplaceAll(v, "\r", " ")
|
||||
v = strings.ReplaceAll(v, "\n", " ")
|
||||
if len(v) > 8192 {
|
||||
v = v[:8192]
|
||||
}
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (s *Store) Audit(ip, device, action, command string, code int, ms int64, msg string) error {
|
||||
_, err := s.DB.Exec("INSERT INTO audit_logs(timestamp,caller_ip,device,action,command,exit_code,duration_ms,error_msg) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
|
||||
time.Now().Unix(), ip, device, action, redactAudit(command), code, ms, redactAudit(msg))
|
||||
time.Now().Unix(), ip, device, action, command, code, ms, msg)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -401,59 +387,6 @@ func normalizeSecurityMode(mode string) string {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type SecurityPolicyState struct {
|
||||
GlobalMode string
|
||||
Nodes map[string]string
|
||||
Version uint64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) LoadSecurityPolicy() (SecurityPolicyState, error) {
|
||||
state := SecurityPolicyState{GlobalMode: "medium", Nodes: map[string]string{}, Version: 1}
|
||||
if err := s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT mode FROM security_settings WHERE node_name='' LIMIT 1").Scan(&state.GlobalMode); err != nil && err != sql.ErrNoRows {
|
||||
return state, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if m := normalizeSecurityMode(state.GlobalMode); m != "" && m != "inherit" {
|
||||
state.GlobalMode = m
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
state.GlobalMode = "medium"
|
||||
}
|
||||
var version int64
|
||||
if err := s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT version FROM security_policy_meta WHERE id=1").Scan(&version); err != nil {
|
||||
return state, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if version > 0 {
|
||||
state.Version = uint64(version)
|
||||
}
|
||||
rows, err := s.DB.Query("SELECT node_name,mode FROM security_settings WHERE node_name<>''")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return state, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var node, mode string
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&node, &mode); err != nil {
|
||||
return state, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if m := normalizeSecurityMode(mode); m != "" {
|
||||
state.Nodes[node] = m
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return state, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) bumpSecurityPolicyVersion(tx *sql.Tx) error {
|
||||
_, err := tx.Exec("UPDATE security_policy_meta SET version=version+1 WHERE id=1")
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) SecurityPolicyVersion() uint64 {
|
||||
var version int64
|
||||
if err := s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT version FROM security_policy_meta WHERE id=1").Scan(&version); err != nil || version < 1 {
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
return uint64(version)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) GetGlobalSecurityMode() string {
|
||||
var mode string
|
||||
err := s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT mode FROM security_settings WHERE node_name='' LIMIT 1").Scan(&mode)
|
||||
@@ -471,18 +404,8 @@ func (s *Store) SetGlobalSecurityMode(mode string) error {
|
||||
if mode == "" || mode == "inherit" {
|
||||
return errors.New("invalid global security mode")
|
||||
}
|
||||
tx, err := s.DB.Begin()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer tx.Rollback()
|
||||
if _, err = tx.Exec("INSERT INTO security_settings(node_name,mode,updated_at) VALUES('',?,?) ON CONFLICT(node_name) DO UPDATE SET mode=excluded.mode,updated_at=excluded.updated_at", mode, time.Now().Unix()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err = s.bumpSecurityPolicyVersion(tx); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return tx.Commit()
|
||||
_, err := s.DB.Exec("INSERT INTO security_settings(node_name,mode,updated_at) VALUES('',?,?) ON CONFLICT(node_name) DO UPDATE SET mode=excluded.mode,updated_at=excluded.updated_at", mode, time.Now().Unix())
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) GetNodeSecurityMode(node string) (string, bool) {
|
||||
@@ -506,18 +429,8 @@ func (s *Store) SetNodeSecurityMode(node, mode string) error {
|
||||
if mode == "" {
|
||||
return errors.New("invalid security mode")
|
||||
}
|
||||
tx, err := s.DB.Begin()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer tx.Rollback()
|
||||
if _, err = tx.Exec("INSERT INTO security_settings(node_name,mode,updated_at) VALUES(?,?,?) ON CONFLICT(node_name) DO UPDATE SET mode=excluded.mode,updated_at=excluded.updated_at", node, mode, time.Now().Unix()); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err = s.bumpSecurityPolicyVersion(tx); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return tx.Commit()
|
||||
_, err := s.DB.Exec("INSERT INTO security_settings(node_name,mode,updated_at) VALUES(?,?,?) ON CONFLICT(node_name) DO UPDATE SET mode=excluded.mode,updated_at=excluded.updated_at", node, mode, time.Now().Unix())
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type SecuritySetting struct {
|
||||
@@ -541,55 +454,3 @@ func (s *Store) ListNodeSecurityModes() ([]SecuritySetting, error) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func hashDeviceToken(token string) string {
|
||||
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SetDeviceCredential stores only a SHA-256 hash of the per-device token.
