Files
inliver233 e193f425ba Measure the toolkit on a real Flutter target and correct what it claimed
Ran the scripts against a real Flutter AOT / multi-dex / 36-.so APK (Dart 3.6.0,
com.tingfeng.tool) and recorded what each one actually did. Two of them were wrong
in the direction that reads as a target finding, one Coverage claim overstated what
ships, and four documentation statements were false.

Fixed:

  dart_pprefs.py decoded only the general-purpose register file, so `ldr dN,[x27,#imm]`
  (0xFD400000) was never matched and every double constant read from the object pool
  was dropped -- 302 pool offsets and 1802 sites on this sample, one of them with 150
  references that would have been reported as zero. The documented advice is to count
  references before editing a shared constant, so a one-sided quiet gap here produces
  exactly the wrong decision. Now covers both register files; a purpose-written
  arbiter agrees with it to 0/0 across .text, against 0/302 before.

Documented but deliberately not fixed, because a fix would not have been run:

  elf_plt.py misses the last PLT stub slot (`off < fsz - 16`), which on libloader.so
  turned a real, called import (dl_iterate_phdr) into "not a resolved stub".
  find_refs.py advertises dex-directory input but iter_files() accepts only .smali,
  so it answers "no references" with exit 0 for input it never read.
  so_constpatch.py's rebuild drops the zip `extra` field and destroys 4 KB alignment.
  Each has its root cause and fix sketch recorded.

Documentation corrections in dart-aot.md:

  blutter's asm/ does contain full instruction listings with pool annotations -- the
  file said to ignore it, and it is the richest artifact in the chain.
  The first build costs ~78 s, not "tens of minutes"; MSVC 19.34 suffices, not VS 2022.
  The file-PP offset mapping is not recoverable from the binary (4241 shared strings,
  4237 distinct deltas), so a snapshot-decoding front end is a dependency, now stated.
  Documented aotopsy as the no-toolchain route, and the trap that its version label is
  a structural profile name (it says 3.6.2 for a 3.6.0 snapshot).

Coverage now separates what was measured from what is inferred, names blutter/aotopsy
as a prerequisite instead of implying the pool decodes itself, lists the scripts this
pass did not run, and says plainly that the packer / VMP / integrity-check scenarios
were not exercised at all.

Added hand-off points for JNI, dex-observed hardening, and the existing native boundary
documents, plus docs/verification-jiongnew/ -- the evidence record, including the four
gate outputs verbatim. No second skill: the gap is one front-end dependency, not a
subject area, and relocating Flutter docs would not have supplied it.
2026-09-20 04:59:38 +08:00

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Findings about the skill, from measuring it

Everything here is a result about the skill, not about the target. Each item names the evidence that produced it and its strength.


F1 — The Coverage claim was partly aspirational, and the pass identified exactly which part

SKILL.md's Coverage section lists as covered by verified mechanisms:

Flutter / Dart AOT: pinning the engine version, decoding the object pool, locating and patching business logic inside libapp.so (dart-aot.md).

Measured against a real Dart 3.6.0 libapp.so, that sentence splits into three claims of very different standing:

Sub-claim Standing after this pass
pinning the engine version verified — the banner route (§1) is correct and 3.6.0 is confirmed three ways
decoding the object pool false as written — the kit cannot do it; there is no resolver
locating business logic inside libapp.so true, but conditional — it works, on top of an external snapshot dumper that the skill neither ships nor installs

The worked example in TOOL-VERDICTS.md shows both halves at once: the chain "showRewardAdProvider" → pp+0x23548 → ref site 0x7a9464 → ShowRewardAdFamily.call_2f28ac @ 0x7a93ec succeeded, and step 1 was performed by blutter, not by the skill.

The reason is structural, not a shortage of effort: dart_pool_strings.py reports file offsets while pp.txt and dart_pprefs.py work in pool offsets. Over the 4,241 strings present in both spaces there are 4,237 distinct deltas (min −1,361,429, max +277,654). The mapping is a property of the reconstructed pool and is not a constant, so no amount of care inside the script recovers it.

Capabilities the kit does not have, stated plainly: snapshot/object-pool deserialisation; symbol and name recovery; a real call graph (the --build-index index holds raw B/BL targets only); a decompiler; a function boundary/size table.