|
||||
func (s *Store) DeviceCredentialConfigured(name string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
return s.HasDeviceCredential(name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) SetDeviceCredential(name, token string) error {
|
||||
if strings.TrimSpace(name) == "" || token == "" {
|
||||
return errors.New("device name and token required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
now := time.Now().Unix()
|
||||
_, err := s.DB.Exec(`INSERT INTO device_credentials(name,token_hash,created_at,updated_at)
|
||||
VALUES(?,?,?,?) ON CONFLICT(name) DO UPDATE SET token_hash=excluded.token_hash,updated_at=excluded.updated_at`, name, hashDeviceToken(token), now, now)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) VerifyDeviceCredential(name, token string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if name == "" || token == "" {
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
var stored string
|
||||
err := s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT token_hash FROM device_credentials WHERE name=?", name).Scan(&stored)
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return subtleConstantTimeEqual(stored, hashDeviceToken(token)), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func subtleConstantTimeEqual(a, b string) bool {
|
||||
if len(a) != len(b) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
var v byte
|
||||
for i := range a {
|
||||
v |= a[i] ^ b[i]
|
||||
}
|
||||
return v == 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) HasDeviceCredential(name string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
var count int
|
||||
err := s.DB.QueryRow("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM device_credentials WHERE name=?", name).Scan(&count)
|
||||
return count > 0, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -58,38 +58,3 @@ func TestAuditConcurrent100NoLoss(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("busy_timeout=%d, want >=5000", busy)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestDeviceCredentialHashAndRotation(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
s, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "commander.db"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer s.DB.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
if err := s.SetDeviceCredential("node-1", "secret-one"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
configured, err := s.HasDeviceCredential("node-1")
|
||||
if err != nil || !configured {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("credential should be configured: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
valid, err := s.VerifyDeviceCredential("node-1", "secret-one")
|
||||
if err != nil || !valid {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("valid credential rejected: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
valid, err = s.VerifyDeviceCredential("node-1", "wrong")
|
||||
if err != nil || valid {
|
||||
t.Fatal("wrong credential accepted")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.SetDeviceCredential("node-1", "secret-two"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
valid, err = s.VerifyDeviceCredential("node-1", "secret-one")
|
||||
if err != nil || valid {
|
||||
t.Fatal("old credential accepted after rotation")
|
||||
}
|
||||
valid, err = s.VerifyDeviceCredential("node-1", "secret-two")
|
||||
if err != nil || !valid {
|
||||
t.Fatal("rotated credential rejected")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+49
-731
@@ -1,731 +1,49 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Apple Design System - VPS Commander Console (app.css)
|
||||
* Grounded in Apple HIG (macOS / iPadOS) & Liquid Glass Design Specs
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
:root {
|
||||
color-scheme: dark;
|
||||
|
||||
/* macOS Dark Semantic Colors */
|
||||
--bg-body: #000000;
|
||||
--bg-card: #16181d;
|
||||
--bg-sub: #1f232b;
|
||||
--bg-input: #121418;
|
||||
|
||||
--border: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.08);
|
||||
--border-strong: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.14);
|
||||
--border-subtle: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.04);
|
||||
|
||||
--text-main: #f5f5f7;
|
||||
--text-muted: #86868b;
|
||||
--text-status: #a1a1a6;
|
||||
--pre-text: #e5e5ea;
|
||||
--thead: #86868b;
|
||||
|
||||
--accent: #0a84ff;
|
||||
--accent-subtle: rgba(10, 132, 255, 0.15);
|
||||
--accent-hover: #0071e3;
|
||||
|
||||
--dot-online: #30d158;
|
||||
--dot-offline: #ff453a;
|
||||
--dot-warn: #ffd60a;
|
||||
|
||||
--shadow: 0 4px 20px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.35);
|
||||
--shadow-hover: 0 8px 30px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.5);
|
||||
|
||||
--font-system: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "SF Pro Display", "SF Pro Text", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;
|
||||
--font-mono: "SF Mono", ui-monospace, Menlo, Monaco, Consolas, monospace;
|
||||
|
||||
--card: var(--bg-card);
|
||||
--line: var(--border);
|
||||
|
||||
--radius-lg: 16px;
|
||||
--radius-md: 10px;
|
||||
--radius-sm: 6px;
|
||||
|
||||
--ease-apple: cubic-bezier(0.16, 1, 0.3, 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
:root[data-theme="light"] {
|
||||
color-scheme: light;
|
||||
|
||||
/* macOS Light Semantic Colors */
|
||||
--bg-body: #f5f5f7;
|
||||
--bg-card: #ffffff;
|
||||
--bg-sub: #f0f0f4;
|
||||
--bg-input: #ffffff;
|
||||
|
||||
--border: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.08);
|
||||
--border-strong: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.14);
|
||||
--border-subtle: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.04);
|
||||
|
||||
--text-main: #1d1d1f;
|
||||
--text-muted: #86868b;
|
||||
--text-status: #6e6e73;
|
||||
--pre-text: #1d1d1f;
|
||||
--thead: #86868b;
|
||||
|
||||
--accent: #0071e3;
|
||||
--accent-subtle: rgba(0, 113, 227, 0.12);
|
||||
--accent-hover: #0077ed;
|
||||
|
||||
--dot-online: #34c759;
|
||||
--dot-offline: #ff3b30;
|
||||
--dot-warn: #ff9500;
|
||||
|
||||
--shadow: 0 2px 14px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.06);
|
||||
--shadow-hover: 0 6px 20px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.12);
|
||||
|
||||
--card: var(--bg-card);
|
||||
--line: var(--border);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
* {
|
||||
box-sizing: border-box;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
html, body {
|
||||
min-height: 100%;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
body {
|
||||
margin: 0;
|
||||
background: var(--bg-body);
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
font: 13px/1.5 var(--font-system);
|
||||
-webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased;
|
||||
-moz-osx-font-smoothing: grayscale;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
macOS Style Header (Liquid Glass Floating Topbar)
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
header {
|
||||
min-height: 56px;
|
||||
padding: 0 24px;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
gap: 16px;
|
||||
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
background: rgba(22, 24, 29, 0.75);
|
||||
backdrop-filter: blur(24px) saturate(190%);
|
||||
-webkit-backdrop-filter: blur(24px) saturate(190%);
|
||||
position: sticky;
|
||||
top: 0;
|
||||
z-index: 100;
|
||||
transition: all 0.2s var(--ease-apple);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
:root[data-theme="light"] header {
|
||||
background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.brand-wrap {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
gap: 12px;
|
||||
min-width: 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.brand-logo {
|
||||
width: 32px;
|
||||
height: 32px;
|
||||
border-radius: 8px;
|
||||
object-fit: cover;
|
||||
flex: none;
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 2px 8px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.15);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
header strong {
|
||||
font-size: 16px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
letter-spacing: -0.015em;
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
header span {
|
||||
margin-left: 10px;
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.header-actions {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
flex-shrink: 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
Main Grid Layout & Content Cards
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
main {
|
||||
max-width: 1400px;
|
||||
margin: auto;
|
||||
padding: 24px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.grid {
|
||||
display: grid;
|
||||
grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));
|
||||
gap: 20px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.wide {
|
||||
grid-column: 1 / -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.card {
|
||||
min-width: 0;
|
||||
background: var(--bg-card);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
|
||||
padding: 20px 22px;
|
||||
box-shadow: var(--shadow);
|
||||
transition: border-color 0.2s var(--ease-apple), box-shadow 0.2s var(--ease-apple);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.cardhead {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
gap: 12px;
|
||||
min-width: 0;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 16px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.cardhead > h2 {
|
||||
min-width: 0;
|
||||
margin: 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h2 {
|
||||
margin: 0 0 16px;
|
||||
font-size: 15px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
letter-spacing: -0.01em;
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
Controls: Buttons, Inputs, Selects
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
button, select, input, textarea {
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border-strong);
|
||||
border-radius: 8px;
|
||||
background: var(--bg-sub);
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
padding: 7px 12px;
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-system);
|
||||
font-size: 13px;
|
||||
max-width: 100%;
|
||||
transition: all 0.15s ease-out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
button {
|
||||
display: inline-flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
justify-content: center;
|
||||
cursor: pointer;
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
user-select: none;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
button:hover {
|
||||
background: var(--bg-card);
|
||||
border-color: var(--accent);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
button:active {
|
||||
transform: scale(0.98);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
button:focus-visible, select:focus-visible, input:focus-visible, textarea:focus-visible {
|
||||
outline: 2px solid var(--accent);
|
||||
outline-offset: 1px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Primary Action Buttons */
|
||||
#run, #mcpSave, #webhookSave, #saveGlobalSecurity {
|
||||
background: var(--accent);
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
border-color: transparent;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#run:hover, #mcpSave:hover, #webhookSave:hover, #saveGlobalSecurity:hover {
|
||||
background: var(--accent-hover);
|
||||
border-color: transparent;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Secondary & Action Buttons */
|
||||
#logout {
|
||||
background: transparent;
|
||||
border-color: var(--border);
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#logout:hover {
|
||||
color: var(--dot-offline);
|
||||
border-color: rgba(255, 69, 58, 0.4);
|
||||
background: rgba(255, 69, 58, 0.1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Icon Button (Theme Toggle) */
|
||||
.btn-icon {
|
||||
display: inline-flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
justify-content: center;
|
||||
width: 32px;
|
||||
height: 32px;
|
||||
padding: 0;
|
||||
border-radius: 8px;
|
||||
background: var(--bg-sub);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
cursor: pointer;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.btn-icon:hover {
|
||||
border-color: var(--border-strong);
|
||||
background: var(--bg-card);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.theme-svg {
|
||||
display: none;
|
||||
width: 16px;
|
||||
height: 16px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
:root[data-theme="dark"] .svg-sun {
|
||||
display: block;
|
||||
color: #ffd60a;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
:root[data-theme="light"] .svg-moon {
|
||||
display: block;
|
||||
color: #1d1d1f;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Console & Code Blocks */
|
||||
textarea {
|
||||
width: 100%;
|
||||
height: 110px;
|
||||
resize: vertical;
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-mono);
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
margin: 10px 0;
|
||||
background: var(--bg-input);
|
||||
border-radius: 8px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pre {
|
||||
white-space: pre-wrap;
|
||||
overflow: auto;
|
||||
background: var(--bg-input);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: 8px;
|
||||
padding: 14px;
|
||||
color: var(--pre-text);
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-mono);
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
line-height: 1.5;
|
||||
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
Devices Grid & Cards (Content Layer)
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
.devices {
|
||||
display: grid;
|
||||
grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fill, minmax(280px, 1fr));
|
||||
gap: 14px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.device-card {
|
||||
min-width: 0;
|
||||
padding: 16px;
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: 12px;
|
||||
background: var(--bg-sub);
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
gap: 12px;
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 2px 8px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.15);
|
||||
transition: transform 0.2s var(--ease-apple), border-color 0.2s var(--ease-apple);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.device-card:hover {
|
||||
transform: translateY(-1.5px);
|
||||
border-color: var(--border-strong);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.v1-head {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
gap: 4px;
|
||||
min-width: 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.v1-row1 {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
min-width: 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.v1-title {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
min-width: 0;
|
||||
flex: 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.v1-name {
|
||||
font-size: 15px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
letter-spacing: -0.01em;
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
white-space: nowrap;
|
||||
overflow: hidden;
|
||||
text-overflow: ellipsis;
|
||||
display: block;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.v1-row2 {
|
||||
font-size: 11px;
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
padding-left: 15px;
|
||||
white-space: nowrap;
|
||||
overflow: hidden;
|
||||
text-overflow: ellipsis;
|
||||
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.dot {
|
||||
display: inline-block;
|
||||
width: 7px;
|
||||
height: 7px;
|
||||
border-radius: 50%;
|
||||
background: var(--dot-online);
|
||||
vertical-align: middle;
|
||||
flex: none;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.offline .dot {
|
||||
background: var(--dot-offline);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.btn-revoke {
|
||||
padding: 2px 8px;
|
||||
font-size: 11px;
|
||||
border-radius: 5px;
|
||||
background: transparent;
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
color: var(--dot-offline);
|
||||
cursor: pointer;
|
||||
flex-shrink: 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.btn-revoke:hover {
|
||||
background: rgba(255, 69, 58, 0.14);
|
||||
border-color: var(--dot-offline);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Node Profile Grid (Compact 2-Column Metrics) */
|
||||
.profile-grid {
|
||||
display: grid;
|
||||
grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));
|
||||
gap: 6px 12px;
|
||||
padding: 10px 12px;
|
||||
background: var(--bg-card);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: 8px;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.p-item {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
gap: 6px;
|
||||
min-height: 20px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.p-label {
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
font-size: 11px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.p-val {
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-mono);