F2 — Two scripts fail in the way that reads as a target finding (the P26 class)

The handover singled out pitfalls.md P26: "a self-built analysis script fails in a way that reads as a target finding." This pass produced two live instances of exactly that, which is why the P26 warning earns its place.

elf_plt.py returned a confident false negative. It reports 3,437 stubs where .rela.plt holds 3,438, and answers 0x587060 -> not a resolved stub for an entry that is a legitimate stub for dl_iterate_phdr, with a real caller at 0x576a2c. Nothing in the output indicates a problem. For the script's stated purpose — deciding whether a hardening symbol exists in a library — the wrong answer is indistinguishable from the right one.

find_refs.py returns a clean empty result for input it cannot read. Its docstring advertises "a smali tree or a directory of dex files"; iter_files() accepts only .smali. Given the dex directory it printed [total refs] 0, exited 0, and emitted no warning. This is worse than a crash: it is the exact input to "nothing references this, safe to patch", produced by the very tool recommended for judging blast radius before patching.

Both, plus dart_pprefs.py's silently dropped double constants, share one property: the failure is one-sided and quiet. None of the three reports reduced confidence in its own output.


F3 — Defects found, ranked by consequence

# Script Defect Consequence Status
1 find_refs.py iter_files() matches only .smali; dex dirs yield 0 results, no error, exit 0 silent false "no references" on the tool whose job is blast-radius cause identified, not fixed
2 elf_plt.py loop bound off < fsz - 16 misses the final stub slot false negative for one real symbol per library, conditionally fixed on a copy, re-verified
3 dart_pprefs.py only the GP register file is decoded; ldr dD,[x27,#imm] (0xFD400000) and all double constants lost under-reports pool references (302 displacements / 1,802 sites here), which breaks the "count refs to judge importance" advice in dart-aot.md §9/§10 — one site went [0 refs] → [79 refs] fixed on a copy; agrees with capstone 0/0
4 so_constpatch.py rebuild drops the zip extra field, destroying 4 KB alignment for extractNativeLibs=false APKs the output will not load; masked here because this target is DEFLATED + extractNativeLibs=true cause identified, proven by fixture; not fixed
5 so_constpatch.py --diff --name-regions compares file offset with vaddr feature completely inert on libraries where p_vaddr != p_offset (2 of 36 here), with no warning cause identified
6 so_constpatch.py external_attr rewritten on 1982/1982 entries metadata-based integrity comparison detects the rebuild cause identified
7 dexutil.py switch payloads decoded as instructions; decode() does not resolve operands caused a spurious "desync likely" verdict on saveToLocal cause identified
8 so_constpatch.py "N byte(s) changed" is the overwrite window, not bytes changed overstates change count (13 reported vs 7 actual) cause identified
9 lib_map.py ? means both "read failed" and "not probed" a real read failure is invisible cause identified
10 dart_pool_strings.py TSV escaping is lossy for LF/CR/TAB 7 of 18,363 rows ambiguous; 19 entries genuinely contain those bytes cause identified
11 elf_plt.py size = 16 if ... else 16 dead code cause identified
12 dex_strings.py --per-file prints only files with hits can be misread as "only this dex was scanned" cause identified

Items 1-3 are the ones that changed a conclusion during this pass rather than merely being noticed.


F4 — Documentation contradictions

Independently found while mapping the skill and while using it. The executable cross-reference checkers (check_refs.py, check_repo.py) pass, so these are invisible to the repo's own gates.

# Location Problem
1 dart-aot.md §2 Claims blutter's asm/ has no instructions — "Do not plan around it." Wrong. asm/windmill_ad_plugin/src/ads/reward/reward.dart is 1,327 lines carrying class layouts, signatures, a full instruction listing, pool annotations and resolved call targets. It is the richest artifact in the chain and the doc says to ignore it.
2 dart-aot.md §2 Budgets "tens of minutes" for the first blutter build; measured ≈78 s (~30× pessimistic). Also demands a very recent C++ compiler; MSVC 19.34 (Nov 2022) suffices.
3 dart-aot.md §7 Presents two-byte hit chaining as an acceptance test. On this sample, 9,840 two-byte CJK candidates yield 2,081 chained runs, all garbage.
4 signature-derived-keys.md:61 Documents python scripts/sig_probe.py --live --pkg <pkg> — the script has no --pkg; it takes --live PKG. Line 54 and pitfalls.md P27 give the correct form.
5 dart-aot.md:204 dart_disasm.py ... --index callers.json --build-index omits the required argument value; argparse errors out.
6 byte-level-patching.md:186 Says different-length strings "need dex_strpatch-class tooling", while dex_strpatch.py requires len(new) == len(old) — it is precisely the tool that cannot do this. Contradicts dex-patching.md:123.
7 Coverage vs toolchain.md Coverage lists Unity/IL2CPP logic recovery as not covered, but toolchain.md Tier 4 names concrete tooling without pointing back at that disclaimer, so a reader of toolchain.md alone would take IL2CPP for a supported route.
8 Script count SKILL.md/README.md index 35 rows, which is 34 scripts plus the scripts/dexpatch/ directory row.
9 dart_pool_strings.py docstring Says two-byte auto-detection is unreliable (confirmed here); dart-aot.md §7 treats UTF-16LE hits as a reliable rule.
10 verification.md rung 7 Re-downloading a distributed file to compare hashes has no landing place in SKILL.md's six "done" criteria, so the two sections disagree on strength.