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
white-space: nowrap;
|
||||
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.badge-docker-text {
|
||||
padding: 1px 6px;
|
||||
border-radius: 4px;
|
||||
font-size: 10px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.badge-docker-text.yes {
|
||||
background: rgba(48, 209, 88, 0.15);
|
||||
color: var(--dot-online);
|
||||
border: 1px solid rgba(48, 209, 88, 0.3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.badge-docker-text.no {
|
||||
background: rgba(142, 142, 147, 0.15);
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.device-card.offline {
|
||||
opacity: 0.65;
|
||||
filter: saturate(0.5);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
MCP Toolbar, Grid & Forms
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
.mcp-toolbar {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
gap: 12px;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 16px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-grid {
|
||||
display: grid;
|
||||
grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fit, minmax(280px, 1fr));
|
||||
gap: 14px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-item {
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: 10px;
|
||||
padding: 16px;
|
||||
background: var(--bg-sub);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-item h3 {
|
||||
margin: 0 0 6px;
|
||||
font-size: 14px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-meta {
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
line-height: 1.6;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-actions {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
margin-top: 14px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-form {
|
||||
display: grid;
|
||||
grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr;
|
||||
gap: 12px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-form .full {
|
||||
grid-column: 1 / -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-form label {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
gap: 6px;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-form input, .mcp-form select, .mcp-form textarea {
|
||||
width: 100%;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-form textarea {
|
||||
min-height: 72px;
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-mono);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-nodes {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-wrap: wrap;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
padding-top: 4px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-nodes label {
|
||||
flex-direction: row;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
gap: 6px;
|
||||
cursor: pointer;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-status {
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
margin-top: 8px;
|
||||
min-height: 18px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-test-result {
|
||||
margin-top: 12px;
|
||||
padding: 12px;
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: 8px;
|
||||
background: var(--bg-input);
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-test-result.ok {
|
||||
border-color: rgba(48, 209, 88, 0.4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-test-result.fail {
|
||||
border-color: rgba(255, 69, 58, 0.4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
Data Tables (macOS Table Standard)
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
.tablewrap {
|
||||
width: 100%;
|
||||
max-width: 100%;
|
||||
overflow-x: auto;
|
||||
border-radius: 8px;
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
table {
|
||||
width: 100%;
|
||||
min-width: 760px;
|
||||
border-collapse: collapse;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
th, td {
|
||||
text-align: left;
|
||||
padding: 10px 14px;
|
||||
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
white-space: nowrap;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
th {
|
||||
background: var(--bg-sub);
|
||||
color: var(--thead);
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
text-transform: uppercase;
|
||||
letter-spacing: 0.03em;
|
||||
font-size: 11px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
td {
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tr:last-child td {
|
||||
border-bottom: none;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tr:hover td {
|
||||
background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Security Policies */
|
||||
.security-grid {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
gap: 14px;
|
||||
align-items: flex-end;
|
||||
flex-wrap: wrap;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 16px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.security-grid label {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
gap: 6px;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.security-grid button {
|
||||
height: 32px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Login Page (Apple Centered Card) */
|
||||
.login {
|
||||
display: grid;
|
||||
place-items: center;
|
||||
min-height: 100vh;
|
||||
padding: 20px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.login form {
|
||||
width: min(360px, 90vw);
|
||||
background: var(--bg-card);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
|
||||
padding: 32px 28px;
|
||||
box-shadow: var(--shadow-hover);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.login input, .login button {
|
||||
width: 100%;
|
||||
margin-top: 14px;
|
||||
height: 38px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.login h1 {
|
||||
margin: 0 0 8px;
|
||||
font-size: 20px;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
letter-spacing: -0.015em;
|
||||
text-align: center;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.login p, #error {
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
text-align: center;
|
||||
font-size: 13px;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 12px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#error {
|
||||
color: var(--dot-offline);
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Responsive */
|
||||
@media (max-width: 800px) {
|
||||
.grid {
|
||||
grid-template-columns: 1fr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.wide {
|
||||
grid-column: auto;
|
||||
}
|
||||
main {
|
||||
padding: 16px 12px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
header {
|
||||
padding: 0 16px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
*{box-sizing:border-box}
|
||||
:root{color-scheme:dark;--bg-body:#0b1020;--bg-card:#111a2d;--bg-sub:#0d1526;--border:#24304a;--border-strong:#34415d;--text-main:#e7ebf3;--text-muted:#7f8ba3;--text-status:#9aabc5;--pre-text:#b9c5da;--thead:#91a0bb;--dot-online:#4ade80;--dot-offline:#f87171;--shadow:0 8px 30px rgba(0,0,0,.2);--card:var(--bg-sub);--line:var(--border)}
|
||||
:root[data-theme="light"]{color-scheme:light;--bg-body:#f4f6fa;--bg-card:#fff;--bg-sub:#eef2f7;--border:#d1d9e4;--border-strong:#b8c3d3;--text-main:#172033;--text-muted:#647089;--text-status:#58657a;--pre-text:#26344b;--thead:#53627a;--dot-online:#16833d;--dot-offline:#c62828;--shadow:0 8px 26px rgba(28,45,72,.08);--card:var(--bg-sub);--line:var(--border)}
|
||||
html,body{min-height:100%}body{margin:0;background:var(--bg-body);color:var(--text-main);font:14px/1.5 system-ui,-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",sans-serif}header{min-height:64px;padding:0 24px;display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;gap:14px;border-bottom:1px solid var(--border);background:var(--bg-card);position:sticky;top:0;z-index:2}
|
||||
.brand-wrap{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:12px;min-width:0}
|
||||
.brand-logo{width:36px;height:36px;border-radius:8px;object-fit:cover;flex:none;box-shadow:0 2px 8px rgba(0,0,0,.15)}
|
||||
header strong{font-size:18px}header span{margin-left:12px;color:var(--text-muted);font-size:12px}.header-actions{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px;flex-shrink:0}main{max-width:1400px;margin:auto;padding:22px}.grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(2,minmax(0,1fr));gap:16px}.wide{grid-column:1/-1}.card{min-width:0;background:var(--bg-card);border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:14px;padding:18px;box-shadow:var(--shadow)}.cardhead{display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;gap:12px;min-width:0}.cardhead>h2{min-width:0}h2{margin:0 0 14px;font-size:16px}button,select,input,textarea{border:1px solid var(--border-strong);border-radius:9px;background:var(--bg-sub);color:var(--text-main);padding:9px 12px;font:inherit;max-width:100%}button{cursor:pointer}button:hover{filter:brightness(1.05)}button:focus-visible,select:focus-visible,input:focus-visible,textarea:focus-visible{outline:2px solid var(--border-strong);outline-offset:2px}textarea{width:100%;height:110px;resize:vertical;font-family:ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,Consolas,monospace;margin:8px 0}pre{white-space:pre-wrap;overflow:auto;background:var(--bg-sub);border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:9px;padding:12px;color:var(--pre-text)}.devices{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fill,minmax(220px,1fr));gap:10px}.device{min-width:0;padding:14px;border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:10px;background:var(--bg-sub)}.device b{display:block;min-width:0;overflow-wrap:anywhere;word-break:break-all}.dot{display:inline-block;width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:50%;background:var(--dot-online);vertical-align:middle;flex:none;margin-right:7px}.offline .dot{background:var(--dot-offline)}.muted{color:var(--text-muted)}.status{margin-top:3px;font-size:12px;color:var(--text-status);overflow-wrap:anywhere;word-break:break-word}.actions{display:flex;flex-wrap:wrap;gap:8px}.actions button{flex:1 1 150px}#device{min-width:180px}.tablewrap{width:100%;max-width:100%;overflow-x:auto;overscroll-behavior-x:contain}table{width:100%;min-width:760px;border-collapse:collapse}th,td{text-align:left;padding:9px;border-bottom:1px solid var(--border);font-size:12px;white-space:nowrap}th{color:var(--thead)}.login{display:grid;place-items:center;min-height:100vh;padding:20px}.login form{width:min(380px,90vw);background:var(--bg-card);border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:16px;padding:28px;box-shadow:var(--shadow)}.login input,.login button{width:100%;margin-top:10px}.login h1{margin:0}.login p,#error{color:var(--text-muted)}
|
||||
@media(max-width:800px){.grid{grid-template-columns:1fr}.wide{grid-column:auto}main{padding:12px}header{padding:0 14px}.header-actions{gap:6px}.card{padding:15px}.cardhead{flex-wrap:wrap}.cardhead>#device{width:100%;min-width:0}.actions button{flex:1 1 140px}}
|
||||
@media(max-width:680px){header{align-items:flex-start;padding-top:12px;padding-bottom:12px}header span{display:none}.brand-wrap{padding-top:2px}.brand-logo{width:32px;height:32px}.header-actions{flex-direction:column;align-items:stretch;width:112px}.header-actions button{width:100%;padding:8px 9px}.devices{grid-template-columns:1fr}.cardhead{flex-direction:column;align-items:stretch;gap:8px}.cardhead h2{margin-bottom:0}.cardhead button,#device{width:100%;min-width:0}.actions button{flex:1 1 calc(50% - 4px)}}
|
||||
@media(max-width:450px){main{padding:9px}.card{padding:13px;border-radius:12px}.actions{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr}.actions button{width:100%;min-width:0}.login form{padding:22px}.header-actions{width:104px}}
|
||||
@media(prefers-reduced-motion:reduce){*,*::before,*::after{transition:none!important}}
|
||||
|
||||
/* 主题切换极简矢量图标按钮 */
|
||||
.btn-icon{display:inline-flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;width:38px;height:38px;padding:0;border-radius:9px;background:var(--bg-sub);border:1px solid var(--border-strong);color:var(--text-main);cursor:pointer;transition:background .2s,border-color .2s}
|
||||
.btn-icon:hover{filter:brightness(1.1)}
|
||||
.theme-svg{display:none;width:18px;height:18px}
|
||||
:root[data-theme="dark"] .svg-sun{display:block;color:#facc15}
|
||||
:root[data-theme="light"] .svg-moon{display:block;color:#475569}
|
||||
|
||||
/* 设备卡片与画像升级 (方案 1: 经典主副标题分行) */
|
||||
.devices{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fill,minmax(280px,1fr));gap:12px}
|
||||
.device-card{min-width:0;padding:16px;border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:12px;background:var(--bg-sub);display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:12px}
|
||||
|
||||
.v1-head{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:4px;min-width:0}
|
||||
.v1-row1{display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;gap:8px;min-width:0}
|
||||
.v1-title{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px;min-width:0;flex:1}
|
||||
.v1-name{font-size:16px;font-weight:700;color:var(--text-main);white-space:nowrap;overflow:hidden;text-overflow:ellipsis;display:block}
|
||||
.v1-row2{font-size:12px;color:var(--text-muted);padding-left:16px;white-space:nowrap;overflow:hidden;text-overflow:ellipsis}
|
||||
|
||||
.btn-revoke{padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;border-radius:5px;background:transparent;border:1px solid var(--border-strong);color:var(--dot-offline);cursor:pointer;flex-shrink:0}
|
||||
.btn-revoke:hover{background:rgba(239,68,68,.15);border-color:var(--dot-offline)}
|
||||
|
||||
/* 资源画像 2列紧凑栅格 */
|
||||
.profile-grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(2,minmax(0,1fr));gap:6px 12px;padding:10px 12px;background:var(--bg-card);border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:8px;font-size:12px}
|
||||
.p-item{display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;gap:6px;min-height:20px}
|
||||
.p-label{color:var(--text-muted);font-weight:500;font-size:11px}
|
||||
.p-val{font-family:ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,Monaco,Consolas,monospace;font-weight:600;font-size:12px;color:var(--text-main);white-space:nowrap}
|
||||
.badge-docker-text{padding:1px 6px;border-radius:4px;font-size:11px;font-weight:700}
|
||||
.badge-docker-text.yes{background:rgba(34,197,94,.15);color:var(--dot-online);border:1px solid rgba(34,197,94,.3)}
|
||||
.badge-docker-text.no{background:rgba(148,163,184,.15);color:var(--text-muted);border:1px solid var(--border)}
|
||||
.device-card.offline{opacity:.62;filter:saturate(.45)}
|
||||
.device-card.offline .btn-revoke{opacity:1}
|
||||
|
||||
.mcp-toolbar{display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;gap:12px;margin-bottom:14px}.mcp-grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(280px,1fr));gap:12px}.mcp-item{border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:10px;padding:14px;background:var(--bg-sub)}.mcp-item h3{margin:0 0 6px;font-size:15px}.mcp-meta{font-size:12px;opacity:.72;line-height:1.7}.mcp-actions{display:flex;gap:8px;margin-top:10px}.mcp-form{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;gap:10px}.mcp-form .full{grid-column:1/-1}.mcp-form label{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:5px;font-size:12px;opacity:.9}.mcp-form input,.mcp-form select,.mcp-form textarea{width:100%;box-sizing:border-box}.mcp-form textarea{min-height:72px;font-family:monospace}.mcp-nodes{display:flex;flex-wrap:wrap;gap:8px}.mcp-nodes label{flex-direction:row;align-items:center}.mcp-status{font-size:12px;margin-top:8px;min-height:18px}.mcp-field-error{border-color:#e05252!important;outline:1px solid #e05252}.mcp-test-result{margin-top:12px;padding:12px;border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:10px;white-space:normal}.mcp-test-result.ok{border-color:#3a9b68}.mcp-test-result.fail{border-color:#c44}.mcp-test-tools{margin:8px 0 0;padding-left:18px}.mcp-test-detail{margin-top:8px;white-space:pre-wrap;overflow:auto;max-height:220px;font-family:monospace;font-size:12px}
|
||||
@media(max-width:700px){.mcp-form{grid-template-columns:1fr}.mcp-form .full{grid-column:auto}.mcp-toolbar{align-items:flex-start;flex-direction:column}}
|
||||
|
||||
.security-grid{display:flex;gap:12px;align-items:end;flex-wrap:wrap;margin-bottom:16px}.security-grid label{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:6px}.security-grid select,.tablewrap select{padding:7px 9px;border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:6px;background:var(--bg-sub);color:inherit}.security-grid button{height:34px}
|
||||
|
||||
.notification-form{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;gap:10px;margin:12px 0}.notification-form label{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:6px;font-size:12px}.notification-form .full{grid-column:1/-1}.notification-form input,.notification-form select,.notification-form textarea{width:100%;box-sizing:border-box}.notification-form textarea{min-height:72px}@media(max-width:700px){.notification-form{grid-template-columns:1fr}.notification-form .full{grid-column:auto}}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -384,3 +384,21 @@ document.addEventListener("visibilitychange", () => {