Item 1 is the most damaging because it steers a reader away from the best available evidence.


F5 — "verified mechanisms" left no reproducible trace in the repo

The Coverage preamble frames its list as verified mechanisms, and references/long-task-discipline.md defines Observed as "reproduced it, with the exact command and output". The repository contains no sample, no fixture, no captured log or screenshot, no patch record, no test and no CI, and its README.md states it holds no target-specific data.

So the strongest support the repository itself can exhibit for those claims is Inferred. This is not an accusation that the claims are false — several were confirmed here on the first attempt, and dart-aot.md §1 proved exactly right. It is a statement about evidentiary standing: the repo asks its readers to label their own claims and does not leave itself a way to meet its own bar.

The concrete measurement figures that are reproducible are the 14 sample-scoped numbers listed in the skill map (e.g. dex 4.32 MB → 7.73 MB; .RSA 1199 B vs 777 B at runtime; a log tag going 8 → 0).


F6 — Boundary evidence: where the skill's method held, and where it ran out

This is the observation the pass was built to produce, so it is stated as a sequence rather than a verdict.

Held, unchanged: manifest and packer triage; multi-dex string/class recon at 27.6 MB across four dex files (dex_strings.py, dexutil.py); native ELF import mapping at scale (36,974 relocations); live-process library mapping; equal-length .so constant patching; the launch-timeline methodology (coldstart.py); the P26 discipline itself — checking whether a tool was ever able to answer before reading its silence as a finding, which is what turned the blutter crash from a false "unusable" into a corrected "works after a relink".

Ran out: from the Dart snapshot inward. Everything past pp.txt is fine; getting to pp.txt from the binary requires a container resolver the kit does not have. That is one dependency, not a subject area.

Not exercised at all: packers, code virtualization, custom linkers, integrity-check redirection, tamper-triggered suicide. This target has none of those, and the unmodified app's own startup failure also removes the repack loop those scenarios need.


F7 — A trap in this specific environment that will produce false confirmations

androguard 4.x (the version installed here) has four independent reference-analysis failures on this sample: get_xref_from() returns 0 for everything, including AdLoader.loadAd()V which has 20+ callers by other means; get_ref() raises; a full get_operands() sweep returns 0 strings.

Anyone who reaches for androguard to double-check a "zero references" conclusion will get zero, and therefore agreement. The zero-reference result in TARGET-FACTS.md does not come from androguard; it comes from dexutil.py plus raw-byte re-checks of the bodies that would not decode cleanly. This is worth a line in the environment documentation because it is a tool that lies in the direction of the hypothesis being tested.


F8 — Reconciling the two failures: a genuine but unproven loader signal

Recorded as a boundary between what was established and what was guessed, because collapsing them would be its own error.

The launch does show non-standard startup plumbing (observed):

  • E LoaderLog: 10026 / 101004 on the device, 10020 / 101003 on the emulator — an SDK-side loader logging numeric status codes
  • E Instrumentation: Uninitialized ActivityThread, likely app-created Instrumentation, disabling AppComponentFactory — the process is not taking the ordinary ActivityThread path
  • E m.tingfeng.too: Unknown bits set in runtime_flags: 0x40000000

And yet the dex-side packer verdict is clean: no hardening library in the native set, an ordinary application android:name (app.video.guoguo.GApplication), no known packer markers. Those two observations sit in tension.

Not resolved. The LoaderLog emitter was not attributed to a specific class — the string exists in classes2.dex and classes3.dex but the classes that declare it are third-party, and this pass did not trace the call chain. Whether this plumbing is a benign logging SDK, part of the Flutter plugin bootstrap, or a light-weight loader contributing to the abort is unverified. Stating it as established would be exactly the kind of overreach this report is trying to document.