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
loadWebhooks().catch(console.error);
|
||||
|
||||
// 开启 5 秒平滑实时自动轮询
|
||||
let devicePollTimer = null;
|
||||
function startDevicePolling() {
|
||||
if (devicePollTimer) clearInterval(devicePollTimer);
|
||||
devicePollTimer = setInterval(() => {
|
||||
if (!document.hidden) {
|
||||
loadDevices().catch(console.error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}, 5000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
startDevicePolling();
|
||||
|
||||
document.addEventListener("visibilitychange", () => {
|
||||
if (!document.hidden) {
|
||||
loadDevices().catch(console.error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
+166
-275
@@ -1,85 +1,23 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Apple Design System - VPS Probe
|
||||
* Grounded in Apple HIG (macOS / iOS) & Liquid Glass Design Specs
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
:root {
|
||||
/* Dynamic System Colors - Dark (Default) */
|
||||
--system-bg: #000000;
|
||||
--secondary-system-bg: #16181d;
|
||||
--tertiary-system-bg: #21252d;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Materials & Overlays */
|
||||
--liquid-glass-bg: rgba(22, 24, 29, 0.72);
|
||||
--liquid-glass-border: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.09);
|
||||
--hairline-border: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.08);
|
||||
--hairline-border-hover: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.16);
|
||||
--hairline-highlight: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.04);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Apple Semantic Labels */
|
||||
--label-primary: #f5f5f7;
|
||||
--label-secondary: #98989d;
|
||||
--label-tertiary: #636366;
|
||||
--label-quaternary: #48484a;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Apple System Accents & Status */
|
||||
--accent: #0a84ff;
|
||||
--accent-subtle: rgba(10, 132, 255, 0.15);
|
||||
|
||||
--system-green: #30d158;
|
||||
--system-green-subtle: rgba(48, 209, 88, 0.14);
|
||||
--system-yellow: #ffd60a;
|
||||
--system-yellow-subtle: rgba(255, 214, 10, 0.14);
|
||||
--system-red: #ff453a;
|
||||
--system-red-subtle: rgba(255, 69, 58, 0.14);
|
||||
--system-purple: #bf5af2;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Typography Stacks */
|
||||
--font-system: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "SF Pro Display", "SF Pro Text", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;
|
||||
--font-mono: "SF Mono", ui-monospace, Menlo, Monaco, Consolas, monospace;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Radii & Shadows */
|
||||
--radius-lg: 16px;
|
||||
--radius-md: 10px;
|
||||
--bg-main: #0c0e14;
|
||||
--bg-card: rgba(22, 27, 34, 0.7);
|
||||
--bg-card-hover: rgba(28, 35, 45, 0.85);
|
||||
--border: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.08);
|
||||
--border-hover: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.16);
|
||||
--text-main: #f0f6fc;
|
||||
--text-muted: #8b949e;
|
||||
--text-dim: #6e7681;
|
||||
--accent: #58a6ff;
|
||||
--online: #3fb950;
|
||||
--online-bg: rgba(63, 185, 80, 0.12);
|
||||
--offline: #f85149;
|
||||
--offline-bg: rgba(248, 81, 73, 0.12);
|
||||
--warn: #d29922;
|
||||
--warn-bg: rgba(210, 153, 34, 0.12);
|
||||
--font-mono: ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, "SF Mono", Menlo, Consolas, "Liberation Mono", monospace;
|
||||
--radius-lg: 14px;
|
||||
--radius-md: 8px;
|
||||
--radius-sm: 6px;
|
||||
--shadow-subtle: 0 4px 20px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.35);
|
||||
--shadow-hover: 0 8px 30px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.5);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Animation */
|
||||
--ease-apple: cubic-bezier(0.16, 1, 0.3, 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Light Appearance */
|
||||
@media (prefers-color-scheme: light) {
|
||||
:root {
|
||||
--system-bg: #f5f5f7;
|
||||
--secondary-system-bg: #ffffff;
|
||||
--tertiary-system-bg: #e5e5ea;
|
||||
|
||||
--liquid-glass-bg: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.78);
|
||||
--liquid-glass-border: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.08);
|
||||
--hairline-border: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.07);
|
||||
--hairline-border-hover: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.14);
|
||||
--hairline-highlight: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.02);
|
||||
|
||||
--label-primary: #1d1d1f;
|
||||
--label-secondary: #86868b;
|
||||
--label-tertiary: #a1a1a6;
|
||||
--label-quaternary: #d1d1d6;
|
||||
|
||||
--accent: #0071e3;
|
||||
--accent-subtle: rgba(0, 113, 227, 0.1);
|
||||
|
||||
--system-green: #34c759;
|
||||
--system-green-subtle: rgba(52, 199, 89, 0.12);
|
||||
--system-yellow: #ff9500;
|
||||
--system-yellow-subtle: rgba(255, 149, 0, 0.12);
|
||||
--system-red: #ff3b30;
|
||||
--system-red-subtle: rgba(255, 59, 48, 0.12);
|
||||
|
||||
--shadow-subtle: 0 2px 14px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.06);
|
||||
--shadow-hover: 0 6px 20px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.12);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
* {
|
||||
@@ -89,44 +27,36 @@
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
body {
|
||||
background-color: var(--system-bg);
|
||||
color: var(--label-primary);
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-system);
|
||||
font-size: 13px;
|
||||
line-height: 1.45;
|
||||
background-color: var(--bg-main);
|
||||
background-image:
|
||||
radial-gradient(at 15% 15%, rgba(56, 139, 253, 0.05) 0px, transparent 50%),
|
||||
radial-gradient(at 85% 85%, rgba(63, 185, 80, 0.04) 0px, transparent 50%);
|
||||
background-attachment: fixed;
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", Arial, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 14px;
|
||||
line-height: 1.5;
|
||||
min-height: 100vh;
|
||||
-webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased;
|
||||
-moz-osx-font-smoothing: grayscale;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.layout {
|
||||
max-width: 1400px;
|
||||
max-width: 1440px;
|
||||
margin: 0 auto;
|
||||
padding: 0 24px 48px;
|
||||
padding: 24px 20px 40px;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
min-height: 100vh;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
Header & Liquid Glass Navbar
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
/* 导航栏 */
|
||||
.navbar {
|
||||
position: sticky;
|
||||
top: 0;
|
||||
z-index: 100;
|
||||
margin: 0 -24px 28px;
|
||||
padding: 14px 24px;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 24px;
|
||||
flex-wrap: wrap;
|
||||
gap: 16px;
|
||||
background: var(--liquid-glass-bg);
|
||||
backdrop-filter: blur(24px) saturate(190%);
|
||||
-webkit-backdrop-filter: blur(24px) saturate(190%);
|
||||
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--liquid-glass-border);
|
||||
transition: all 0.2s var(--ease-apple);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.brand {
|
||||
@@ -136,30 +66,25 @@ body {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.logo-dot {
|
||||
width: 12px;
|
||||
height: 12px;
|
||||
background: var(--accent);
|
||||
border-radius: 3px;
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 0 10px var(--accent-subtle);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.brand-text {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: baseline;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
width: 14px;
|
||||
height: 14px;
|
||||
background: linear-gradient(135deg, #58a6ff, #1f6feb);
|
||||
border-radius: 4px;
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 0 12px rgba(88, 166, 255, 0.5);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.brand-text h1 {
|
||||
font-size: 17px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
letter-spacing: -0.015em;
|
||||
color: var(--label-primary);
|
||||
font-size: 20px;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
letter-spacing: -0.02em;
|
||||
color: #fff;
|
||||
display: inline-block;
|
||||
margin-right: 8px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.brand-text .sub {
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-size: 13px;
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.controls {
|
||||
@@ -168,181 +93,164 @@ body {
|
||||
gap: 12px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Cluster Summary Pill */
|
||||
.summary-badge {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
background: var(--hairline-highlight);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--hairline-border);
|
||||
background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.04);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
padding: 5px 12px;
|
||||
border-radius: 980px;
|
||||
border-radius: 20px;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.dot-online {
|
||||
width: 7px;
|
||||
height: 7px;
|
||||
width: 8px;
|
||||
height: 8px;
|
||||
border-radius: 50%;
|
||||
background: var(--system-green);
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 0 6px var(--system-green);
|
||||
background: var(--online);
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 0 8px rgba(63, 185, 80, 0.6);
|
||||
animation: pulse 2.5s infinite;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@keyframes pulse {
|
||||
0% { transform: scale(0.95); box-shadow: 0 0 0 0 rgba(63, 185, 80, 0.7); }
|
||||
70% { transform: scale(1); box-shadow: 0 0 0 6px rgba(63, 185, 80, 0); }
|
||||
100% { transform: scale(0.95); box-shadow: 0 0 0 0 rgba(63, 185, 80, 0); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* macOS-Style Segmented Control */
|
||||
.view-switch {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
background: var(--tertiary-system-bg);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--hairline-border);
|
||||
border-radius: 8px;
|
||||
padding: 2px;
|
||||
background: rgba(22, 27, 34, 0.8);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--radius-md);
|
||||
padding: 3px;
|
||||
gap: 2px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.view-switch .btn {
|
||||
display: inline-flex;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
justify-content: center;
|
||||
gap: 6px;
|
||||
height: 26px;
|
||||
padding: 0 12px;
|
||||
border: none;
|
||||
background: transparent;
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-system);
|
||||
border: none;
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
padding: 5px 12px;
|
||||
border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
border-radius: 6px;
|
||||
cursor: pointer;
|
||||
transition: all 0.15s ease-out;
|
||||
user-select: none;
|
||||
transition: all 0.15s ease;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.view-switch .btn:hover {
|
||||
color: var(--label-primary);
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.view-switch .btn.active {
|
||||
background: var(--secondary-system-bg);
|
||||
color: var(--label-primary);
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 1px 3px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.12), 0 0.5px 1px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.08);
|
||||
background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.1);
|
||||
color: #fff;
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 1px 3px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
Content Grid & Node Card (Content Layer)
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
/* 卡片视图 */
|
||||
.card-grid {
|
||||
display: grid;
|
||||
grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fill, minmax(320px, 1fr));
|
||||
gap: 18px;
|
||||
grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fill, minmax(330px, 1fr));
|
||||
gap: 16px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.node-card {
|
||||
background: var(--secondary-system-bg);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--hairline-border);
|
||||
background: var(--bg-card);
|
||||
backdrop-filter: blur(12px);
|
||||
-webkit-backdrop-filter: blur(12px);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
|
||||
padding: 18px 20px;
|
||||
padding: 18px;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
gap: 16px;
|
||||
box-shadow: var(--shadow-subtle);
|
||||
transition: transform 0.25s var(--ease-apple), border-color 0.25s var(--ease-apple), box-shadow 0.25s var(--ease-apple);
|
||||
transition: all 0.2s cubic-bezier(0.16, 1, 0.3, 1);
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 4px 16px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.node-card:hover {
|
||||
transform: translateY(-1.5px);
|
||||
border-color: var(--hairline-border-hover);
|
||||
box-shadow: var(--shadow-hover);
|
||||
border-color: var(--border-hover);
|
||||
background: var(--bg-card-hover);
|
||||
transform: translateY(-2px);
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 8px 24px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.35);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.card-top {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
align-items: flex-start;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.node-title {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
gap: 4px;
|
||||
min-width: 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.node-name-wrap {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
min-width: 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.flag-icon {
|
||||
font-size: 15px;
|
||||
line-height: 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.node-name {
|
||||
font-size: 15px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
font-size: 16px;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
color: #fff;
|
||||
letter-spacing: -0.01em;
|
||||
color: var(--label-primary);
|
||||
white-space: nowrap;
|
||||
overflow: hidden;
|
||||
text-overflow: ellipsis;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.local-badge {
|
||||
font-size: 10px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
padding: 2px 6px;
|
||||
border-radius: 5px;
|
||||
background: var(--accent-subtle);
|
||||
padding: 1px 6px;
|
||||
border-radius: 4px;
|
||||
background: rgba(88, 166, 255, 0.15);
|
||||
color: var(--accent);
|
||||
border: 1px solid rgba(10, 132, 255, 0.25);
|
||||
flex-shrink: 0;
|
||||
border: 1px solid rgba(88, 166, 255, 0.25);
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.node-meta {
|
||||
font-size: 11px;
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--text-dim);
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
gap: 6px;
|
||||
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.meta-pill {
|
||||
background: var(--hairline-highlight);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--hairline-border);
|
||||
padding: 1px 6px;
|
||||
background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.04);
|
||||
padding: 2px 6px;
|
||||
border-radius: 4px;
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Status Pill */
|
||||
.status-badge {
|
||||
font-size: 11px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
padding: 2px 8px;
|
||||
border-radius: 980px;
|
||||
display: inline-flex;
|
||||
padding: 3px 8px;
|
||||
border-radius: 12px;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
gap: 5px;
|
||||
flex-shrink: 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.status-badge.online {
|
||||
background: var(--system-green-subtle);
|
||||
color: var(--system-green);
|
||||
border: 1px solid rgba(48, 209, 88, 0.22);
|
||||
background: var(--online-bg);
|
||||
color: var(--online);
|
||||
border: 1px solid rgba(63, 185, 80, 0.2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.status-badge.offline {
|
||||
background: var(--system-red-subtle);
|
||||
color: var(--system-red);
|
||||
border: 1px solid rgba(255, 69, 58, 0.22);
|
||||
background: var(--offline-bg);
|
||||
color: var(--offline);
|
||||
border: 1px solid rgba(248, 81, 73, 0.2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.status-badge .dot {
|
||||
@@ -352,9 +260,7 @@ body {
|
||||
background: currentColor;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
Metrics & Progress Bars (San Francisco Metrics)
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
/* 进度条指标区域 */
|
||||
.metrics-bars {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
@@ -364,64 +270,61 @@ body {
|
||||
.metric-item {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
gap: 5px;
|
||||
gap: 4px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.metric-header {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.metric-label {
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.metric-value {
|
||||
color: var(--label-primary);
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-mono);
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.progress-track {
|
||||
height: 5px;
|
||||
background: var(--tertiary-system-bg);
|
||||
border-radius: 980px;
|
||||
height: 6px;
|
||||
background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.06);
|
||||
border-radius: 3px;
|
||||
overflow: hidden;
|
||||
position: relative;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.progress-fill {
|
||||
height: 100%;
|
||||
border-radius: 980px;
|
||||
transition: width 0.4s var(--ease-apple), background 0.3s ease;
|
||||
border-radius: 3px;
|
||||
transition: width 0.4s ease, background 0.3s ease;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.progress-fill.normal {
|
||||
background: var(--system-green);
|
||||
background: linear-gradient(90deg, #238636, #3fb950);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.progress-fill.warn {
|
||||
background: var(--system-yellow);
|
||||
background: linear-gradient(90deg, #9e6a03, #d29922);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.progress-fill.danger {
|
||||
background: var(--system-red);
|
||||
background: linear-gradient(90deg, #da3633, #f85149);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Secondary Stat Widget (Inset Grouped) */
|
||||
/* 统计卡片底部小部件 */
|
||||
.card-stats-grid {
|
||||
display: grid;
|
||||
grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr;
|
||||
gap: 8px;
|
||||
background: var(--hairline-highlight);
|
||||
background: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--radius-md);
|
||||
padding: 10px 12px;
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--hairline-border);
|
||||
padding: 10px;
|
||||
border: 1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.03);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.stat-box {
|
||||
@@ -432,37 +335,34 @@ body {
|
||||
|
||||
.stat-title {
|
||||
font-size: 11px;
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
color: var(--text-dim);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.stat-desc {
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-mono);
|
||||
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
|
||||
white-space: nowrap;
|
||||
overflow: hidden;
|
||||
text-overflow: ellipsis;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.stat-desc b {
|
||||
color: var(--label-primary);
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
color: var(--text-main);
|
||||
font-weight: 500;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.traffic-in { color: var(--accent) !important; font-weight: 600; }
|
||||
.traffic-out { color: var(--system-purple) !important; font-weight: 600; }
|
||||
.traffic-in { color: #58a6ff !important; }
|
||||
.traffic-out { color: #bc8cff !important; }
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
Compact Table View (macOS Table Standard)
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
/* 表格视图 */
|
||||
.table-wrapper {
|
||||
background: var(--secondary-system-bg);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--hairline-border);
|
||||
background: var(--bg-card);
|
||||
backdrop-filter: blur(12px);
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
|
||||
overflow-x: auto;
|
||||
box-shadow: var(--shadow-subtle);
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 4px 16px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.probe-table {
|
||||
@@ -473,23 +373,20 @@ body {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.probe-table th {
|
||||
background: var(--tertiary-system-bg);
|
||||
padding: 10px 16px;
|
||||
font-size: 11px;
|
||||
background: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.25);
|
||||
padding: 12px 16px;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--hairline-border);
|
||||
text-transform: uppercase;
|
||||
letter-spacing: 0.03em;
|
||||
color: var(--text-muted);
|
||||
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
white-space: nowrap;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.probe-table td {
|
||||
padding: 12px 16px;
|
||||
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--hairline-border);
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
padding: 14px 16px;
|
||||
border-bottom: 1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.04);
|
||||
font-size: 13px;
|
||||
vertical-align: middle;
|
||||
color: var(--label-primary);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.probe-table tr:last-child td {
|
||||
@@ -497,12 +394,12 @@ body {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.probe-table tr:hover td {
|
||||
background: var(--hairline-highlight);
|
||||
background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.col-mono {
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-mono);
|
||||
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mini-bar-wrap {
|
||||
@@ -515,14 +412,14 @@ body {
|
||||
.mini-bar {
|
||||
flex: 1;
|
||||
height: 5px;
|
||||
background: var(--tertiary-system-bg);
|
||||
border-radius: 980px;
|
||||
background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.08);
|
||||
border-radius: 3px;
|
||||
overflow: hidden;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.mini-bar-fill {
|
||||
height: 100%;
|
||||
border-radius: 980px;
|
||||
border-radius: 3px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.table-node {
|
||||
@@ -531,60 +428,53 @@ body {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.table-node .name {
|
||||
font-size: 13px;
|
||||
font-weight: 600;
|
||||
color: var(--label-primary);
|
||||
color: #fff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.table-node .sub {
|
||||
font-size: 11px;
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
color: var(--text-dim);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
Footer
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
/* 页脚 */
|
||||
.footer {
|
||||
margin-top: auto;
|
||||
padding-top: 32px;
|
||||
padding-top: 36px;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--label-secondary);
|
||||
border-top: 1px solid var(--hairline-border);
|
||||
color: var(--text-dim);
|
||||
border-top: 1px solid var(--border);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.update-time {
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-mono);
|
||||
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Error State */
|
||||
/* 错误提示 */
|
||||
.error-msg {
|
||||
text-align: center;
|
||||
padding: 40px;
|
||||
color: var(--system-red);
|
||||
background: var(--system-red-subtle);
|
||||
border: 1px dashed rgba(255, 69, 58, 0.3);
|
||||
color: var(--offline);
|
||||
background: var(--bg-card);
|
||||
border: 1px dashed rgba(248, 81, 73, 0.3);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ==========================================================================
|
||||
Responsive Adaptations
|
||||
========================================================================== */
|
||||
/* 响应式调整 (Mobile) */
|
||||
@media (max-width: 768px) {
|
||||
.layout {
|
||||
padding: 0 16px 36px;
|
||||
padding: 16px 12px 28px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.navbar {
|
||||
margin: 0 -16px 20px;
|
||||
padding: 12px 16px;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 16px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.brand-text h1 {
|
||||
font-size: 16px;
|
||||
font-size: 18px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.controls {
|
||||
@@ -594,11 +484,12 @@ body {
|
||||
|
||||
.card-grid {
|
||||
grid-template-columns: 1fr;
|
||||
gap: 14px;
|
||||
gap: 12px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.node-card {
|
||||
padding: 16px;
|
||||
padding: 14px;
|
||||
gap: 12px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.card-stats-grid {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
<meta charset="utf-8">
|
||||
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, viewport-fit=cover">
|
||||
<title>VPS Probe - 节点监控探针</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/probe.css?v=20261001">
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/probe.css?v=20260929">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<div class="layout">
|
||||
@@ -41,6 +41,6 @@
|
||||
<span id="lastUpdated" class="update-time">自动刷新中...</span>
|
||||
</footer>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<script src="/static/probe.js?v=20261001"></script>
|
||||
<script src="/static/probe.js?v=20260929"></script>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user